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ABSTRACT

In 1995, the membership of governing boards in colleges in British
Columbia changed from lay persons appointed by the provincial government.
The new boards consisted of fewer lay appointees with the addition of elected
faculty, staff, and students, together with the college presidents and education
council chairs as non-voting members. The presence of employees and students
on boards was viewed by most observers as likely to enhance the quality of
decision-making in general. However, that same presence could introduce an
element of real or potential conflict of interest (Flanigan, 1994).
The broadening o f input and decision-making brought about in the shared
governance model, assuming the constituents could effectively manage the
actual sharing of power, was expected to lead to improved quality of decisions
and also to greater acceptance by stakeholders (Draper and Van Groningen,
1990). Moreover, boards were also the final authority for setting institutional
budgets and were the legislated employers. The established culture of boards
had changed and had affected the boards’ role in general matters through the
sheer presence of different constituents. In matters of finance and labour
relations, boards had to find ways to fulfill their obligations while maintaining their
integrity and credibility.
This quantitative study reported the views and experiences of board
members concerning three aspects of leadership through shared governance in
three decision-making contexts. The study explored the different views and
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experiences among seventeen colleges and between the six constituent groups
of board members, and also identified differences which had emerged since a
similar study conducted by the researcher in 1995/96. Colleges were found to
differ significantly in philosophies and practices toward shared governance,
particularly in relation to conflict of interest and the existence of clear policies and
procedures. Presidents were found to be troubled by internal members’ lack of
independence from their constituencies. The generally negative views overall of
shared governance by presidents, although cited as common by Baliles (1996),
were in marked contrast to the earlier study. In contrast, internal members had
generally reported more positive opinions with the passage o f time, while
external members had remained consistently positive toward shared
governance.
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CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The governing boards of colieges and university colleges in British
Columbia, Canada have been required to face hitherto unaddressed challenges
in fulfilling their decision-making roles by virtue o f recent, far reaching changes in
their membership. Colleges are two year institutions which ofFer a wide range of
programs in the areas of university transfer, vocational and trades, career and
technical, adult education, and non-credit community education. University
colleges are a recent creation in British Columbia and are unique in Canada.
They are essentially comprehensive community colleges with the additional
mandate to offer baccalaureate degrees.
In 1995, an amendment, known as Bill 22, was made to the College and
Institute Act of British Columbia which is the founding legislation of colleges and
university colleges. This amendment resulted in the composition of the boards
being changed from entirely that of lay community members appointed by the
provincial government. In its place, the new boards consist of fewer lay
appointees and the notable addition of faculty, staff, and students elected from
within their own constituencies, together with the president o f the college and the
chair of the education council as non-voting, ex-officio members. The education
1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

councils are faculty dominated, senate-like bodies which were created under the
new legislation and have prescribed advisory (to boards), joint (with boards), and
final authority roles in various areas of decision-making, all of which previously
came within the sole purview of the boards.
The presence of employees and students on the governing boards is
seen by most observers as a positive move by the provincial government and
likely to enhance the quality of decision-making in areas of general responsibility
for boards. However, it is possible that an element of real or perceived conflict of
interest may enter the climate of boards in matters o f finance and labour
relations. Consequently, the former could lead to tension among board members
in reaching decisions on budget allocation, be it in times of growth in resources
or in times of retrenchment, due to the vested interest of the employee and
student members in determining the locus of budget changes. Similarly, the latter
may be fertile ground for dispute when collective agreements are being
negotiated and administered, again because of the vested interest of the
employee and student members. In some cases, those employee and student
board members may even wear two hats simultaneously when also serving as
officers in their trade unions or student associations.
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Statement of the Problem

The problem under investigation in this study was how boards o f colleges
and university colleges in British Columbia have dealt with the change in their
composition, which now includes employees and students, in selected aspects of
boardsmanship applied to areas of decision-making in general matters, financial
matters, and labour relations matters. The aspects of boardsmanship explored in
this study are the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision
making process, and how the real or perceived conflict o f interest of employee
and student board members has been addressed. The views and experiences of
board members since this significant change in the composition and power base
of boards, as expressed by the members themselves, was the focus of this
study.

Background of the Problem

Colleges have had a relatively short history in British Columbia, while
university colleges are a very recent innovation. For the first half of the twentieth
century, post-secondary educational opportunity in the province was extremely
limited.
The University of British Columbia was established in 1915. Enrolment in
1945 was 3,000, and by 1953 reached just over 5,000. One satellite
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college was established in the capital city of Victoria, and these two
campuses, as well as one small private college, represented the sum total
of post-secondary education in British Columbia until 1965. In addition, a
number of vocational training schools were constructed in the province by
the Ministry of Education.
The sixties saw an increase in the college age population as a
result o f the baby boom experienced in Canada after World W ar II, and
the percentage of this population seeking higher education was growing.
In British Columbia, the numbers reached “...18 per cent by 1961,
compared to 12 per cent in Canada as a whole and 40 per cent in the
United States, with projections to 25 per cent by 1971. The University of
British Columbia was projecting an enrolment of 30,000 by 1970—an
unacceptable figure in the view of most academics of that day” (Dennison,
1986, p. 25).
Community colleges, already established in the United States,
were suggested as the answer although academics were split on their
suitability for British Columbia. However, the newly appointed president of
the University o f British Columbia, Dr. John B MacDonald, provided the
lead in his report Higher Education in British Columbia and A Plan for the
Future. He suggested that government create new universities in heavily
populated areas, as well as encourage the establishment of regional
colleges across the province. His reasons were twofold: (1) to take the
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pressure off the universities which were certain to grow; and (2) to create
post-secondary educational opportunities for people in rural areas of
British Columbia. MacDonald stressed the community orientation of the
new institutions “ Two requirements are fundamental to the promotion of
excellence in British Columbia’s higher education. These are first,
diversification of opportunity, both in respect to the kinds of education
experience available and the places where it can be obtained. The
second requirement is self-government of individual institutions in respect
to setting objectives, standards, admissions, selection of staff, curricula,
personnel policies, administrative structure, and all the other things that
go to make up the operation of a college. These two elements—
diversification and self-government— together will not ensure excellence,
but in their absence an excellent system of higher education in British
Columbia would be unattainable” (MacDonald, 1962, p. 19).
The government was quick to respond. Victoria College was made
into a degree granting institution in 1963, becoming the University of
Victoria, and construction of Simon Fraser University commenced in 1964.
The first community college, Vancouver Community College, was created
in 1965 to be followed by Selkirk College the following year. Today, British
Columbia boasts twenty two community colleges, university colleges,
institutes and the Open Learning Agency.
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In 1988, a government study, known as The Access Report,
revealed that British Columbia was producing fewer students with
undergraduate degrees (3.07 per 1,000 of population) than the national
average (4.5 per 1,000). This was partly attributed to the lack of student
spaces at the three provincial universities. As a result, the government
responded in 1989 with the “Access for All” initiative which saw the
creation of the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George
and the conversion of four community colleges into university colleges. A
fifth university college was created a few years later. The new institutions
have sought to create a unique image for themselves rather than simply
try to emulate traditional universities. The focus of their degree
development has been in applied fields which represents an extension of
their training tradition gathered as community colleges. However, as
Dennison (1997) noted, they face pressure from the university sector to
conform to more regular higher education standards; “ Sustained
innovation in the post compulsory education sector has been relatively
rare in Canada. Many institutions, established with optimistic flourish and
noble goals, have been forced into more conventional formats over time.
The university colleges have maintained their commitment to access,
responsiveness, teaching quality, and curricular comprehensiveness. By
any yardstick, they are innovative institutions" (p. 5). (van Toor, 1997)
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The College and Institute Act of British Columbia, under which the
colleges and university colleges in this study operate, clearly articulates specific
decision-making roles for governing boards and education councils. Indeed,
although the scope of the roles did change with the arrival of education councils,
the locus of decision-making was clearly specified both before and after the
legislative amendment known as Bill 22. In effect, these roles are delegated by
the Minister of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology to the boards and
education councils and the roles cannot, in turn, be delegated to any other
parties. With reference to boards, in some areas, such as the setting of general
policy and the establishment of academic rules, the broadening of input and
decision-making brought about by the shared governance model is likely not only
to lead to improved quality of outcomes but also to acceptance by a greater
number of the stakeholders in the institutions. Consequently, shared decisions,
in theory, should lead to ease of implementation of the outcomes; and those
outcomes may well be consistent with the values expressed in the legislation.
However, these positive outcomes anticipated are based on the assumption that
boards can effectively manage the basic task of sharing power among the
constituents to deal with matters of common institutional interest.
Among the boards’ other prescribed responsibilities are finance and
labour relations. Boards are the final decision-making authority in setting the
institutional budgets and ensuring that appropriate resources are allocated to all
departments in the institutions. Additionally, boards are also the employers of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

8

reference as defined in the provincial labour code and, as such, are one of the
parties to every collective agreement. Both these roles require boards to take a
higher moral stance when dealing with the legitimate vested interests of faculty,
staff, and students. The problem may manifest itself when those vested interests
actually infiltrate the boards and their decision-making processes. The erstwhile
independent, disinterested nature of the boards is now being potentially
compromised. In fact, the long established culture of boards has changed and
has even affected the boards’ role in general matters by virtue of the shear
presence of different constituents. As a result o f the new composition of boards,
when it comes to the more overtly troublesome matters of finance and labour
relations, boards have had to discover new ways to fulfill their obligations while
maintaining their integrity and credibility as well as their cohesion. This they have
done by interpreting provincially legislated guidelines and establishing local
bylaws and procedures.
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Importance of the Study

The undemoted diagram highlights the main changes that occurred to the
College and Institute Act as a result of the legislative amendment Bill 22:

Diagram 1: Changes to the College and Institute Act of British Columbia
as a result of Bill 22
Before Bill 22
Objects of a College
To provide comprehensive
(a) courses of study at the first and
second year levels of a baccalaureate
program,
(b) post-secondary education or
training, and
(c) continuing education.
Objects of a University College
No reference before Bill 22.

Board Composition
5 or more members appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council (in
practice, boards generally comprised
around 11 members)
No employee or student shall be
appointed to, or continue as a member
of, the board.

After Bill 22
Objects of a College
Same as before Bill 22.

Obiects of a University College
To provide comprehensive
(a) courses of study for a
baccalaureate degree program,
(b) post-secondary education or
training, and
(c) continuing education.
Board Composition
8 or more persons appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council,
1 elected faculty member,
2 elected students,
1 elected support staff member,
The president, and
The chair of the education council.
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Term o f Office
Not specified, but generally terms of 1,
2, and 3 years for a total of 6 years.
However, there were numerous
exceptions.

Term of Office
Appointed: Same as before Bill 22,
Faculty and support staff: 3 years, and
may be elected to further terms,
Students: 1 year, and may be elected
to further terms, and
President and chair of education
council: ex-officio.

(Selected) Powers of Board
Shall manage, administer, and direct
the affairs of the institution.

(Selected) Powers of Board
Shall manage, administer, and direct
the affairs of the institution, subject to
the powers of the education council.

Shall manage and promote the
educational or training programs.

Shall manage and promote the
educational and training programs,
subject to powers of the education
council.

Shall administer funds, grants, fees,
endowments, and other assets.

Same as before Bill 22.

Student Union (Association)
No reference before Bill 22.

Student Union (Association)
Board will assess and collect student
union fees, subject to certain financial
reporting requirements.

Advisorv Role of the Education Council
No reference before Bill 22.

Advisory Role of the Education Council
An education council must advise the
board, and the board must seek advice
from the education council, on
development of education policy on
(a) mission and goals,
(b) implementation of courses and
programs,
(c) reports after implementation of noncredit courses and contract programs,
(d) implementation priorities for new
courses and programs,
(e) cancellation of courses and
programs,
(f) evaluation of programs and
educational services,
(g) policies concerning library and
resource centres,
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(h) setting the academic schedule,
(1) policies on faculty member
qualifications,
(j) procedure for student discipline
appeals,
(k) terms for affiliation with other post
secondary bodies,
(1) consultation with community and
program advisory groups,
(m) qualifications for admission
policies,
(n) criteria for awarding certificates,
diplomas, and degrees, and
(o) other matters specified by board.
Powers of the Education Council
No reference before Bill 22.

Powers of the Education Council
(a) make bylaws,
(b) set policies on examinations and
student evaluations,
(c) set policies on student withdrawal
from courses, programs, and the
institution,
(d) set criteria for academic standing,
academic standards, and the grading
system,
(e) set criteria for awards recognizing
academic excellence,
(f) set policies and procedures for
appeals by students on academic
matters and establish a final appeal
tribunal for these appeals, and
(g) set curriculum content.

Joint Board and Education Council
Approval
No reference before Bill 22.

Joint Board and Education Council
Approval
(a) curriculum evaluation for
equivalency from other institutions,
(b) curriculum evaluation for
equivalency between departments of
the institution, and
(c) other responsibilities of the board
that, on the initiative of the board, the
board and education council agree are
subject to joint approval.
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Bill 22 provided a framework for the introduction of shared governance in
British Columbia. W hile quite prescriptive in some areas, there are also other
areas which are very loosely written and allow for local interpretation and
implementation at each institution. A good example is the advisory powers of the
education council on policies. It is not clear whether the powers relate only to the
development of policies or also extend to the implementation o f such policies.
The language is ambiguous. This begs the broader question “Is the role of the
education council one of governance or administration?”. Such ambiguity was a
stated intention when the legislation was drafted. As a result, it is highly likely
that institutions have differed in their approach to constructing the shared
governance model, particularly in areas where they were given the greatest
discretion; and this was explored in the study.
Bill 22 had quite a checkered history from its inception as part of the
election manifesto o f the then party in opposition in the British Columbia
Legislature to the final amendment to the College and Institute Act. The purpose
of adding internal constituents to hitherto external boards of governance was
deemed to “...put the community back into community colleges" by the Canadian
Federation of Students (1992, p. 2) in one of many submissions from interest
groups solicited by the new government once the change in legislation came to
be drafted. However the Advanced Education Council of British Columbia (1994),
representing the institutional boards of the day, argued that colleges were owned
by their communities, that is the external communities-at-large not the
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employees and students. Consequently, it felt that boards appointed by the
provincial government, i.e. the status quo, best reflected the nature of community
ownership. Others saw the change to governance in colleges coming as a direct
result of the recent creation of university colleges and their closer relationship
and resemblance to universities. Malaspina University College (1993), in a paper
contemplating its elevation to degree granting status, suggested that the
credibility of such degrees would be dependent upon a more formal involvement
of internal interests, notably those of faculty, in decision-making. In particular, it
saw the then proposed education councils on academic affairs as being the
formalization of curriculum committees which university colleges had voluntarily
moved quickly to establish in order to satisfy standards’ requirements in the
university sector.
The volatile educational climate in British Columbia at the time of the
drafting of Bill 22 provides an interesting backdrop to the eventual legislation and
the focus of this study. Collective bargaining, which had been conducted locally
between individual boards/administrations and union locals throughout the
history of colleges in British Columbia, was being legislated into a two-tier model
of provincial negotiations on monetary items and local negotiations on the more
professional type of items contained in collective agreements. It is fair to say that
this change was more favoured by trade unions looking for a larger, more
productive bargaining arena than it was by boards and administrations. The
College and Institute Educators' Association of British Columbia (1994), in a
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submission to the drafters of Bill 22, drew very clear comparisons between the
planned changes in labour relations and governance. The Association advocated
collaboration between trade unions and student unions (associations) and
interaction between unions and college boards, particularly once the latter
included faculty, staff, and student members. Interestingly, the Canadian
Federation of Students (1992) suggested to the provincial government that
government appointed board members inevitably yielded to “...partisan political
pressure” in order to ensure re-appointment whereas elected internal members
would have no such temptation (p. 2). The Federation further argued that
“...student unions are akin to labour unions in that their primary purpose is to
collectively negotiate for and represent their members” (p. 4). There emerged,
therefore, a clear indication o f a faculty, staff, and student alliance to pursue a
government legislated shift in power simultaneously in both the labour relations
and governance fields.
The submissions which were made to the provincial government as it
drafted Bill 22 were quite polarized in nature and reflect much o f the diversity
which has emerged in North American literature on the subject of shared
governance in general. Firstly, it is important to note the elements of the political
manifesto of the New Democratic Party (1990) which formed the basis for the
whole legislative change:
•

There will be multi-year budgeting [i. e. funding] for colleges [this has
not been enacted by 1998];
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•

There will be internal representation on college boards and senates
[enacted in 1995];

•

Tuition and supplementary fees will be frozen [eventually implemented
in 1996 and still in force in 1998];

•

Funding for continuing education administration will be restored [not
enacted] and funding will be provided to private business and
community groups to deliver non-credit continuing education [enacted];
and

•

Private institutions will be brought under governmental control
[enacted], (pp. 1-13)

The manifesto clearly represented a significant change to the status quo as far
as governance was concerned. And it brought somewhat predictable responses.
A special task force comprising representation from boards, administration,
faculty, staff, and students struggled for consensus but eventually managed to
stress the need for clear legislation, whatever the eventual composition and role
for college boards. In addition, it was suggested that internal members should
only form a minority on boards; and clear guidelines as to conflict o f interest and
accountability would be required. Furthermore, it called for government to
provide clear expectations o f the roles of boards, education councils, and
presidents (Report of the Committee on Governance in Colleges and Institutes,
1993). In a more direct retort, the Advanced Education Council of British
Columbia (1994), representing boards consisting solely of appointed members at
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that time, advocated little change. It suggested that boards, with a minority of
internal members, should consult with constituency groups but should retain final
decision-making power on all matters over which they had legislated jurisdiction.
Further, constituency groups might include educational councils. Each institution
should have the discretion whether or not to create such a body.
The trade unions were obviously more supportive of the notion o f shared
governance than existing boards but were less prescriptive as to what the
legislation should look like. What was clear, however, was the expectation that
internal members would play a full voting role on boards and education councils,
the latter dominated by faculty, and would have extensive decision-making
power on academic matters and perhaps even on other matters. In addition, it
was suggested that the unions should develop "...appropriate conflict of interest
guidelines as a model for consideration by locals, institutional boards, the
Advanced Education Council, and the Ministry [o f Advanced Education, Training,
and Technology]” (College and Institute Educators’ Association Committee on
Governance Implementation, 1994). At the end o f the day, the finalization of Bill
22 assumed legendary status with the most popular version being that the
legislation was penned by representatives of government and the academic
faculty unions, behind closed doors and to the exclusion of all other interested
parties.
One significant aspect of the legislation is the absence of any formal
evaluation of the change that it brought. While institutions go through a routine
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self evaluation every five years where examination of governance is included, it
is but one of many areas of focus and, subsequently, it is unlikely that the new
governance models would be reviewed in any great depth. This lack of
evaluation is all the more regrettable because each college is likely to have
developed a slightly different structure and modus operandi. This study,
therefore, focused on the views and potential differences of the board members
themselves as a first step in discerning whether the intent of the legislated
change has been effective in certain aspects and contexts o f decision-making.
Thereafter, the study examined what might be the leadership implications for
engaging this new collection of members who come from a variety of campus
constituencies.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the new
composition of boards influences three aspects of leadership through shared
governance: 1.) The sharing of power, 2.) The effectiveness of the shared
decision-making process, and 3.) How real or perceived conflict of interest
because of the employment or student status of some o f the board members has
been addressed. These aspects of leadership were studied in three particular
contexts, namely board decision-making in general matters of business, in
financial matters, and in the field of labour relations.
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The impact of the change in membership of the boards as a result of Bill
22 was explored through the anticipated differing views and experiences of the
board members themselves. The researcher sought to find if differences
emerged among colleges based on the likelihood that they have adopted
different strategies in interpreting the legislation. Further, the potential for
differences among members was examined, by virtue of the constituency from
which they emanate, namely appointed members; elected faculty; elected staff;
elected students; ex-officio presidents; and ex-officio chairs of education council.
Finally, the results of the study were compared with a similar study conducted by
the researcher in early 1996 to see if the passage of time since Bill 22 was
enacted had changed board members’ views.

Conceptual Framework

Boards of governance in colleges play a definite yet unusual role. Clearly,
the boards have power, much of which is established by legislation, and, through
their decision-making role, they have the ability to set the direction for colleges
and achieve long term impact through their policy formulation role was noted by
Piland (1994). And yet, the boards sometimes seem to lead from behind
because colleges have very democratic cultures, far more so than other
organizations outside of the education sector. In a college, there are many
leaders including administrators, both individually and collectively, and, faculty
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who tend to assume power collectively on matters such as academic standards
and to wield power individually on matters such as curriculum.
Leadership in colleges is, therefore, quite fragmented and the power that
is vested in those leadership roles is held quite jealously. The notion of
ownership in decision-making in specific areas, e.g. curriculum for faculty and
budget for board and administration, and the reluctance to concede it is central
to the power struggle noted by many authors including Edelfelt (1982) and
Kanter (1994). This somewhat tense, web-like structure functions through the
existence of a clear, consistently applied process of consideration of issues and
decision-making. Indeed, process is paramount to the peaceful climate of a
college campus and, frequently, the nature of the process appears to be more
important than the actual decision itself. When process breaks down, a college
moves into a turmoil where the legitimate leadership is quickly called into
question.
As noted earlier, this distributed leadership/power model is unique to the
three levels of education—schools, colleges, and universities. The uniqueness
comes from the sense held by the faculty, staff, and students of having a right to
be involved in decision-making, whereas, in other organizations, devolution of
power remains a voluntary action on the part of those occupying traditional
leadership roles. Trust plays a significantly important part in shared governance
and Lovas (1994) noted “...[ it ] requires that everyone have integrity in dealing
with other groups which is hard when there are conflicting loyalties as we often
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find in the collegial environment” (p. 22). Moreover, inclusion o f employees and
students on college boards in British Columbia represented a major move
forward from the leadership roles which these internal members previously had
held. This is because o f the nature of board business and the consequences of
its outcomes. The entrance by internal members into new areas of decision
making with the attendant issues that arise was one of the m ajor focuses of this
study. Faculty, staff, and students clearly have a different interest in matters of
finance and labour relations than do appointed lay members o f a board because
the decisions to be made by that board will potentially affect their employment or
program of studies. In addition, there may be other more general issues of
decision-making that also have the same affect on employment and studies.
Employee and student board members, therefore, have strong vested interests
in board decisions. But, does that represent conflict of interest? Can boards
function independently, with the expected degree of integrity and accountability,
while containing members who stand to gain or lose from the decisions they
make? The legislation, which created shared governance in British Columbia,
assumed that boards could function appropriately. But, it then left individual
colleges to make the necessary arrangements according to their own culture and
history with only limited guidelines on conflict of interest. The potential for
differing outcomes was, therefore, worthy of review.
This study investigated the three aspects of board leadership, namely the
sharing of power among quite different constituents, often with a history of
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tension and confrontation; the existence of decision-making process in the
shared governance model; and how the real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members has been addressed. These aspects of
boardsmanship were viewed through three contexts o f decision-making in the
expectation that differing results might be generated. These decision-making
contexts were general board matters, financial matters, and matters of labour
relations; for the literature suggests that shared governance can be very
successful in the first context but can be difficult to sustain in the second and
third contexts.

Diagram 2: Study of the Aspects of Leadership in the Context of Certain
Decision-Making Areas
Aspects of Leadership through Governance

Sharing of
Power

Context
of
Board
DecisionMaking

Effectiveness of
the Shared
Decision-Making
Process

Addressing Conflict
of Interest

General
Matters
Financial
Matters
Labour
Relations
Matters
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Research Questions

This study sought to answer the following questions in relation to selected
aspects of boardsmanship required in the shared governance model in the
context of selected areas of decision-making:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in
certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived
conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and
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how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.

Diagram 3: Study of Aspects o f Leadership in the Context o f Certain
Decision-Making Areas. Examined through Three Lenses
Aspects of Leadership through Governance
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Board
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Statement of Hypotheses

The legislative amendment which brought shared governance to British
Columbia is alternatively prescriptive and liberal in detail, therefore, it is
conceivable that differing outcomes might have emerged in how institutions have
chosen to operate. In addition, the disparate backgrounds of the boards’
memberships might also lead to differing views on how the shared governance
model functions. However, there is also a good deal of literature to suggest
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predictable outcomes based on experiences in other provinces and states.
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are stated in the null form:
H1. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning the sharing o f power in the shared governance
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour matters.
H2. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning the effectiveness of the shared decision-making
process in the shared governance model fo r decision-making in general matters
of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H3. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning how real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members has been addressed in the shared
governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial
matters, and labour matters.
H4. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the sharing of power in the
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour matters.
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H5. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the effectiveness of the
shared decision-making process in the shared governance model for decision
making in general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H6. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn, i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning how real or perceived
conflict of interest o f employee and student board members has been addressed
in the shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H7. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning the
sharing of power in the shared governance model fo r decision-making in general
matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
H8. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the shared governance
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour matters.
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H9. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning how
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board members
has been addressed in the shared governance model for decision-making in
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.

Assumptions of the Study

This study was predicated on the belief that there is need to expand the
body of knowledge on shared governance in general in the education setting
and, in particular, to start building a body of knowledge based on the experience
of introducing shared governance into the college and university college sectors
of British Columbia. It is assumed that, in the absence of specific formal
evaluation tools attached to the governance legislation, board members would
acknowledge this shortcoming and would view the study as warranted and
useful. Consequently, it was anticipated that at least a representative number of
board members would choose to participate in this study. Representation in this
context extended both to the potential of seventeen institutions and six
constituencies of membership, namely lay appointees by the provincial
government, elected faculty members, elected support staff members, elected
student members, and the ex-officio positions of college president and chair of
the educational council.
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Further, it was assumed that the office of the researcher did not adversely
influence participation in the study. The researcher holds a senior administrative
position in a British Columbia university college and, consequently, plays an
active part in the shared governance model at his institution. In addition, a further
potential complication was his position vis-d-vis the employee and student
members of his institution's board which can be characterized as indirectly
supervisory. However, it is assumed that participation in the study was based on
willingness to be involved in an academic exercise rather than any implied
obligation that might be construed due to the nature o f the researcher’s status.

Delimitations of the Study

The study focused entirely on members of the boards o f governance of
the colleges and university colleges of British Columbia. Its purpose was to elicit
board members’ views of and experiences with the shared governance models
that have been developed in response to Bill 22. The impact of the legislation
might reasonably be expected to extend to other stakeholders, including
legislators, media, the general public, and constituencies from which some
members have been elected, i.e. the faculty, support staff, and student
populations at large. However, that speaks to further fields of study, and this
particular study was deliberately confined to board members.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
Limitations of the Study

Participation in the study was entirely voluntary and called for donation of
time by board members who virtually all have other occupations and
commitments. In addition, membership of boards is fairly volatile and any
number of new members may have felt that they did not have the experience of
college boardsmanship necessary to complete the survey instrument. This
possibility was addressed to some extent by trying to include former board
members rather than new members where the replacement took place in the
weeks immediately prior to the study.
In the two month period before and during the study, five presidents
announced their resignation or retirement. This is an abnormally high number out
of a total of seventeen. While it would appear that these significant decisions did
not affect willingness to participate in the study, it is possible that the data
provided by the individuals was affected by their recent decisions. However, it is
impossible to ascertain the impact of these events.
Concurrent with the study has been a concerted effort on the part of
boards, trade unions, and student unions to lobby government about the funding
crisis facing the British Columbia post-secondary education system. The time
has been described as a crossroads for education and has prompted an
advocacy alliance among the players which is virtually unheard of in British
Columbia. This initiative may have had an affect on the study. While some
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boards may have seen the study as an opportunity to further express concerns,
others may have seen it as the less important of two tasks and declined to
participate. Again, it is impossible to quantify the possible impact.
In the period of follow-up to initial returns of questionnaires, when board
members who had not participated were being encouraged to think again about
doing so, Canada was faced with the prolonged threat o f a postal strike.
Ultimately, the strike did take place and lasted seventeen days. This may have
had some negative impact on further participation. An alternative method of
returning questionnaires by fax was initiated but may not have been convenient
for all potential respondents.
Finally, it must be recorded that the researcher’s closeness to the subject
matter through his employment may have influenced the choice of some board
members to participate. In this regard, separation of the roles of research and
employment was stressed as much as possible to the potential participants in all
correspondence and material pertaining to the overall study and questionnaire.

Specific Term inology

For the purposes of this study, the undemoted terms are defined thus:
Shared governance: a structure of leadership involving employees and
students as well as provincially appointed trustees which has full, legislated
decision-making powers in defined situations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30
Post-Secondary Education In stitu tio n s : colleges, university colleges,
institutes, and universities. Note, this study was confined to the first two
institutions and one example of the third. In the study, they are often referred to
collectively as colleges, unless some distinction is to be made.
Board: a body empowered by the College and Institute Act of British Columbia
to govern an institution in prescribed areas.
Education C ouncil: a body of employees and students empowered by the Act
to govern and administer in an institution other than a university in certain
prescribed areas and in others at the discretion of the board.
College and Institute A ct: legislation which establishes and regulates post
secondary institutions in British Columbia with the exception of universities.
B ill 22: the amendment to the Act which introduced and specified shared
governance.
A ppointed Board Member: a member of the community, who is not an
employee or student, appointed to the board by the provincial government.
Elected Board Member: an employee (faculty member or support staff member)
or student who is elected to the board by his/her constituency.
C onstituency: the sector of the college population or the general community
from which a board member has been appointed or elected or qualifies for an ex
officio position on the board.
C onstituent: an appointed, elected, or ex-officio board member who has been
drawn from one of the six constituencies noted in this study, i.e. government
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appointed lay persons, faculty, support staff, student, president, or chair o f the
education council.

Organization o f the Study

Chapter I contains the statement o f the problem, the background of the
problem, the importance o f the study, the purpose o f the study, the conceptual
framework within which the study was constructed, the research questions to be
examined, statement of the hypotheses, assumptions o f the study, delimitations
of the study, limitations of the study, and specific terminology used in the study.
Chapter II contains a review o f literature including the definition of shared
governance, description of the background to the development o f shared
governance, discussion of the issues surrounding shared governance, and the
advantages and disadvantages of shared governance. Chapter III contains a
methodological overview, the research design of the study, discussion of the
validity and reliability of the data, entry to the population participating in the
study, selection of the sites and subjects, protection of the subjects, approach to
the data analysis, and background of the researcher. Chapter IV contains
presentation and discussion of the findings o f the study including focus on the
descriptive statistics, comparative statistics, and the practical significance of the
study. Chapter V contains the conclusions, i.e. the relationship between the
hypotheses and the findings, and the recommendations regarding
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implementation of the findings and suggestions for further research. The main
chapters are followed by a reference list and appendices containing
documentation used in the study and the tabulated analysis of the raw data
obtained from the questionnaires.
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CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Shared governance in a broad sense is a popular topic for discussion and
study. It ties into contemporary views on leadership as they move away from
models of exclusiveness, the great man theories, towards models o f
inclusiveness and collaboration. In addition, there are obvious links to the quality
movement based on the premises that an organization will be more effective
through shared decision-making, and the individual participant will be more
motivated through a sense of contribution and belonging.
The sharing o f powers traditionally held in an organization by the board
and the chief executive officer is occurring throughout the public and private
sectors to varying extents. The experience in education differs somewhat in that
the university sector has a long tradition of limited shared governance which
stems more from the culture of a community of learning than other organizational
cultures. The school and college sectors have gradually followed the university
path with accelerated progress occurring in the last twenty-five years but with the
fundamental difference that these sectors have, at the same time, become
unionized to a far greater extent than their senior counterpart. This potential
clash of cultures provided a strong undercurrent in this study as the sharing of
33
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power among participants who have a history of confrontation was explored. The
decision-making tasks of boards fall into two categories, those where internal
and external members have no particular vested interest and those where the
internal members would appear to have vested interest on account of their
employee or student status. The form er may still cause tension between internal
and external members if power sharing and decision-making procedures are not
carefully planned. However, the latter will almost certainly cause tension unless
the real or, at least, perceived conflict of interest on the part of the internal
members is handled in a way which is satisfactory to all board members.
Boards and senior management traditionally play significant roles in the
financial affairs and labour relations of an organization. This is especially true in
the education sector. Shared decision-making in these areas would appear to
take on far greater significance with the likelihood of conflict than, say, curriculum
or student affairs where the locus of ownership is not so fiercely contested.
This review of literature explored the views and experiences of educators
and governors in shared governance models across North America. It focused
on the research questions which were posed in this study:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain
aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness
of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict
of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
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when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected
faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and education
council chairs, in certain aspects o f boardsmanship, namely the sharing of
power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in
respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and labour
relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of
interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The information derived from the literature was intended to provide a backdrop to
the drama of shared governance and to offer experiential insight and opinion on
the aspects o f leadership in three contexts of decision-making under review in
this study.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
This chapter contains the definition of shared governance, background to
the development of shared governance, discussion of the issues surrounding
shared governance central to this study including a general perspective and
those of financial affairs and labour relations, and the advantages and
disadvantages o f shared governance. The issues of a general perspective
discussed include roles to be played, influence of the president, consensus and
representation, the scope of involvement in shared decision-making, an advisory
or decision-making role and the impact on middle managers, structures and
relationships, the importance of shared governance for students, and faculty and
support staff attitudes.

Definition of Shared Governance

Shared governance is not a precise science with universal application. It
is a sharing of power brought about by changing processes to suit the culture of
the organization and, thus, will differ accordingly in terms of approach,
expectations, and outcomes. Lovas (1984) noted that “...shared governance is
both an opportunity and a risk...[it] truly means shared responsibility and
authority but not necessarily equally shared power or decision-making” (p. 22).
Therefore, it is immediately noted that there is no standard approach. Draper and
Van Groningen (1990) suggested that there is quite a range to the degrees of
power sharing:
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There are many definitions of shared governance circulating in the field.
At one end o f the continuum are formalized structures of process and
procedure; at the other end are largely informal and simple means for
getting people involved in decisions. Leadership styles are often the key,
but district history - particularly with collective bargaining - seems to play a
major role in determining to what extent shared governance is formal or
informal, and to what extent it can succeed, (p. 11)

This issue of formal/informal structure, often expressed as the right to make
decisions versus the right to offer advice to those who would make the decisions,
is an important one which will be explored later in greater detail.
Reil and Sodemnan (1993) noted the underlying philosophy upon which
shared governance is founded:
Wisdom and common sense tells us that decisions based on shared
values and made by the stakeholders in those decisions who are
responsible fo r acting are going to have more commitment and chance of
success than those that don’t. Along with common sense, there is a good
deal of research, both in and out of schools, that corroborates this basic
tenet, (p. 2)
Accordingly, decisions made by those most affected and grounded in common
values are likely to be successful. Wood (1991), in a study of internal board
members in a shared governance model in a college system, found “Most
institutional members and the presidents of their associations considered the
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composition o f their boards to be an important reflection of values and beliefs
about collegiality, participation, and professionalism in higher education
organizations” (p. 360). Inclusion of interested parties is one thing, arriving at
common values may be another. Inevitably, a sharing of power brings together
players o f disparate backgrounds and beliefs, not to mention goals and
objectives. For a decision-making model to function under these conditions,
there is a fundamental requirement that trust pervade the entire culture. This was
noted by Draper and Van Droningen (pp. 12-13) and many other authors. Bogen
and Moskus (1992) compared shared governance to a marriage and suggested
both require to be “...a relationship based on a strong commitment, mutual
support, shared understanding of roles, honest communication, and trust” (p.
11).

The values of shared decision-making are consistent with those of
progressive educational institutions. Later in this chapter, the correlation will be
noted between student success, faculty satisfaction, and the sharing of power.
Mahon (1994) drew the comparison between shared governance as a process
and total quality management as a process of continuous incremental
improvement based on the Japanese concept of Kaizen. However, he noted “I
cannot stress enough that TQM and shared governance are processes. They
are not quick fixes" (p. 9).
Education is not a static entity. Education is about change. Freire (as cited
in Harris, 1996) described education as an agent of action as opposed to being a
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simple provider of knowledge, for its own sake. In this vein, Rost (1993) opined
that shared governance is leadership that leads to real, intended change, while
management is more about efficiently and effectively maintaining the status quo.
This notion of change and innovation being linked to shared decision-making is
further supported by Lau (1996), “The need for shared governance is not as
great when resources are available to support the majority of the program
requests" (p. 5). Therefore, the need for innovation when times are tough can be
met through the collaborative governance structure. From this, change can be
brought about because of the stakeholder inclusiveness. Such change is often
not dramatic but, rather, is a gradual process of building small success stories,
one at a time. In due course, systemic change can occur incrementally through
participative decision-making (Lappe and DuBois, 1994).
It has been seen that shared decision-making can exist in different forms
and is generally reflective of the organization’s established culture. The
differences that exist between universities, where shared governance is firmly
established, and schools and colleges, where it is still in the process of being
established, were explored. Clearly the cultures of these educational subsectors
differ and this may have significant affect on the sharing of power. Southern
Methodist University (1979) observed in a report that governance of universities
is unlike that of corporations in that power tends to reside in the faculty and is
directed upward, whereas, in the latter, power resides in the board and senior
management and is directed downward. This very unique climate of universities
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might be considered to readily facilitate the concept of shared governance in an
informal sense and even encourage its formalization. It was found that colleges
and schools are considered more akin to corporations than universities in their
governance structure, and hence the experience of sharing differs accordingly.

Background to the Development of Shared Governance

1. Institutional Planning and For What?

“Shared governance may be the only way to restore order, tranquillity, and
morality in our public institutions” espoused Thomas (1979, pp. 1-2). He then
went on to list the characteristics, and not from a perspective of strengths, of
institutions as seen by social scientists:
1. Most of our public institutions, once established, tend to spend a great
deal of time and money to maintain themselves;
2. Public institutions, in their concern to maintain themselves, tend to
forget their original purpose for which they were established;
3. Leadership in public institutions has a tendency to forget that the
institutions were set up to benefit clients and not the personal goals of
their leaders;
4. Public institutions, like schools, tend to create conflicting interests
between teachers and administration;
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5. Accountability in public institutions is difficult to achieve; and
6. Public institutions talk a great deal about equity and justice but have
difficulty establishing it.
Munitz (1995) found that views of educational institutions have not changed
much from those of public institutions fifteen years on. He stated “Surveys show
that voters in many states now view public colleges and universities much as
they do other public agencies: self-regarding bureaucracies wasting too many
taxpayer dollars” (p. 10). Is this a system swaying on its philosophical and moral
principles? By adjusting the locus of power and decision-making, can the
foundation principles be reinforced? There is strong suggestion that decision
making based on consensus of all stakeholders tends to be more ethically
principled than when based on power alone. Whether the introduction of shared
governance does begin to address the systemic shortcomings leveled at
education were further explored.
Decision-making is an important contributor to the climate of an institution.
Roueche and Baker (as cited in Deas, 1994) noted that it ranked along with
leadership, motivation, and communications as the keys to a climate for
excellence. Thus, it is suggested that the model of decision-making is crucial to
achievement of excellence. Many of the shortcomings attributed to education are
to do with its inability or unwillingness to engage in long term planning. The
historically short tenure of college presidents probably precludes their adopting
anything other than a short term perspective, suggested Boggs (cited in Baker,
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1995), however, boards could and should be able to take a long term view in
institutional planning (pp. 33-34). While the apparent favouring of short term,
multi-directional goals may also be the result of a lack of governmental
commitment and consistency, it tends to reinforce the notion of educational selfcenteredness. Phelan, Kirkland, and Freed (1993) cited six areas o f inhibition
towards long term institutional planning:
1. A majority of institutions plan from year to year rather than for long
term. Crisis management becomes the norm. No formal mechanism
integrates departmental or institutional efforts;
2. The external environment is evaluated infrequently...and the institution
does not have the broad view necessary to make appropriate
decisions. Leaders may be unaware of external factors posing threats
or offering opportunities;
3. The internal environment is seldom assessed. Thus, the institution is
unable to identify its own strengths and weaknesses;
4. The relationship between institutional resource allocation and goals is
commonly ignored. Consequently, the institution is unable to respond
to emerging needs;
5. Institutions often evaluate their performance on revenues and
expenditures, encouraging spending rather than working to achieve
goals; and
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6. Institutional mission statements are not used to guide the organization.
Rather than providing a pragmatic guide for the future, mission
statements simply adorn college catalogs and presidential offices.
(P- 3).
The need for change within an institution frequently comes from external
pressure, and a commitment to long term and strategic planning affords the
institution the opportunity to control and influence the change. This would appear
to suggest a likely correlation between a commitment to planning and a shared
governance structure made up of those who will be affected by the change.
Thus, the governance structure may itself be seen as the change agent.
However, Dennison (1994) noted that colleges do not historically have well
established shared governance structures. This is due to colleges having their
roots in the public school system, as opposed to the university system, with the
consequent lack of professionalism among the faculty and a preponderance of
trade unionism (pp. 32-33). This absence of tradition in shared decision-making
was strongly suggested by Giles (1981) as contributing to ineffectual college
boards. She opined that external, lay board members lack the investment in the
college enterprise and are not prepared to spend the time necessary. “Good
governance is a full time job" (Giles, p. 22). Wood (1991) concurred with Giles’
view, “The power of the boards of governors is limited by a number of factors
such as their part-time involvement, the expertise of the presidents, and the
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technical nature o f the decision-making. A number of research studies conducted
in a variety of settings support this analysis” (p. 333).
The message that emerged, therefore, is that colleges have not been
seen as strong on long term planning because of several internal and external
factors. Boards were viewed as being capable of adopting the necessary long
term view, however, authors tended to doubt the boards’ ability and commitment,
especially in the 1970's and 1980’s. It was evident that the arrival of shared
governance, with the inclusion of committed and knowledgeable internal
members, was seen as the way to bring about improvement of institutional
planning performance.

2. A Climate of Confrontation.

As a concept, the sharing of governance is relatively simple. Where the
difficulties appear to develop is how it is perceived, and how the participants
choose to behave. Rather than a sharing, there is much to suggest that
governance changes represent more of a shift in power. This was noted by
Lovas (1994) and as faculty and administrators both perceive the shift, and
corresponding gain/loss o f power, the author questions whether true sharing is
ever possible. Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) also acknowledged the shift in
power but suggested that there are mutual obligations among
boards/administrators and faculty, “Those in positions of power need to let go of
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their concentrated authority, and those newly participating need to look at
problems and solutions from a college wide perspective” (p. 21). The notion of
ownership in decision-making in specific areas, e.g. curriculum for faculty and
budget for trustees and administration, and the reluctance to concede it is center
to the power struggle noted by many authors including Edelfelt (1982) and
Kanter (1994).
It would appear that a sharing of decision-making, perhaps presenting a
win-win situation to the confrontationists, is more likely to occur in an informal
setting rather than under prescriptive legislation. Kanter (1994) observed that the
early 1990’s experience among community colleges going through the
development of shared governance in California was that “...when behaviour is
legislated, issues become polarized and often much more complicated than they
were originally envisioned” (p. 229). Certainly, as noted by Lovas (1994), rigidity
of positions is the antithesis of effective power sharing —“Blessed are the
flexible, for they shall not be bent out of shape" (p. 14). This holding of power is
often effected by committees with specific responsibilities. As a result, they tend
not to acquire a big picture perspective but, rather, jealously hold onto their
authority in a narrow context. Acebo (1992) suggested that colleges are not by
nature collegial:
W hile the concept of a team is easily grasped, and most people have
experienced at least some aspect of the power of the team, the collegial
setting has precious few of them. Instead, colleges generally have an
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abundance of committees, and committees are not teams— nor are
academic divisions, administrative cabinets, and boards of trustees, (p. 9)
This lack of cohesion frequently leads to confrontation between groups on
campus. The “...turf wars between governing boards, senates, and unions” was
an example of confrontation cited by Nussbaum (1995) where overlapping
interests collide. This tension will be further explored in the context of decision
making in a labour relations environment.
What is the nature of the traditional college and school governance and
administrative structures that it makes it seem so difficult to change? Reyes and
McCarty (1986) observed that while educational institutions are sometimes seen,
and this is an image which they themselves encourage, as a community of
scholars in which governance is shared, this is more true of universities than
colleges and schools. The latter are quite bureaucratic in nature, particularly
where there is a heavy union presence (pp. 1-24). This observation was echoed
by Piland and Butte (1991, p. 6).
The main characteristic of a bureaucracy is a power base founded on a
top/down principle, where decision-making resides at the top and involvement of
others is generally on an advisory basis if there is a role at all. The notion of a
community and its involvement in governing the institution is not prevalent in a
bureaucracy:
The concept of community within the institution of higher learning cannot
survive if the power of administration is thought of as a supreme echelon

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47
in a hierarchy o f authority, if the concept of hierarchy is acceptable within
a college, the administration becomes the fount of authority from which
faculty, students, and alumni draw their respective roles and under whose
direction and control all activity is performed. Such a concept of
authority...is alien to the great social purpose of higher education and
does not conform with the facts o f academic life. On the other hand, when
the power o f administration is conceived as a constituent element of a
community o f power, then the functions of that power are more definitely
prescribed, and the limitations o f that power are more clearly understood.
(Mann, 1968, p. 2)
Thus, the concepts of community, consensus, and social purpose are
established in contrast to the absolute power of a hierarchical bureaucracy.
Furthermore, Lau (1996) noted, “Genuine involvement produces identifiable
results capable o f providing satisfaction separate from the decisions themselves.
The results are then the product of the whole, and accountability to the affected
groups are from those groups that were involved in the process. The
interdependency o f the relationships within the organization maintains a state of
balance between the competing groups” (pp. 3-4).
Notwithstanding the common good that may be seen to derive from
shared governance, there remains the clash of confrontation and consensus
seeking. W hile the latter is noted as the academic way by Polishook and Naples
(1989, p. 2) and provides the foundation to the shared governance model, a
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stark anomaly can occur when it is situated in a confrontational unionized
environment. The anomaly is that faculty and support staff players may be called
upon to simultaneously adopt positions of opposite value, consensus in decision
making and confrontation in collective bargaining.
In this tense arena of alternating collaboration and confrontation, one
common theme pervades the literature as being absolutely essential to the
success of shared governance. That theme is trust. Its importance is constantly
stressed, and yet its absence is frequently noted with sadness. Mitchell, Grant,
and Rossa stated “...shared governance depends upon trust, a trust that is best
built upon positive experiences with the process and a sincere conviction that the
advantages of having the best minds collectively steer a course for the college
far outweigh any disadvantages, real or imagined” (p. 22). However, the doubts
exist. Dennison (1994) observed that questions of conflict of interest and the
relationship between internal board members and the constituencies from which
they are drawn are so often raised without satisfactory answers as to seriously
undermine the shared governance structure (pp. 26-27). Indeed, Nussbaum
(1995) found, in a study of the views of both college presidents and senate
presidents, that neither believed that trust and cooperation had been enhanced
with the advent of the shared decision-making model (p. 24). Furthermore, Trani
(1997) suggested that the ongoing, perhaps escalating, tension that has been
associated with shared governance has caused noticeable weakening of the
institutional presidency. “The authority of the university and college presidents is
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being undercut by all of its partners—trustees, faculty members, and political
leaders” (p. 16).
Wirth (1991) also identified the potential weakness in participative
decision-making that exists because only relatively few faculty and staff are likely
to have lead roles and thus, they have the opportunity to impose their own
will,“...it is all too easy to take advantage of the power vacuums which
temporarily exist in the early stages of shared governance and impose one’s own
view without appropriate consultation with other faculty” (p. 4). Even in a climate
of consensus seeking there may exist, therefore, the natural tendency to assume
individual power. Several authors, including Nussbaum (1995), suggested the
need for institutions to develop a code of ethics to guide the behaviour of
participants (pp. 57-58). While this may appear to go against the desire to avoid
prescriptive legislation noted earlier, it may be the answer. For, it is clear that the
internal constituents of colleges—administration, faculty, staff, and students—are
not necessarily natural partners. A history of confrontation and the continuing
tension of industrial style labour relations may mean that it will take more time
than regulations, or perhaps a combination of the two, before the necessary
trusting relationships between the traditional appointed or elected boards of
governors are established.
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3. State/Provincial Centralization of Boards’ Responsibilities.

A third and final setting to be considered in the issue of shared decisionmaking at the institutional level is the amount of actual decision-making that is
possible. During the period of the last twenty five years of local democratization,
there has also been a change in the relationship between institutions and
states/provinces. Hodgkinson (1974) noted two important shifts, the effect of
each moves in the opposite direction “...students began to be included on faculty
senates and other campus-wide decision-making bodies, as well as on boards of
trustees, [while] more and more decision-making power was taken over by
statewide coordinating agencies and influenced by legislative politics” (p. 1).
Piland and Butte (1991) discerned from trustee views concerns about the trend
towards state centralization of decision-making, particularly where it concerned
funding schemes. Cohen (1996) noted the differing impact of this centralization
tendency on various areas of decision-making:
As the states become more involved with college policies, gaps in interinstitutional cooperation will be filled and criteria for student matriculation
and progress will be set. These pressures will result in efforts to micro
manage the administrative functions of community colleges, but they will
have minimal effect on classroom instruction and student services The
thrust o f state-level coordination focuses on reporting, compliance with
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regulations, and accountability for numerous aspects of institutional
operations, (p. 2)
Stevens and Piland (1988), in a study of Californian educators, noted further
concern at the local level about the degree o f centralization in general and in
specific areas of decision-making. They recorded strong disagreement with the
suggestion that the California community college system should be administered
as a unified system by a state board. While there was agreement that the state
should establish uniform systems of budgeting and accounting for local districts,
there was strong disagreement that the state should have comprehensive
authority with regard to academic affairs. It is interesting to note that trustees had
stronger opposition to centralization than presidents, but both groups were
agreed on the locus of responsibility and authority:
The concept of increasing state control...is opposed by the locally elected
trustees, and to a lesser extent, the colleges’ chief operating officers.
However, both groups want the state board to assume a considerable
amount of accountability and responsibility while authority is maintained at
the local level, (pp. 255-259)
It would appear that the trend towards centralized decision-making has occurred
in the areas which have tended to be the purview of trustees and administration
at the local level and which faculty, staff, and students sought jurisdiction over in
the call for shared governance. Dennison and Gallagher (1986) observed in the
Canadian case that colleges have never really enjoyed the degree of
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independence associated with the universities, “Canada’s colleges have never
fully been the master of their own destiny. Since their inception, the degree of
their mastery has steadily declined, with the power and influence of provincial
and federal governments gradually became more dominant” (p. 189). This
centralist tendency has become even more prevalent in British Columbia in the
1990’s and is one of the undercurrents which was examined in this study in
relation to shared decision-making. Dennison and Gallagher were in no doubt
about the limitations of college board decision-making power, irrespective of the
boards’ composition, and the dependency of the boards upon the two levels of
government:
Power and decision-making authority are a serious business to and for
Canada’s colleges. Both their current effectiveness and their potential are
intimately connected to the relationships that will be established between
both levels of government and the institutions. However college board
membership is determined, and whatever powers these boards may
acquire, in the final analysis, the colleges are instruments of governments
which have created and supported them. What confidence provincial
governments place in college boards, and how the two levels of
government work out their relationships as they pertain to post-secondary
education, will surely have a major impact on the future direction of
colleges in Canada, (p. 194)
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It is clear, therefore, that college boards in both the USA and Canada
have experienced a gradual but definite diminution of their authority and scope of
decision-making. This shift in power has coincided with the development of
shared governance and, consequently, has left the more democratically
represented boards with less room in which to exercise that democracy. There is
no particular evidence to suggest that boards consisting of internal and external
members are better suited to establish effective relationships with government,
than were the former boards consisting only of external members. However, the
forging of relationships with government, given the systematic centralization of
decision-making power, is absolutely necessary to maintain the status of the
colleges, and the task appears to have fallen on the chief executive officers.
“Presidents must take the lead both in communicating frequently with legislators
at the local, state, and federal levels and in keeping the board members aware of
the important legislative issues” (Boggs, 1995, p. 33). The literature would
appear to suggest that the advent of shared governance might have resulted in a
weakening of the powers of the presidency within the colleges but a
corresponding strengthening of those powers outside the colleges.
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Discussion of the Issues

Shared Governance in General

1. Roles to be Played

Shared governance involves individuals coming together in specific
groups such as the board o f trustees, traditional administrative groups, and multi
representative groups such as senates. The movement away from exclusive
decision-making bodies, usually involving only trustees and senior administrators
(the corporate management structure) to bodies incorporating all stakeholders in
an educational institution is dramatic and likely to be chaotic. “Although trustees
may have backgrounds in private business, they will soon realize that colleges
cannot be run like private business enterprises" (Nason, cited in Boggs, 1995, p.
35). This is because of internal and external restrictions. Internally, constituent
groups such as faculty and students have a traditional interest in being involved
in decision-making. And, externally, uState/[provincial] and federal laws restrict
the freedom of judgment of both the president and the board” (Boggs, 1995, p.
35). Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) also differentiated between participatory
business management and shared educational governance, with the latter
involving more extensive structures, more formal roles, and the sense of right-tobe-there held by the participants—the faculty, staff, and students
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(p. 21).
Shared governance, as has been frequently noted in this review, is
viewed as a natural progression in colleges and schools, it is considered logical
that the time honoured practices in the universities should flow down to the junior
branches of education. Furthermore, this sense of impending destiny contrasts
somewhat with moves towards participatory management in the business sector
which are very much at the discretion of boards and senior managers. However,
Baliles (1996) suggested that the transition to shared governance in colleges is
still much dependent on the philosophy and actions of the presidents (p. 11). The
influence that presidents can exert starts to shape the governance model into a
functional structure. Lau (1996), drawing on the California community college
model, illustrated such a structure:
All policies and most of the strategic decisions flow from the board of
trustees to the president/superintendent for implementation. The
president/superintendent interprets the policies and, with the approval of
the board, allocates resources in order to operationalize the strategic
plans. Decision-making and power on both these levels, policy making
and operations, are shared among several competing groups, (p. 2)
This pivotal role for presidents is interesting and contrasts with the views of Trani
(1997), who posited the weakening o f the presidencies as a direct result of
shared governance (p. 16). Lau further noted the requirement of boards that they
develop policies and guidelines which provide senates with the mandate and
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strength to “...administer academic and professional standards, course approval
and curricula, and other academic matters” (p. 7). Nussbaum (1995) expanded
on the senate role in states where it is only nominally advisory to the board. He
suggested that boards should “...consult collegiaily with senates on academic
and professional matters and, while the boards make the final decision, they
should rely on the advice and judgment of the senates" (p. 10).
The volatility of the educational environment and the strong expectations
of inclusiveness held by the constituency groups has been recorded extensively.
Hence, there is considerable support in legislation for the need for clarity and
definition of roles. Both Hodgkinson (1974) and Allen (1991) emphasized the
need for clear enunciation of what the participants in a collaborative structure are
supposed to do, and perhaps more importantly what they are not required to do.
The latter noted that “...administrators and teachers are not accustomed to this
type of [shared] governance and it is hard for them to function in new, often
unprecedented roles in their schools [or colleges], and easy to fall back into
traditional, fam iliar roles” (p. 13). Lovas (1994) noted the important distinctions of
authority and responsibility/accountability and stressed the need to identify who
had what in a structure. The consequence of failing to do this is likely to lead to
unclear decision-making steps and a lack of ownership in the results.
Mitchell, Grant, and Rossa (1992) cited the first step toward shared
governance as the “...delineation of the roles, responsibilities, and relationships
among all the major committees involved in the governance of the college” (p.
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21). And yet, while delineation is called for, there is frequent reference in the
literature to caution against prescription o f shared decision-making procedures.
However, Allen and Glickman (1992) continued the call for clarification, “Shared
governance is an elusive process with many pitfalls. Participating schools [and
colleges] must first define the process and identify the players and then clarify
and resolve the issues” (p. 80). Baliles (1996) echoed this need and suggested it
be done sooner rather than later (p. 11). Moreover, and not for the first time in
the literature, he identified the presidents as playing a key role in the delineation
process, noting “...[they] should lead the board and faculty through a process of
clarifying the precise nature of shared governance on each campus and
reducing ambiguities in authority and decision-making processes” (p. 8). The
complexity of educational governance has been stressed over and over again
and is at the root of the apparent need for clarification of roles in order to make
shared decision-making successful. The nature of that complexity is never more
evident than in the relationships between boards, senates, and trade unions, the
latter particularly in the case of faculty unions. Sumner (1991) advocated the
necessity of developing policy which clarifies processes and roles in relation to
governance, administration, and collective bargaining. She observed the
potential overlap of interests but highlighted the need to prevent discussion o f a
matter spilling over from one arena to another with the possible outcome of
unofficial views and even unofficial decisions emerging. Seitz (1993) echoed this
sentiment and suggested that such clarification must be openly articulated in
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formal documents like policies or memoranda of understanding to which all
parties have agreed.
Kanter (1994) noted that “...the institutional challenge— is for
administrators and faculty both to identify specific areas of responsibility and
authority before decisions are made and actions are taken” (p. 230). However,
Allen and Glickman (1992) offered that the very tendency to want to avoid being
prescriptive on roles and procedures is what leads to dysfunctional boards in the
educational system (p. 80). Dennison (1994) observed in the Canadian context
that, where provincial ministries have declined to develop detailed regulations on
shared governance and have left it upto individual colleges, they have ended up
with quite different models from institution to institution (p. 27). W hether clear
role definition can be achieved at the local level on a voluntary basis is
questionable. Deas (1996) suggested that shared governance is more likely to
be effective where it is legislated at the state/provincial level with prescribed
roles for the players and built-in controls to prevent ambiguity and turf wars.
Piland (1994) offered that true sharing of power is only achieved when the
board of trustees and the senate can come together in a jo in t decision-making
role. However, Hodgkinson (1974) noted the traditional differences:
...relationships between boards and senates are quite confused and often
threatening to both sides. Board members often may see the senate as a
group attempting to wrest power and authority away from the president.
The senate, on the other hand, may see the board as a distant, unthinking
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group o f businessmen[/women] who get together only two or three times a
year and try to solve all the institution’s problems on the basis of that
limited exposure, (p. 147)
The Academic Senate for California Community Colleges (1996) underscored
the tension between the disparate players. It expressed particular caution around
the acceptance o f advisory governance councils in place of what it saw as the
legitimate decision-making roles of the academic senates and faculty unions
within their respective jurisdictions. Moreover, the suggestion was made that
senates and unions should engage in active collaboration so as not to be
undermined by boards, administrations, and advisory councils (p. 4). This call to
arms very much resembles the strategy adopted by unions in British Columbia
around the introduction of shared governance in colleges and university colleges
and which provided a backdrop to this study.
Piland and Butte (1991), in a study of trustees, noted a strong view that
boards should not be involved in college administration. In a deeper analysis,
they concluded that elected trustees have a tendency to want to get more
involved in adm inistrative matters than do appointed members (pp. 9-10). In
another study of trustees’ views, Deas (1994) found that boards described their
role as “...rubber stamping the work of the administrators. This was not intended
in a negative context, but reflected the high-level role of trustees and their trust in
administration...” (p. 47). Such a relationship was possible through “...the
existence of well designed policies...to steer [ board and administration ] through
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the processes of management" was noted by Jasiek, Wisgoski, and Andrews
(cited in Deas, 1994).
In summary, the potential acceptance and success of shared decision
making processes seems, on balance, to be dependent upon a clear set of
definitions as to roles and procedures. There is, however, much discussion
around a prescriptive, top down approach to this need for clarification with a lot
of support for development of the guidelines at the local level, among all the
players. The college president is seen in an important leadership role in this
context. On the other hand, much has been written about the widely differing
models, and differing success rates, that emerge when state and provincial
governments do not set minimal standards.

2. The Influence of the President

The change that is shared governance is an example of leadership. And
leadership, even if it involves all stakeholders, is directly associated with the
beliefs and actions of the college president or school principal. Gulassa (1989)
noted that leadership which inspires others to outperform is determined by the
style of the CEO. Edelfelt (1982) observed “...that programs [of teacher
involvement] in schools in which principals were not supportive were not making
the progress [towards shared governance] that schools with supportive principals
were making” (p.7). Thus, the importance of leadership from the top towards
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sharing o f power was identified, albeit in a collaborative manner as noted by
Hackmann and Berry (1994), “...while top administrators cannot create effective
change by themselves, they can and must be an integral part o f the process as
they facilitate change” (p. 2).
The role of the president is obviously crucial in the transition to shared
decision-making. His/her own characteristics play an important part in this. The
president is clearly aligned to the board of trustees, indeed Deas (1994) noted
that trustees view their president as a colleague first and an employee second.
The president can also be seen as a catalyst in change of governance. A smart
president will, however attempt to hone him/herself as an educational leader
and, consequently, an ally of all the constituents—faculty, staff, students, and
fellow administrators. This is, o f course, not an easy task and speaks to the
necessary juggling skills of the ringmaster in the educational circus.
One of the considerations of power sharing explored in this study is the
financial stewardship context which is commonly associated with the board of
trustees and may appear to be much sought after by faculty, staff, and students.
He who holds the purse strings holds the real power. Here, the president’s role in
change is not so clear as Deas (1994) found that “...while trustees noted that
faculty are less desirous of being involved in fiscal management but seek the
sort of assurances that the board can provide...vice-presidents felt that the buck
stopped with them and not the president" (p. 48). Perhaps this confirms that
presidents are not natural financial leaders (Wood, 1984 and Taylor, 1988). In
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any case, there is clear suggestion that internal constituents often view the
advent of shared governance as the opportunity to get into the budget but do not
relish the role if they are given such authority, particularly when it comes to
setting priorities for budget cutting.
One important consequence of the move towards shared governance,
noted by Lovas (1994), is the frequent elimination o f the president’s cabinet or
similar group of senior administrators which commonly had a key role in
administrative decision-making. The impact on these players and how they have
responded will be examined later in this review. In addition, the elimination of a
close circle of advisors has affected the behaviour o f presidents They are now
required to be far more consultative and open to other views, and this has called
for a different set o f leadership skills. In some cases, presidents have been very
successful in broadening the consultative and decision-making base while at the
same time serving as the titular head of the college. However, in other cases,
presidents have grown to feel isolated, with no close allies, and have tended to
withdraw from the leadership role in deference to the various constituency bodies
which have legislated power and authority in the institution.

3. Consensu? and Representation

Most contemporary writings lean toward a decision-making structure that
is collaborative and constructive rather than a top down authoritarian structure
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where final decisions rest with a few high ranking individuals or even just a board
and president. It is important in this new democracy to create the right kind of
inclusive environment. Hunt (1984) noted “...there is a growing body of literature
which stresses the importance of social context rather than personal
characteristics as the main influence on the outcome of social interactions” (p.
170). The creation o f such an environment where individuals can contribute to
the common good becomes the responsibility of those formerly looked to for
exclusive decision-making. “The essential task of management is to arrange
organizational conditions and methods of operation so that people can achieve
their own goals best by directing their own affairs toward organizational
objectives” cited Mann (1968, p. 3). Those organizational objectives, the
common good, are a powerful issue in determining the effectiveness of any
shared governance model. Lau (1996) stated it plainly with reference to his
institution, “Compton Community College was founded for the benefit of society
at large, not for the benefit of professors, administrators, students, trustees, or
any grouping of constituents. As a result, the governing board represents the
public at large” (p. 9). This calls for a coming together of board members in spite
of their differing constituencies, social statuses, and values. Seitz (1993) also
seemed in no doubt as to the simplicity of the requirement to surrender personal
agendas in favour o f the common good:
Board members must subordinate personal interests to those of the
institution. That stance is essential. The fiduciary relationship in board
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affairs hold members to a standard of good faith and honesty in their
actions. Persons reluctant to comply with that standard should seek
another pastime, (p. 8)
Alas, despite the calls for board members to act as one, the individualism that
many exhibit is probably the greatest knock against shared governance and
goes hand in hand with the omnipresence of allegations of conflict of interest. In
that respect, therefore, the tendency toward individualism is more often directed
at the internal board members—faculty, staff, and students. “The definition of
individualism offered by Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1996, p.
334) where reality or prominence rests in the individual as opposed to the
greater society can be applied to a board as a corporate entity representing the
larger community but with its members embarking on personal agendas” (cited in
Deas, 1997, p. 2). As a result o f this behavioural tendency, “...the common good
that is the object of a board is sacrificed by an individual member in favour of
narrower, more personal values, a tendency which has been observed by Buber
(1985)” (cited in Deas, 1997, pp. 2-3). Individualistic behaviour by board
members, whether it be the pursuit of personal agendas or the hoarding of
power for whatever reason, seriously undermines the effectiveness of a college
board. The opposite of individualism, and the ideal state for a functional board, is
a group of board members exhibiting relative neutrality. Relative neutrality is
seen as the position o f compromise that is proposed as the overlapping of self
interest and participation stewardship (Abascal-Hildebrand, 1997) and the mean
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of the extremes o f excess and deficiency noted by Aristotle over 2000 years ago
(cited in Deas, 1997, p. 5). If the charge of individualism that is directed against
internal board members is valid, what does it say about their motives? Do they
join boards with the express intention of disregarding the group culture in favour
of their own objectives? Deas (1997) believed that, generally, there was no overt
intention toward individualism but, rather, a tendency on the part of some internal
members to fail to recognize the group culture which is directed toward the
common good. As a result of this, there is an almost inevitable tendency to lean
toward what they know best which becomes something of a personal agenda,
“...boards are tending to look upon that kind of virtue of boardsmanship
[receptiveness to change] much in the same way as the crew observed Plato’s
sea captain. They see it but they do not understand it and, consequently, they
revert to what they are comfortable with, which in the case of the elected
[internal] members are the narrow, short-term issues that most directly affect
them and their constituencies” (p. 8).
Are faculty, staff, and students interested in contributing to the common
good of the institution? Senge (1996) predicted so with the observation that
“...deep within us is a tremendous longing to understand how wholes work. The
inability to understand wholes is damaging and dangerous.” Hodgkinson (1974),
similarly, placed value on the community of decision-making when he noted the
direction of senates:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66
The campus senate operates on the apparent assumption that faculty,
students, and administration can best make decisions in a communitarian
environment with each group represented, (p. 4)
Consensus based decision-making may not just be more effective, there are
those such as Thomas (1979) who believe that it also upholds ethical principles
while exclusive decision-making based on power tends to violate such principles.
And yet, clearly, shared governance is steeped in politics and that is not a
subject which is generally associated with ethics. The very creation of shared
decision-making is generally a politically motivated act, often government
initiated in response to pressure from unions and associations o f faculty, staff,
and students. Moreover, the behaviour of internal and external board members,
especially when it is sufficiently polarized to be differentiated, is characterized as
political. Boggs (1995) noted that arguments can be made that appointed
external members are inherently less political than elected external members
and internal members. However, such appointments are generally themselves of
a political nature, a reward for services rendered to the party or administration in
power (p. 29). Wood (1991), in a study of internal board members, concluded
that participation in the governance process is political in nature by all standards
of organizational politics literature. Members’ behaviour may be influenced by
social characteristics, the power o f presidents, and expectations of the role but,
nevertheless, the strongest factor was the constituency from which they had
been elected (abstract, p. 2).
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One of the most important aspects of shared governance, and one which
is frequently among the most contentious, is whether members of college-wide
decision-making bodies should represent the constituency from which they have
emerged or should act more as members-at-large. Hodgkinson (1974) favours
the latter and noted “...if senates were always engaged in bloc voting, and
decisions were always made in accordance with numbers present from each
constituency, the institution-wide perspective might be lost on certain crucial
issues” (p. 16). Zald (1969) posited that there is a “...direct relationship between
a board’s degree of power in relation to an institution’s administration and the
degree to which board members represent the interests of external groups”
(cited in Wood, 1995, p. 41). By interests of external groups, it is assumed that
the reference is to the outside community at large, which many authors believe
represents the ownership of community colleges. Lovas (1994) also noted the
value of independence of membership, “...shared governance requires us to take
the time to listen to one another from an institutional as opposed to a
constituency perspective” (p. 14). This role for faculty, in particular, may not be a
natural one with tradition leaning towards specialization and narrowness of
interest and knowledge. Wirth (1991) underscored the need fo r change of focus,
“...individual faculty must acquire a view or perspective broader than his/her
department and must be willing to study material and data outside of their own
area of interest" (p. 2). It seems that some sort of accommodation has to be
made for internal members. For, it is inevitable that they will retain links with their
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constituency; often some are even officers in their trade union at the same time
as they sit on a college board (as noted by Wood, 1991, p. 2). Separation of
responsibility to board and union is difficult but not impossible. Wood (1995)
managed to prescribe such a separation:
All board members, regardless of role, were expected to think
institutionally, placing the needs of the whole college over those of
specific interest groups. More specifically, institutional members were
supposed to act as trustees rather than delegates, but they were
encouraged by their board colleagues to facilitate two-way communication
and contribute their special knowledge and insights resulting from their
participation in the college community, (p. 45)
Further, Wood suggested that internal members should not raise constituency
issues at the board table or use their board status to interfere with or influence
the administrative processes o f the college (p. 48). By taking such a position, he
believed that internal members did much to avoid the allegation of conflict of
interest. Dennison and Gallagher (1986) concurred with the view that the areas
of responsibility can, indeed, be separated:
...the employee members of colleges should be able to contribute
significantly to the policies o f their institutions and should have full
freedom to exercise their professional responsibility to their students. The
fact remains, however, that the interests of the personnel o f community
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colleges must not take precedence over the judgment of the
representatives of the community to be served by the college, (p. 154)
The vision o f the decision-making body as a whole is, at the least, as
important as that of each of its members. Weisbord (1993) noted the danger that
any body, regardless of its membership, faces of becoming insular and
accountable only unto itself. He suggested that this can be avoided by
maintaining an institutional perspective and concentrating on the big picture
rather than getting embroiled in trivial issues or personal agendas. There were
numerous references to the difficulty that faculty, in particular, have in remaining
with the big picture. And the task becomes even more difficult in a clim ate of
conflict. Filan (1992) observed the dilemma facing the internal members:
Two of the most difficult aspects of the job are learning how to shift one’s
loyalty from a specific discipline to the institution as a whole and learning
the skills to resolve conflict—between faculty in their departments,
between faculty and students, between faculty and administration, and
between themselves and their faculty. Unfortunately, few institutions
provide any kind of formalized training to assist either their new or
experienced [participants] to hone these skills, (p. 4)
The lack of training is an important point which will be revisited later in this
review. Wood (1995) suggested that presidents, board chairs, and external
board members must act in the best interests of the college to create a
supportive yet directive climate which serves to persuade internal members that
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their focus should be on institutional, not constituency, affairs (p. 48). In a similar
vein, Periey (1995) stated that the problems o f boards, made dysfunctional by
individualistic behaviour on the part o f internal members, have to be solved by all
the members themselves. He called for a higher level o f professionalism in order
to protect the credibility of educational institutions when coming under public
scrutiny. In particular, he implored his fellow faculty to demonstrate loyalty to the
profession before loyalty to an individual discipline (p. 47).
Broad-based representation on bodies looking for decisions through
consensus is democratic, empowering, and likely to produce sound outcomes
which will enjoy support throughout an institution. But are such bodies effective?
Hodgkinson (1974) was somewhat doubtful about their existence alongside less
democratic vehicles emerging in the educational sector of the day:
It is the diversity of background and outlook within and across faculty,
student, and administrative groups that makes consensus improbable and
strict “representation” ( one person truly speaking as his [/her] constituents
would themselves speak) unlikely. Thus, we tended to see the broadly
representative campus senate model as somewhat utopian and romantic,
given the hard-nosed styles of adversary bargaining widely used in higher
education today, (p. 14)
Regardless of whether a consensus based model can eclipse or at least coexist
with adversarial models, and it is probably no clearer today than it was twentyfive years ago, many writers agreed that the consensus model is difficult and
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time consuming to operate. Lovas (1994), in a survey of administrators, noted
the three most common knocks against shared decision-making:
1. Shared governance is slow, tedious, time-consuming, and wasteful;
2. More time implementing the shared governance process results in
greater difficulty for administrators in implementing new programs and
otherwise meeting their responsibilities; and
3. [ Shared governance ] has resulted in chaos, confusion, stalemate,
and the inability to make decisions and respond to situations in a
timely manner, (p. 15)
It would seem, therefore, that shared governance is not a quick fix option and
ought not to be entered into with intention of streamlining procedures.

4. The Scope of Involvement
in Shared Decision-Making

There is a challenge to being a member of a college board. Whether
he/she is elected or appointed, internal or external, the challenge exists. Seitz
(1993) neatly categorized the challenges for each member as follows:
1. Knowing and properly observing board functions, duties, and
relationships;
2. Knowing the nature o f education and the unique character of the
institution charged to represent;
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3. Knowing the difference between policy making and administration; and
4. Knowing how to assess, foster, and preserve institutional strength and
quality, (p. 3)
Meeting those challenges successfully involves the board acquiring a group
culture and focusing on a set of high level goals which pursue the common good.
“Board agenda and focus primarily [is] on the big picture and on the future, i. e.
on major board-realm issues. The board is not involved in management o f staff,
programs, or facilities” (Gregory, 1996, p. 3-4). And then, there is turf.
In a governance structure, there is turf to be considered, that is areas
where a particular constituency has traditionally held sway and likely will view the
prospect of sharing that role as giving up turf. Polishook and Naples (1989)
revisited the landmark US Supreme Court decision of 1980 in the National
Labour Relations Board vs. Yeshiva University case which concluded that
“...faculty pervasively control the educational enterprise” (p. 6). However, Collins
(1970) in examining faculty views of the student role in shared governance noted
that “...faculty enthusiasm for student involvement in decision-making waxed in
regard to social matters but waned in regard to academic matters” (p. 11).
Perhaps it was getting too close to a turf issue? Certainly, there is overwhelming
support in the literature for the notion that academic affairs should be controlled,
or at the very least heavily influenced, by faculty. That seems to be the most
basic tenet, strongly rooted in the university culture and well established in
colleges even before the move to formal shared governance. Munitz (1995)
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confirmed the academic affairs principle that control should rest with the faculty.
He opined that in state or provincial situations where the president and trustees
do have legal decision-making authority, they should “...concur with the faculty
judgment, which can be overruled only in rare instances and for compelling
reasons stated in detail” (p. 11).
The other side o f the coin from academic affairs is financial affairs, long
the purview of the board and administration. It has been noted by a number of
writers that faculty and faculty dominated bodies still have little or no real power
in regard to fiscal matters and the setting of the budget in particular (Mann, 1968;
McConnell, 1970; and Flanigan, 1994). There were frequent references to poor
input opportunities for other stakeholders and poor communications on this
fundamental management issue. Indeed, Gulassa (1989) noted that where there
is a truly collaborative approach to budgeting, and examples do exist, shared
governance has finally been achieved. Lovas (1994), noting support staff views
on financial affairs, also highlighted the need for an open, participative process
particularly when a budget reduction exercise is required. There may be a
cultural difference here between faculty and support staff with the form er wanting
greater involvement in decisions related largely to budget growth while the latter
appeared more concerned about having a role in the event o f budget reduction.
Wood (1995) concluded from a study of internal board members that, by and
large, they had only achieved limited to moderate power within the board
structure (p. 33). In another dimension of the progress of shared governance
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development, Munitz (1995) observed that faculty still control academic affairs,
but the board and administration still control the budget and, therefore, progress
has been inhibited (p. 11). Progress, here, is taken to mean both progress in the
development of the board/senate relationship and in the development of
programs, curricula, and teaching methodology. This limited impact by internal
members on the decision-making realm o f boards may be due to the fact that the
internal members function more effectively in the less formal forums that also
exist in a college. Allen and Glickman (1992) noted that schools and colleges
end up in a shared governance model with overlap between the formal (board,
senate) roles and informal (departments, committees) roles (pp. 81-82). Although
it will vary according to institution, it is likely that a good deal of real decision
making, particularly where it relates to proposed change, is still transacted
through the informal network. The final reason for the perception that internal
members achieve only limited power in the board environment may be due to a
resistance on their part to conform to the expectations of the role. Wood (1991)
found that presidents and external members have established clear standards:
College presidents and public board members define the institutional
members’ role as trustee rather than delegate with the explicit or implicit
goal of integrating them into the boards’ culture, social dynamics, and
decision-making priorities and processes, (p. 354)
There is fairly strong suggestion in the literature, and from experience,
that the impetus for the call for shared governance comes more from faculty than
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it does support staff and students. Perhaps, as a result, shared decision-making
models differ from state to state and province to province. In most cases,
however, faculty now have a formal role on college boards while in many cases
staff and students are also represented. Wood (1995) observed that faculty are
seen by all internal members as having more impact on boards than the other
internal constituents (p. 39). Nussbaum (1995) reported that staff, students, and
administrators, the latter of which infrequently have a form al role on boards, felt
marginalized by the shared governance structure (p. 23). Perhaps also, this
feeling of marginalization can de attributed to the strong impact and influence of
faculty. However, Wood (1991) observed that “...the institutional [internal]
members appear to me to be less powerful members on the board than others—
the other board members do not look to our institutional members to be highly
influential “ (p. 279). Interestingly, the second comment by Wood (1991) may be
the more telling and speaks to an ongoing dichotomy o f opinion on shared
governance.
Wood (1995) suggested that the boards’ focus on the community good
and the tendency o f internal members to hang onto personal values and
interests may be a reason for the limited impact that internal members have
made on boards:
The presidents’ and public members’ frequent emphasis on the good of
the college in their discussions of role expectations for institutional
members illustrated their desire to establish a unity of interests within the
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board and to divorce themselves from the interests of the college’s
constituent groups. At each college [in the study] this tendency toward
social cohesion and unanimity limited the influence of institutional
members by restricting their opportunity to pursue interests they defined
as important and to introduce dissenting opinions, (p. 42)
However, Wood (1991), in a study of internal board members, observed “...most
employee and student members consciously sought to achieve credibility in the
eyes of their board peers by working within the role expectations with the goal of
gaining influence in that way” (p. 357). It is probably not so surprising that
observations of shared decision-making reveal internal members adopting
strategies which allow them to pursue their personal interests. Certainly, it
causes boards to exhibit the sort of moral conflict, identified by Ricouer (1992),
when an organization struggles with competing values (cited in Deas, 1997, p.
10). However, Deas suggested that internal members are “simply playing out the
roles [which they have been accustomed to and] which have been entirely
natural to the culture o f post-secondary education system” (p. 10). Only time and
experience may change that natural tendency, if indeed it does change.
Clearly, the issue of scope of involvement in areas of decision-making
which have a tradition of being effectively controlled by one constituency has
only been addressed to a limited extent in the power sharing progress of the last
twenty-five years and today remains something of a bone of contention. A
common concern expressed by authors, internal board members, and external
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board members alike is the lack of orientation or training given to new members.
If boardsmanship is largely cultural and procedural, and the literature would
suggest so, it does seem shortsighted, or perhaps a little Machiavellian, not to
prepare new members fo r the rigour of shared decision-making. Seitz (1993)
called for an extensive program of orientation fo r new members and identified
the president to be responsible for ensuring that it takes place (p. 13). Further to
the need for board training, there also exists the chance to craft board cultures
and procedures that are unique to community colleges. This would appear
appropriate given the uniqueness of those institutions. However, as Dennison
and Gallagher (1986) noted:
...community colleges have had a clear opportunity to test new forms of
internal governance, but they have tended to forfeit this opportunity.
Young as they are, most have moved very quickly to institutionalize their
forms of government, their administrative structures, and their
organizational patterns. The ambiguity o f their role, their lack of public
support, and the general insecurity of their status have prompted many
colleges to cast in stone their styles and forms of management all too
quickly, (p. 154)
It must be concluded, therefore, that the scope of involvement by constituent
members in the shared governance model is not consistent or well defined. The
varying degrees o f impact by faculty, staff, and students and the ongoing clash
between the boards’ focus on high level, long-term issues and the internal
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members’ tendency toward promotion of personal values and issues would
confirm the uncertainty o f the external members’ involvement. It has been
suggested that more orientation and training o f board members might bring
about more cohesion to the groups in the future.

5. An Advisory or Decision-Making Role
and the Impact on Middle Managers

Crucial to much discussion around shared governance is the status of the
participants, more specifically, do they have the right to provide input to those
who will make the final decision or do they have the right to actually participate in
making the decision? W hile much power can be derived from the former, it would
appear to be the goal o f the aspirants to shared governance to acquire the latter.
Allen and Glickman (1992) stressed the importance of making it clear to the
participants in any shared governance model who, precisely, has the authority to
make the final decision on any given issue. Moreover, they opine that there is
nothing more demoralizing for a group to enter a process believing it is decision
making, only to find that it has an advisory role (p. 84).
Many faculty models revolve around an advisory role noted Collins (1970)
although there has been a tendency towards an actual decision-making role
since that time.
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Shared governance has replaced participatory governance in our current
lexicon. There has been a substantive shift from a governance model in
which all constituents have a right to participate to one in which these
same parties have a right to collaborate in making those decisions. The
difference in the degreeism of involvement can be illustrated between the
right to comment and the right to vote. (Lau, 1996, p. 8)
Collins also noted, and this probably remains more true today, that student
involvement has largely been confined to an advisory role (pp. 5-6).
Hodgkinson (1974) observed that participation in decision-making is often
seen in a different light by administrators from faculty, staff, and students:
One is also led to believe that the meaning of participation for central
administration is quite different than participation as interpreted by
students and faculty members who characteristically want to be near the
center of the decision-making process. Thus, the administrative
perspective on participation emphasizes not shared decision-making but
rather the possibility of access to the decision-making process in the form
of senate recommendations. For many students and faculty, this a big
shock when they come to realize that they are not actually going to decide
things, (pp. 135-136)
Similarly, Dominguez (1975) noted that “...board members’ attitudes towards a
faculty role in the decision-making process was limited to the faculty offering
advice only. They were unequivocally opposed to faculty participation in major
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decisions” (p. 25). The president’s position is often called into question in a
shared governance model. There is a considerable school of thought to suggest
his/her authority is automatically diminished when other constituents have a
decision-making role, particularly in the case of board representation and
through the senate. Trani (1997) advised presidents not to operate in isolation
but to ensure that they retained their leadership authority:
...presidents must resist academia’s insatiable appetite for the kind of
excessive consultation that can bring the institution to a standstill; instead,
presidents should be given the authority they need to lead their
institutions and manage their resources, (p. 1)
One notable impact of the advent of shared governance, whether faculty,
staff, and students have an advisory or decision-making role, has been the
sense of marginalization among middle managers such as deans and directors
(Gulassa, 1989; Lovas 1994). Gulassa noted “...middle management are by
passed or undermined by shared governance—which puts them at a
disadvantage, especially in relation to the faculty with whom they must work" (p.
16). Managers’ reaction to this affect has been to try to find a place in the new
structure. As a result, administrative committees and even senates have been
formed for administrators’ input. The primary purpose of this approach, as noted
by Gulassa, is to make sure that those administrators, e.g. the president or vicepresidents, who do have a prescribed role in the formal (shared) decision-making
structure carry to it a consensual administrative view.
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6. Structures and Relationships

Shared governance is all about structure of the participants and the
relationships that emerge between the bodies involved in the structure and
between the jurisdictions from which the participants have been drawn. There is
no standard structure, and what has evolved is different structures which reflect
the different cultures among educational institutions. McConnell (1970) observed
notable differences in structures even among schools within the same state
system. In a detailed study o f institutions, Reyes and McCarty (1986)
categorized structures as collegial, political, or bureaucratic. They noted that
organizations where presidents had a strong influence tended toward collegiality
while those where deans and other administrators held more sway tended
toward political or bureaucratic models. Unionized organizations tended strongly
toward bureaucracy. The type of institution was also found to influence the type
of governance structure, as follows: major research universities—collegial; minor
research universities—collegial/bureaucratic; doctorate granting universities—
collegial/bureaucratic with tendency toward the latter; comprehensive
universities—collegial; liberal arts colleges—collegial/political; and two year
colleges—highly bureaucratic (pp. 24-26).
On the assumption that a governance structure is generally based on the
philosophical nature of the culture of the institution, it is interesting to examine
some of the participants’ views. McConnell (1970) quoted the American

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
Association of University Professors’ principle of shared authority and
responsibility:
Among the faculty, administration, and governing board there is an
inescapable interdependence and these three components have joint
authority and responsibility for governing the institution. The essential and
overriding idea is that the enterprise is joint and there must be adequate
communication among those components and full opportunity for
appropriate jo in t planning and effort, (p. 4)
This view is sound as fa r as purpose goes, but is not totally inclusive as it
contemplates no role fo r students or support staff. Gulassa (1989) espoused that
faculty and staff should be seen as both the means and the ends to the
educational enterprise; in other words, faculty and staff should serve the
institutional goal of educating students through the governance structure but that
same structure should in turn serve faculty and staff. Epp (1992) characterized
this model as serving mutual needs and suggested it is the “...process by which
administrators may shift their administrative style away from the pyramid toward
the web” (p. 3).
Lovas (1994) cited the undemoted characteristics of any effective shared
decision-making process:
1. The process should strive to be authoritative and anti-authoritarian;
2. The process should seek to understand and explicitly recognize the
differing kinds o f authority among participants;
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3. The process should encourage that decisions to act occur closest to
where the greatest authority for that action exists in the organization;
4. The process redefines “authorship”, establishing an ethic and a
practice that ideas are not credited and owned by individuals in a
collaboration; and
5. The process demands creating new ways of acknowledging individual
participation and contribution to the outcomes and products of shared
decisions and organizational collaborations, (pp. 11-12)
Bergquist (1993) noted that a governance model based on shared decision
making is constructed on open dialogue. He related this to the post-modern
foundation of voice rather than the modernist concept of vision and underscored
the attendant need for internal communication within the decision-making body
and externally with all the stakeholders of the institution. It would appear that the
relationships within a shared governance structure have a degree of reliance and
trust built into them. Wood (1995) observed “...the public [external] members’
lack of experience with educational institutions and their part-time, volunteer
status made them very much dependent upon the information they received from
the president and senior administrators" (pp. 41-42). Moreover, internal members
bring special qualities to their relationships within the collaborative structure.
Scherr (1994) highlighted the value of insider status, of knowing how the
prevailing culture of an organization functions, and being able to apply that
knowledge to the decision-making process.
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Trust plays a significantly important part in shared governance. As Deas
(1994) noted, relationships between board and administration, even in vastly
differing institutions, are recognized as effective and lasting where there is a
discernible trust in one another (p. 51). In the case o f a governance model that
extends beyond the board and administration to include other jurisdictions such
as faculty, staff, and students, the need for trust and respect among the
participants is viewed as absolutely crucial (Mann, 1968; Draper and Van
Groningen, 1990; and Lovas, 1994). Draper and Van Groningen noted that
“...mutual trust...does not necessarily imply total agreement by all participants”
(p. 11). In a similar vein, Lovas observed “...shared governance requires that
everyone have integrity in dealing with other groups, which is hard when there
are conflicting loyalties as we often find in the collegial environment” (p. 22).
Ricouer (1992) has identified a norm of reciprocity, i. e. an obligation to
others which will be returned, in organizations intent on attaining the good
life [common good]. Alas, the obligation does not seem to be in evidence
in the culture of college boards, (cited in Deas, 1997, p. 6)
Liontos (1994) believed that shared decision-making itself has the potential to
build trust among the participants by challenging them to engage each other
rather than work in isolation in the traditional “...egg-crate organization of
schools" (p. 1).
Shared governance in colleges and schools has evolved over more than
twenty-five years. In many cases, it amounted to a logical, natural progression
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for the institution and was entered into on a voluntary basis. Generally the
change, at first, consisted of providing access for faculty, staff, and students to
offer input into decision-making by the board of trustees and administration.
Gradually, however, this has progressed through to the point where all the
stakeholders have an active part in most areas of decision-making, if not in all. In
other state and provincial settings, shared governance has been legislated from
on high and, consequently, its nature has been far more prescriptive and
involuntary. However, regardless of the route by which an educational institution
has arrived at a collaborative decision-making structure, Carver (1990) noted
“...no single relationship in an organization is as important as that between the
board and its chief executive officer" (cited in Boggs, 1995, p. 27). The overriding
principle in effective boardsmanship which seems to emerge from the literature is
that the board makes policy and the president interprets and operationalizes the
policy. This principle stands firm throughout various different models of shared
governance. Hence, Carver’s contention that the “...board should think of itself
as having only one employee, the CEO” (cited in Boggs, 1995, p.28) begins to
make sense.
Views differ on the impact of legislated change to governance. Draper and
Van Groningen (1990) believed that loose, enabling legislation allows an
institution to develop a local governance model in an “...open, deliberate, and
collegial manner” (p. 30), thereby, providing opportunity for the participants
commensurate with their knowledge and responsibility. Draper and Van
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Groningen did note, however, that there has to be some order to the process of
delegating formal power:
As long as a body that is legally responsible for a function retains the
power to make, modify, or revoke a delegation of its authority regarding
that function, the body has the means to control the performance of the
particular function. On the other hand, if the delegation of authority is fixed
by some external entity, the body with legal responsibility is without the
means of controlling the exercise of the particular function through its own
delegation of authority and revisions thereof, (p. 30)
In a study of two separate education systems where loosely legislated shared
governance had become totally bogged down in the initial years on issues of
mandate, jurisdiction, powers, and procedures, Deas (1996) concluded that
“...legislated shared decision-making should be more prescriptive. The control
built in at the outset will allow the participants to work with the process rather
than get all hung up in the early stages and cause near fatal doubts to emerge
[among the participants]” (p. 13). However, Kanter (1994), in relation to the
experience of Californian community colleges, suggested that “...when behaviour
is legislated, issues become polarized and often much more complicated than
they were originally envisaged” (p. 229). She espoused “...the fewer rules the
better. Rules reduce freedom and responsibility." Where differing views do,
however, converge is in the need for clarity o f mission, no matter how it is
achieved. Draper and Van Groningen (1990) noted “...if a person or body is
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given a clear statement of responsibility, a clear grant of authority, the resources
necessary, and adequate time, it is entirely reasonable to hold that person or
body fully accountable for the performance of responsibility” (p. 31).
There may be examples where an organization is effective through the
sheer energy created by conflict within its ranks. Most views, however, of shared
governance in education are that in order to achieve any success there must be
a climate conducive to sharing. Comer, Haynes, Joyner, and Ben-Avie (1996)
noted u...a post-modern shared decision-making environment has a consensus
climate rather than one of competition. They describe such a climate as
embracing collaboration, consensus, and communication”. To that, one might
add a fourth uc”, the characteristic of caring as suggested by Starrat (1996).
Gulassa (1989) made the important distinction between collaboration and
consultation in a culture of shared governance. While the latter is the general first
step, facilitating access for stakeholders to provide input to decision-making, the
former signifies the de facto sharing of power. He cited consultation as being a
vehicle of the vertical structure while collaboration signifies a horizontal or
flattened structure. Gulassa went on to note that integration, the goal of shared
governance, can be an effective counteraction to conflict:
Integration means that...interests o f all parties merge. Defensive
strategies dominate, e.g. preservation of the organizational entity and
protection of the interests of the members. The more management and
union view each as competitors for coveted power and resources, the
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greater the need for strong unions and an equally strong management
class. But if players can be persuaded to see beyond the horizons of their
own organizational interests to the needs of the institution as a whole—
idea integration—then all sides profit. The welfare of each discrete
organization is biologically dependent on the health o f the host institution,
(pp. 3-4)
Lovas (1994) noted that the necessary coming together is not easily achieved,
nor is it a swift process:
For me, shared governance requires careful consideration of...differing
kinds of authority, arranging structures and processes to ensure the most
authoritative members of the organization participate in the decisions
appropriate to their authority. This notion is relatively easy to
conceptualize, but quite difficult to operationalize. I think it’s the major
reason that shared decision-making seems so ponderous, so timeconsuming, and sometimes quite ineffective. The problem lies not in the
notion of sharing but in the particular authorities o f those doing the
sharing, (p.11)
In addition to definition of roles, there is also a need to ensure that the
players in those roles are competent. Clearly faculty, staff, and students bring
something different to the party compared to trustees and administrators.
However, there has to be an understanding of one another’s values and history.
Hodgkinson (1974) questioned “...do faculty and students have a wide enough
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perspective to actually engage in policy-making for an institution?” (p. 6).
Perhaps not in the initial stages. Hackmann and Berry (1994) note that it cannot
be presumed that faculty inherently possess leadership skills, [accordingly] any
change model must provide for leadership development” (p. 2).
Lovas (1994) noted the need for training and staff development for all
participants in shared decision-making bodies. Wirth (1991) suggested the need
for all round tolerance:
Administrators have to become teachers again, exercising great patience,
giving participants time to discover and develop. Individuals and groups
who formerly did not share in decision-making must agree to spend
sufficient time and energy learning new skills, (p. 2)
Flanigan (1994) echoed this statement and noted, in particular, the need for
professional development “...which enhance[s] team facilitation, conflict
management, decision-making, and leadership skills” (p. 10). In contrast, Young
and Thompson (1982) recognized the need for trustees to understand the
principle of academic freedom and the culture from which faculty emerge to
share in governance (pp. 124-126).
Almost as important as a consensual climate and, indeed, one of the
vehicles of consensus building is communication. Many authors cited good,
effective communication as absolutely crucial to shared decision-making, both
down and across the organizational structure as noted by Lovas (1994).
Nussbaum (1995) warned against the balkanization effect that can occur,
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particularly in complex shared governance structures. Where there are several
advisory councils, often representing each of the constituency groups, effective
communication between them is essential to prevent them operating in a vacuum
and developing their own, self-serving positions (p. 20). Further, Messina,
Cearfoss, Trueblood, and Young (1994) cited communication as the virtual
foundation for successful governance.
Consistent with good communication is visibility of decision-making.
Stakeholders of an institution have to see decision-making as open and feel that
they are well informed as to process, issues, discussion, and outcomes. Nason
(1982) highlighted the important status of the college board, describing it as
“both a bridge and a buffer between the college and the community” (cited in
Boggs, 1995, p. 34). Gulassa (1989) noted that “...at any point where the
decision-making process stream flows underground, bad things begin to happen,
and those bad things include cynicism, paranoia, and distrustfullness” (p. 3).

7. The Importance of Shared Governance for Students

While one might point to the concept of a community of learning and
increasing the body of knowledge, or even to an educational institution as a
player in the economic community, it is generally accepted that schools’ and
colleges' main reason for existence is students. It is, therefore, reasonable to
question what the impact of shared governance has been on the student
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population. First, one must consider whether students are actually to be part of
the shared governance or not, and opinions and outcomes differ on that
question. Nason (1982) was quite emphatic that the concept of a student trustee
is inherently flawed; he noted that "students serve too short a time to master all
they need to know and will not be around long enough to live with the
consequences of their decisions" (cited in Boggs, 1995, p. 30). In contrast, the
Canadian Federation of Students (1992), in its lobby of the British Columbia
Government regarding student representation on college boards, was able to
make the point that representation was justified on the grounds that students
comprise by far the largest segment of the college community (p. 2).
Liontos (1994) believed that the primary purpose and goal of shared
decision-making should be student success. "Using it as a means to shift
accountability or abolish a top-heavy central office staff will simply make shared
decision-making a buzzword. Student success and achievement must be kept in
the forefront of our thinking as the reason to implement i f (p. 1). Mahon (1994)
similarly justified shared governance being about and for students by tying it to
the inverted pyramid of the total quality movement which places students at the
top.
The Southern Methodist University (1979), in designing a new shared
governance model, was adamant, and embodied it in the principles of the model,
that students would henceforth play a significant role in the governing body of
the school. Many other instances exist of institutions, o f their own volition or
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through prescribed legislation, moving to include student representatives in all
facets of governance and decision-making. There remain, however, lingering
doubts as to whether they are welcomed by the other stakeholders. Collins
(1970) noted:
The faculty, administration, and trustees were described as dubious
champions of student rights and freedoms. Without reliable protectors
within the academic community, it was concluded that students had the
options of securing their rights and freedoms by the exercise of raw
power, by finding means to participate in the decision-making process, or
by seeking judicial protection through a student bill of rights and freedoms.
Since confrontational politics has been talked to death and since
guarantees of students’ rights and freedoms...seems remote in [the]
political climate, primary focus has been on the second option, inclusion of
students in the power structure, (pp. 10-11)
Hodgkinson (1974) noted a trend during the middle and late sixties which is
seeing itself repeated in the nineties—“1) students began to be included on
faculty senates and other campus-wide decision-making bodies, as well as on
boards of trustees, and 2) more and more decision-making power was taken
over by statewide[/provincial] coordinating agencies and influenced by legislative
politics" (p. 1). Thus, it may be said that the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh
away, twice around.
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Has shared governance had a positive impact on students? A number of
studies would appear to offer a positive response. Richardson and Wolverton
(1994) found that one of the eight characteristics o f high performing institutions
was the existence of often loosely defined, participative governance structures.
Lesser performance was clearly linked to either complex, highly structured and
controlled decision-making environments or the absence of shared governance
altogether (p. 46). Manilla (1979) questioned, however, if students were not likely
to get hurt in a shared decision-making model which really only represented a
power struggle between administrators and faculty. Thomas (1979) lauded
consensus decision-making and noted empirical evidence that conflict in an
institution leads to lower achievement as evidenced by test scores.
Interestingly, there is a commonly held view that benefit to students
comes not so much from their involvement in shared governance directly but
rather from the fact that faculty are involved (Mann, 1968 and Gulassa, 1989).
Gulassa noted “...the more a college invests in the intellectual and scholarly
development [in the context of power sharing] of its faculty the greater the
difference in the meaning of life and professional work and the greater the
success with students” (pp. 2-3).
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8. Faculty and Support Staff Attitudes

In general terms, the jury is still out on the success of shared governance
at the college and school level. Experiences have differed from site to site, and
outcomes have greatly depended on the reasons for introducing it in the first
place (voluntary or involuntary), the existing culture, the presence or otherwise of
unions, and the general attitudes and behaviour of participants. Furthermore,
there may be differing views among the constituents about the actual level of
participation. Drummond and Reitsch (1995) observed “It appears that there is
some difference of opinion between faculty and administrators with regard to
decision-making and the level of shared governance present at the institution.
Administrators report more faculty involvement in governance procedures than
do faculty respondents” (p. 53). Drummond and Reitsch noted that these findings
from their study of faculty and administrator attitudes toward shared governance
models touched on a statement made as long ago as 1918 by Veblen (1957)—
"...administrative use o f faculty committees-for-the-sifting-of-the-sawdust give the
appearance, but not the reality of participation, and are a nice problem in selfdeception, chiefly notable for an endless proliferation” (cited in Drummond and
Reitsch, p. 53).
Debow-Makino, Hill, Atwood, Murdoff, and Westphal (1993) highlighted
the divergence o f views which appears to be quite common:
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...on many of the questions related to sharing of decisions there are sharp
differences among the staff sub-groups. For example: a majority of full
time faculty members believe committees have little influence on major
decisions, but a majority of managers are persuaded they do; and a large
majority of the College’s managers believe the administration is making
efforts to expand participation in decision-making, but only small
minorities of the other groups agree, (p. 6)
Much of the literature suggests that faculty, at least a majority of them, are really
not too bothered about power sharing or getting involved in it. Dominguez (1975)
referred to the “...pervasive ambivalence in faculty attitudes toward participation
in decision-making” (p. 11) and noted that teachers have had a historical
reluctance to actively engage in the type of politics necessary to acquire a place
in democratically elected decision-making bodies. There are even some views
that all this focus on sharing of power with regard to institutional matters has had
a negative affect on academic matters:
Management attention to collective bargaining and reorganization (internal
threats) and state level control of funding and curriculum (external threats)
was perceived as inattention to instructional matters. (Stamm, 1989)
Faculty and support staff performance in shared decision-making has
frequently been criticized by authors, trustees, and administrators. Several
recurring difficulties have been noted, the most basic of which Filan (1992)
addressed was constant open competition between faculty and administration at
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the board table. He remarked that the ongoing rivalry represents a challenge for
the board chairs to adjudicate. Furthermore, Wood (1991) reported that “support
staff [board] members over time have lived a little close to home, that is, focused
on internal matters and have lacked the...visionary breadth” (p. 276). A further
example of faculty difficulties, which speaks to the testing of allegiances, was
stated by Munitz (1995), T hey [faculty board members] frequently worried that
we were cutting [the budget] too much across the board, and not singling out
whole programs for elimination. Yet, they could not develop a consensus on
which programs should go” (p. 11). All three examples of difficulties ascribed to
faculty and support staff board members appear to be connected to their internal
constituency status and personal closeness to the issues faced by college
boards. This closeness, which at times develops into perceived or real conflict of
interest, was, of course, one of the principal areas of inquiry in this study.
At the front and centre of all views on the progress in sharing governance
is the continuing lack of trust among the participants. There is certainly
suggestion that faculty and administrators, in particular, have such marked
differences in their values of what an institution should represent that suspicion
and defensiveness are almost inevitable. Flanigan (1994) noted “...despite this
increased involvement [of faculty on institutional committees], both [CEOs and
Senate Presidents] also agree that the levels of cooperation, trust, and shared
values, quality of committee meetings, and quality of committee reports and
recommendations to the board of trustees have not changed much with shared
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governance” (p. 9). It should be suggested, however, that much of the
ambivalence or even hostility to shared governance expressed by faculty is
directed to the context of shared governance in an advisory capacity and
perhaps reflects that satisfaction can only be attained with full decision-making
power.
One of the big complications in the development o f shared governance is
its parallel existence with the development of trade unionism in the college and
school sectors. The two institutions (governance and unionism) appear different
yet related, independent yet overlapping, and cause a high level of confusion
and tension which is worthy of examination in this study. There is much in the
literature to suggest that the interests of both institutions are best served when
they are kept apart. However, The Academic Senate for California Community
Colleges (1996), in its position paper Developing a model for Effective
Senate/Union Relations, favours a much more collaborative approach. For
example, it suggests that senates and unions should set out their objectives with
regard to academic and professional policies and conditions of employment
respectively. Thereafter, “...it is essential that the two bodies communicate
regularly, settle their differences directly, and do not let outside forces
[unspecified] pit the two organizations against one another” (p. 4). Moreover, the
statement is made that “Faculty are best served by having two strong
organizations, both promoting faculty interests and their commitment to
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academic excellence and integrity" (p. 5). There appears to be clear indication
here of the link between shared governance and the perceived welfare of faculty.
One of the major barriers to getting faculty and staff involved in shared
decision-making is considered to be the low level or non-existence of release
time from regular duties. Flanigan (1994) cited lack of release time, along with
distrust between the participants, and faculty interest as the three key barriers to
a faculty role in shared governance. Liontos (1994) suggested that release time
is the single greatest barrier. However, there is another side to the argument as
noted by Wirth (1991):
Teaching and learning may become secondary priorities. Representatives
[engaged in shared governance] miss time away from work or the
classroom. This is a major problem and creates havoc with scheduling
and program/curriculum development. Some shared governance
participants become more interested and involved in the coordination
effort than their instructional or work assignments, (p. 2)
Obviously, the issue of too little or too much release time is really an extension of
the issue of what is the purpose of shared governance, is it sharing of power or a
shifting of power?
Support staff views to some extent mirror those of faculty, but there is also
a status thing with, perhaps, staff not being as convinced about their acceptance
in the shared governance structure. W irth (1991) noted that “...classified
participants report that there is a feeling that their participation may be token,
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that even though they may speak, their voices may not be heard or considered”
(p. 2). However, in states where colleges have created a series of councils or
senates to individually represent constituency groups, Nussbaum (1995) found
that support staff had generally taken the opportunity to form classified councils
or senates. He explained “The notion has been that collective bargaining
framework is not the appropriate arena into which to bring shared governance
and the broad spectrum of policies in running a college” (p. 14).
Wirth (1991) discussed whether participation in shared decision-making is
really all that attractive to faculty and staff. She noted that, although participation
is likely to satisfy affiliation and esteem needs in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
(1954), participation, in itself, is unlikely to produce the self-actualization that can
only come from a role that offers opportunity for achievement, growth,
development, and challenge (p. 4). Perhaps this explains the results of studies
reported by McConnell (1970) that suggested two thirds of faculty tend never to
get involved in any advisory or decision-making capacity. However, Drummond
and Reitsch (1995), in a study of faculty and administration attitudes toward
shared governance, found that more satisfaction was expressed by both groups
when the level of shared governance in which they participated was greater
when judged against the authors’ scale o f constituency involvement (p. 55).
Drummond and Reitsch noted that faculty sought a sense of real belonging in
the decision-making model, not the sense o f token inclusion feared by Plante
(1989):
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...to one who nurtures contemplative leanings, as many faculty do, no
sense of self-worth is enhanced and no feelings o f membership in a
serious enterprise is promoted when one is asked to interrupt work on a
manuscript or on class preparation to join administrators who are acting
out of heavy-handed good intentions, or, worse yet, are making a
calculated attem pt to appear open and nonautocratic, and so think it time
to touch base with the faculty, (cited in Drummond and Reitsch, pp. 55-56)
Lovas (1994) explored another possible reason why relatively few faculty
are motivated to participate in shared decision-making. He suggested the natural
tendency of faculty, as spawned from years of scholarship, is toward individual
authorship and decision-making. Therefore, there is a reluctance to be involved
in what amounts to group authorship through shared decision-making. Certainly,
the incentive of reward for involvement in shared decision-making does not seem
to be a significant issue for faculty. In a study of faculty at private and public
universities, Miller, McCormick, and Norman (1996) found that “...the
respondents from the private university were less supportive of the ideal that
faculty should be rewarded for participation in the governance process...”
(abstract, p. 1). Finally, Hodgkinson (1974) highlighted the dichotomy of
adversarial collective bargaining and collaborative decision-making in an
institution, often potentially involving the same players, as a disincentive to
faculty who are not prepared to do a juggling act with their values and beliefs
(cited in Deas, 1996).
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It would appear, therefore, that shared governance is something that is
much sought after by faculty and support staff. Once achieved, however, it
seems that relatively few employees actually tend to get involved. In addition,
there is a complicated link between shared governance and labour relations with
many writers suggesting that the two should be kept separate, but members of
senate and union executives advocating alliance and collaboration for the
common benefit of faculty, in particular.

Shared Governance in Financial Affairs

Educators have somewhat sim plistic views about funding of education—
there is never enough and there should be. However, as Rollins (1972) noted
“...when budgets are critically examined, educators naively express surprise,
expecting legislators to continue accepting their requests without too much
scrutiny and with few strings attached” (p. 2). In the last twenty-five years, there
has been a notable tightening of public funding of education along with greater
and continuous calls for more accountability.
Faculty, support staff, and students have not traditionally had a prominent
role in fiscal priority setting and decision-making in the mature university
governance structure or in the emerging college and school structures. Rather,
as noted by Deas (1994), they have looked to the board of trustees for the fiscal
assurance that all is well. As a result of this practice, financial affairs has been
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one of the strongest components of the close relationship between the board
and administration. In addition to general fiscal stewardship, the most important
issue dealt with in this relationship has been the setting o f priorities and the
allocation of resources because in spite of w hat educators might expect of
funding levels, they are never quite sufficient and as Rollins (1972) noted
“...community colleges [and other sectors o f education] cannot afford to be all
things to all people” (p. 7).
The need for planning in financial matters is as strong as it is for any other
aspect of education, and greater than most. In addition, it cannot be done well if
in isolation of other aspects:
It is obvious that fiscal planning which realistically links academic
aspirations with revenues available fo r both a short term and a long term
period is sorely needed. It’s time for all of us [educators] to fight the battle
of the budget together—and not merely by going to the public trough
pleading for more and more funds. We need to prove to our publics that
we are currently getting a dollar’s worth of value out of each dollar spent.
(Rollins, 1972, pp. 2-3)
Hence, not only is the case being made for accountability but also for an
approach involving all educational constituents when traditionally the power and
responsibility has rested solely with the board and administration.
There is not total acceptance that a planned, coordinated, and justified
approach to the fiscal development of education is the only way to go. There
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remains, as noted by Rollins (1972), the anti-planning faction which argues that
educational growth (and presumably contraction) is solely at the discretion of the
politicians, whose constant vacillating renders it pointless to plan extensively.
Rollins noted, and experience since then has reinforced it, that a planned
approach is necessary, however, to protect the educational share o f the public
purse, and that approach must be a coordinated one involving all stakeholders:
A humanistic view must be incorporated into the whole planning process.
Institutional morale is a delicate thing, and if lost through some cold
impersonal political and economic process, is difficult to recover.
Therefore, fiscal planning should be sufficiently democratic so that those
affected by the decisions have the opportunity to supply input and be
involved to the greatest extent possible, (p. 5)
As in other aspects of decision-making, the need for clear, effective
communications in financial affairs has been stressed extensively (Rollins, 1972
and Miller, 1993). Never is that need greater than on the, not infrequent,
occasion of budget cutting which is perhaps the most traumatic and threatening,
and often divisive, event in the educational lifespan.
The classic dilemma facing any institution in a budget reduction exercise
is determining the basis of the cuts. The choice between making reductions
across the board and targeting specific areas in a strategic manner, based on
some sort o f sound rationale, can never be made easily (Smith, 1975, Griffith,
1993, and Miller, 1993). Most educational views, although not always shared by
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unions, lean toward strategic reductions rather than starving everyone, the latter
described by Smith as “...[leading] to an inevitable weakening of the fabric of the
university as a whole—a choice for universal mediocrity or worse" (p. 4).
However, if cuts are to be selective, there remains the difficult task of choosing
where. Phillips (1996) observed that, of all the aspects in the shared decision
making agenda, developing budgets is the least desirable task to be undertaken
by teachers in a high school (abstract, p. 1). This reluctance is likely to be largely
true of faculty in the college sector as well. Chaffe (1982) noted that behaviour
during a period of budget reductions takes on political characteristics, rather than
the rational qualities that are looked for in a climate of shared decision-making. It
is suggested that, while conventional wisdom advances the involvement of all
stakeholders in decisions around cutting budgets, the nature of the task is likely
the single greatest threat to shared decision-making itself with the high risk of
tearing constituencies apart. Indeed, the problem may rest with the urgency of
budget cuts causing Griffith to comment that a financial crisis requires a surgical
rather than a consultative response which speaks against the culture of
democratic, shared governance.
Smith (1975) offered the view, however, that notwithstanding the urgency
and the trauma of deciding budget cuts, more effective decisions will continue to
be made when all stakeholders have a role to play. He noted that “...faculty
assume primary responsibility for the quality, health, and usefulness of its
academic programs. If this is not done [in times of fiscal hardship in particular],
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then the reason for being a community of scholars with general responsibility for
the recovery, organization, dissemination, and enhancement o f knowledge is
abandoned” (p. 4). It is further suggested that the sort of data upon which budget
cuts are to be based requires the careful evaluation of programs, thus ensuring
the academic credibility which is also required when a more positive financial
climate later rolls around. Nussbaum (1995), however, expressed concern that a
budget constructed in a shared governance model is “...cobbled together...[and,
invariably not] in the best interests o f students, the system, and the state” (p. 23).
By this, he meant that such a budget is likely to reflect differing views—the board
and administration espousing the common good while the senate and unions
pursue local vested interests. A budget, after all, is just a numerical reflection of
values and objectives and, if there is wide diversity among the value and
objectives in a college, the budget w ill simply reflect that diversity.
There has been a recent tendency, in particular where states and
provinces have not pursued policies of centralization, for greater democratization
at the local level in regard to fiscal affairs. Institutions are addressing the finding
of the balance between the need for traditionally narrow stewardship and the
value of shared decision-making on priority setting and resource allocation. The
ever changing financial climate facing institutions, especially where the
dependence on direct grants is greatest, places a strain on the shared
governance structure which only tim e and experience may ease. However,
Nussbaum (1995) placed faith in shared decision-making:
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Running a college, particularly during times of limited budgets, requires
countless decisions to be made regarding competing values. Shared
governance mechanisms provide the arena where these values can be
expressed, where conflicts can be addressed, and where priorities can be
established. Through shared governance, communication is enhanced,
opportunities for buy-in are increased, and there is a greater likelihood
that the decisions are neither arbitrary nor uninformed, (p. 19)
A second consideration in comparing shared governance in a general
sense to that of a financial context is the issue of stakeholder involvement on an
advisory or decision-making basis. While the general tendency is toward the
latter, there remains an argument toward the former in financial matters on the
basis of trying to avoid vested interest. A case can be mounted for the neutrality
and independence of the board and administration in making decisions around
allocation of resources which contrasts with the academic stewardship upon
which faculty might base their right to be involved. Breneman (1995) further
suggested that the shared governance model is not necessarily best equipped
for making difficult financial decisions. “The collegial nature of most colleges and
institutions, emphasizing consultation and shared decision-making, seems poorly
suited to the sorts of wrenching changes that lie ahead” (cited in Munitz, 1995, p.
12). Certainly, decisions that relate to increases or decreases in budget
invariably bring internal board members into the spotlight when their program or
department is under review. It is all very well for the faculty, staff, or student
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member to excuse him/herself from discussion and decision-making around that
particular issue, but, in reality, all components of a budget are integrated and
interrelated, and the member who is in conflict of interest on one issue in the
budget is technically in conflict on all issues in the budget. Consequently, if the
member is then unable to participate in consideration of the budget at all, then is
the member really fulfilling his/her obligations to the board? This question is at
the heart of the issue as to whether internal board members are able to function
appropriately in general decision-making and, in particular, in financial decision
making. This issue is one of the major focuses of this study.

Shared Governance in Labour Relations

One of the most important, and at times volatile, areas of governance in
education is labour relations. This has become increasingly so in the college and
school sectors where the growth of unionism has been extensive and profound.
In universities, the growth has not been so marked, perhaps because of the long
established academic collegiality among the stakeholders. Certainly, the conflict
of interest faced by internal college board members in the area of labour
relations is well documented. Wood (1995) suggested “Institutional [internal]
members should have proportional representation on all board committees,
except, in the case of employee members, those dealing with labour relations”
(p. 51). It is interesting to note that neither Wood nor, for example, the guidelines
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on conflict of interest of board members issued by the British Columbia Ministry
of Education, Skills and Training identified student board members as having
conflict of interest in labour matters. And yet, often the decisions made by boards
during contract negotiations can lead to strikes or increases to employees'
compensation, both of which can ultimately affect students directly. Specifically,
the form er can interrupt their education while the latter can cause possible
increases to tuition fees in order to fund the escalating costs.
Is there permanent incompatibility between collective bargaining and
shared governance? Hodgkinson (1974) noted that “...many respondents [in a
study] felt that the existence of a collective bargaining unit on the campus would
immediately do in the campus senate [the flagship of shared governance]” (p.
153). He also highlighted the dichotomy of adversarial collective bargaining and
collaborative decision-making in an institution, often involving the same players
(cited in Deas, 1996). Nussbaum (1995) detected some muddying of the waters
through legislation in terms of who is responsible for what in collective
bargaining. AB 1725, the founding legislation of shared governance in the
California community college system, prescribed a role for the academic senates
(in concert with the boards) on “matters of hiring criteria for new faculty, retreat
rights for administrators, and equivalency processes for determining instructor
qualifications” (p. 9). These matters might reasonably be considered issues
which management and unions would negotiate into collective agreements.
Hence, there is a clear overlapping o f interests in two separate areas of
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engagement—one purportedly collegial and consultative (boards/senates) and
one often confrontational (boards/unions). From a different perspective, Gulassa
(1989) reported on the serious concern about the impact shared decision-making
on the allocation of resources within the budget process would have on collective
bargaining, in effect amounting to a separate set of negotiations away from the
bargaining table (p. 7). Thomas (1979) noted that unions face the dilemma of
whether to trade shared governance for traditional hard-nosed collective
bargaining (pp. 2-3). Again, this suggests that there can only be a dominance of
one over the other.
Messina, Cearfoss, Trueblood, and Young (1994) suggested a distinction
between the two (shared governance and collective bargaining) and the room for
coexistence:
Governance is not intended to interfere in any way with the collective
bargaining process, nor should the collective bargaining process interfere
in any way with governance. Recommendations regarding collective
bargaining matters may not be made by the senates. Efforts shall be
made to clarify the distinction between collective bargaining and
governance issues affecting faculty and support staff. Further, officers,
board members, other representatives or negotiators of collective
bargaining units may not serve simultaneously as officers, board
members, representatives or in any other elected or appointed capacity of
their respective senates, (p. 31)
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A certain clarity and division of responsibilities is suggested but, given the fact
that few faculty and staff choose to get involved in either sphere o f influence, the
division may be difficult to actually achieve. In addition, the division of
responsibilities did not occur in British Columbia where, by accident or design,
many employee and student board members happened to be ranking officers in
their trade or student unions, often serving as presidents. This particular
occurrence was examined in detail in the study. Polishook and Naples (1989)
cited legislation in the California community college system which attempts to
provide a legal distinction between collective bargaining and shared governance
in order to keep them apart. However, Douglas (1979) noted that collective
bargaining and shared governance inevitably conflict with one another and
stated that “...faculties seek to manage and...by their very actions...tend to blur
the principle of mutually exclusive spheres of management and employee
legitimacy” (p. 4). On the other hand, Lavine and Lemon (1975) observed that
“...collective bargaining should be permitted on economic issues related to
[faculty and staff] roles as employees, while professional and academic issues
should be dealt with through shared governance mechanisms" (p. 15). This
might suggest that shared governance should not extend to financial matters and
the question of allocation of resources.
Polishook and Naples (1989) noted that the collegial nature of shared
governance tends to contrast sharply with the confrontational nature of collective
bargaining, although they held out the hope that the existence o f both might lead
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to a softening of the relationships at the bargaining table, particularly after a
number of years. However, Rhoades (1993) illustrated the existence of
retrenchment clauses in collective agreements as an example of the different
direction taken to the principle of tenure which would be upheld in a shared
governance culture. He cited this as indicative of the clash between
confrontational and collaborative values surfacing in educational institutions (pp.
341-343). Further to this seemingly irreversible division, Deas (1996) questioned
whether successful shared governance can actually be spawned from
confrontational collective bargaining as has been the result of contract
negotiations in several college systems.
There are strong suggestions that collective bargaining can have a
directly positive affect on shared decision-making, that affect being to
“strengthen" (Polishook and Naples, 1989), “underpin” (American Association of
University Professors, 1987), and “protect” (Lavine and Lemon, 1975). Lavine
and Lemon noted that the typical characteristics of a faculty collective agreement
such as no strikes, no lockouts, compulsory binding mediation and arbitration
provisions separate it from an industrial contract and speak more to the collegial
climate, consistent with shared governance, than they do the traditional labour
relations climate in industry (pp. 32-33). (It should be noted that the inclusion of
such clauses in collective agreements may not be as typical today). Polishook
and Naples cited an example in the California State University system where the
collective bargaining and shared governance structures can actually come
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together as happened in the response to state budget submissions by union,
faculty senate, and administration in a “tripartite process.” There are, however,
other examples where the values espoused in bargaining and shared
governance are far apart and seem unlikely to be reconciled, as in the case of
the National Association of Scholars’ charge that the American Association of
University Professors’ defence of race and gender based hiring jeopardizes the
academic freedom that has long been championed by faculty and promoted in
shared governance (1995).
So far, this review has focused on the interaction of labour relations and
shared governance from the viewpoint of individual faculty members. Unions,
reflecting the policy of the body corporate, have tended to be antagonistic toward
shared governance noted Polishook and Naples (1989). Piland and Butte (1991),
in a study o f trustees, were left with a split view on the suggestion that unions
work against college goals (pp. 8-9). This may suggest that unions are not
natural partners in shared governance. Certainly, Starrat (1996) noted that
partners in shared decision-making, as agents of change, are always likely to
meet headlong with unions and special interest groups (cited in Deas, 1996).
However, Covey (1996) took a different view and saw unions as able to play a
role in a collaborative culture:
Trade unionism is merely protectionism, the necessity fo r which
diminishes with the building of trust and the creation of a learning
environment. I am not against unionism, I am against management
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practices that cause unionism to flourish. In a progressive learning
environment, unions become communication vehicles not barriers or
agents of confrontation.
There remains, nevertheless, the lingering doubt, particularly in the university
area, that unionism is a threat to the academic ideal. Cameron (1996) stated that
“...unionism stands in potential opposition to academic self-government which is,
in turn, one of the pillars underpinning academic freedom” (P. 8). Drummond and
Reitsch (1995) found that the greater the level of shared governance in an
institution, the more the likelihood that collective bargaining will not be as
confrontational or as widespread in its scope as would otherwise be the case (p.
57).
Examination of the issues that faculty want included in collective
bargaining have [sic] revealed that faculty working in institutions with
strong shared governance tend to limit the collective bargaining to salary
and work conditions, while those in institutions with weak or unsuccessful
shared governance want to extend the bargaining to cover academic
issues. [Accordingly]...the more influence a faculty member believes
his/her department has over academic issues the less they want to
bargain it. (Ponak, Thompson, and Zerbe, 1992, cited in Drummond and
Reitsch, p. 57)
Shark, Brouder, and M iller (1975) studied the impact on students of the
growth, jointly and severally, of collective bargaining and shared governance.
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They predicted that, ju st as students have found a legitimate role in the latter,
there is room for them in the bargaining process on the basis that bargaining
comprises parties with vested interests. It was noted that the process of
negotiation affects the quality, content, style, and cost o f programs and services;
and this has a direct impact on students, hence the notion o f vested interest.
Furthermore, negotiation of economic benefits for employees tends to have a
direct affect on the economic status of students by leading to tuition fee
increases (pp. 1-4). In the intervening twenty-three years since Shark’s study,
the vested interest of students has been consistently confirmed but the evolution
of a role for students in the collective bargaining process has not materialized to
any extent. Nussbaum (1995) viewed collective bargaining in the college sector
as an extension of shared governance in contrast to the virtual unilateral
approach to labour relations prior to collective bargaining:
In terms of shared governance, the advent of collective bargaining was a
watershed event. Governing boards were not only required to involve an
internal constituency (their employees) but also, for the first time, to share
their authority to act. Under collective bargaining, the governing board
essentially had to have the agreement of the appropriate exclusive
representative before it could act on matters within the scope of
bargaining. If agreement was not reached and a governing board acted,
an elaborate set of external dispute resolution procedures was made
available to test the legality of the governing board’s action, (p. 7)
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The suggested incompatibility between labour relations and shared
governance, which has brought widely contrasting views of agreement and
disagreement, perhaps becomes more focused in the actual task of collective
bargaining. In the context of governance councils as advisory bodies within
shared governance structures, The Academic Senate for California Community
Colleges tended to see such councils as a potential threat to undermine
academic senates and unions (abstract, p. 1). Furthermore, the danger of
collective bargaining issues sliding into the agenda o f governance councils was
expressed:
If academic senates and bargaining agents choose to participate in such
a [governance] council, several factors should be kept in mind. Academic
senate members should not be drawn into discussion of bargainable
issues in an inappropriate forum such as a governance council.
Bargaining agent representatives should not be party to such a council
usurping the role of the senate in academic and professional matters.
Discussions of the appropriate roles of the bargaining agent and the
senate should take place directly between the two organizations, (p. 6)
This view speaks again to the formation of alliances between employee players
in the shared governance model and their unions, as has been noted in the
British Columbia situation and which was examined in this study. Additionally,
there is difficulty in determining the ideal representation of management on its
side of the negotiating table. Piland and Butte (1991) found that trustees strongly
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disagreed with the notion that they should be directly involved, presumably
preferring to leave it to the administration assisted by outside help if required.
The notion o f the board “...remaining in the background, limiting its role to major
decisions, encouragement of the management team, and ratification of the
contract” (p. 39) was suggested by Seitz (1993). That administrators have been
given this difficult mantle may tend to explain why Polishook and Naples (1989)
reported negative administrative views on both shared governance and collective
bargaining, citing them as “...forums to provide two bites at the same apple” (p.
5). They noted some dismay among university presidents following the arrival of
faculty unions when it was said “...but they promised that the senates would
disappear when the union was elected” (p. 6). Administrators would, therefore,
appear to be suggesting that there is a not so great distinction between collective
bargaining and shared governance. However, Filan (1992) described the attitude
toward collective bargaining that participants in a shared governance model
expressed as a “balancing act”. He contrasted the inclusiveness of shared
governance, irrespective of constituency, with the exclusiveness, often hostile, of
collective bargaining (p. 4). Piland, Lovell, and Janes (1981) proposed a team
management model including faculty and administration that could even include
divisional chairs, traditionally elected from the faculty, on the management team
for negotiations with the faculty union. They noted that such representation
would break down barriers and encourage better understanding o f the issues
which sometimes get clouded in the heat of the negotiations battle (pp. 17-18).
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However, there remains the huge question as to whether unionized
participants, in any collaborative model that touches on collective bargaining,
could ever be truly independent. For, as Wood (1991) found, there is a clear
expectation on the part o f trade unions, and with it pressure is brought to bear,
that employee board members will represent the best interests o f the unions in
board activities and decision-making. This expectation makes it difficult for
individual employee board members to live up to the ideal of being members-atlarge with the interests o f the whole college, the common good, as their goal (p.
267). Consequently, boards, when dealing with sensitive labour issues, have
tended to move much o f the business to in-camera meetings with the express
intention of excluding internal board members, or at least compelling them to
observe oaths of confidentiality (p. 268).
It would appear that the last twenty-five years has not really provided any
clear indication of whether labour relations and shared governance can
peacefully coexist. In terms of forging a relationship between two apparently
disparate cultures, it may be that a longer period o f tim e is required.

The Advantages and Disadvantages of Shared Governance

It was stated that shared governance is not a precise science, and that
has been demonstrated in the many differing observations noted. It can differ
from institution to institution and can mean different things to the participants
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depending upon their background and values. It is hardly surprising, then, that
there is a fairly even split between advantages and disadvantages of shared
governance according to the literature.

Advantages of Shared Governance

•

Fosters greater understanding and acceptance of decisions by the entire
institutional community (Draper and Van Groningen, 1990);

•

Encourages long term planning in preference to quick, short term decision
making (Lovas, 1994);

•

Leads to institutions which are better equipped to pursue the common good,
both for themselves and for society in general (Carver, 1997);

•

Empowers the participants and, by extension, those from whom they are
drawn (Wirth, 1991);

•

Focuses on utilizing the expertise of professionals within an institution,
reflecting the norms and values of an academic community, modeling
democratic thought and increasing job satisfaction and commitment (Wood,
1995);

•

Leads to more intense commitment on the part of stakeholders to implement
the decisions (Draper and Van Groningen);

•

Facilitates the development of collegial relationships and an improved
environment within the institution (Wirth);
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•

Can lead to productivity from faculty and staff as they have ownership in the
operation and can lead, consequently, to student success (Gulassa, 1989);

•

Provides an avenue for the constituents to develop a greater breadth of
understanding of the issues faced by education in general and their institution
in particular (Wirth);

•

Facilitates increased meeting of employee needs for self-identity, autonomy,
achievement, and psychological growth (Draper and Van Groningen);

•

Reduces the influence and bias of the president and senior administrators on
boards on account of the presence of internal constituency members (Wood);

•

Provides opportunities for conflict resolution even in cases of divergent
objectives, through consultation and joint decision-making (Draper and Van
Groningen);

•

May lead to improved communications across campus (Wirth); and

•

May lead to leadership training and other professional development for
faculty, staff, and students (Draper and Van Groningen).

Disadvantages of Shared Governance

•

Has a time-consuming reputation, for the decision-making process itself as
well as for the various groups involved, with a likely significant impact on
administrators (Draper and Van Groningen, 1990);
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Can lead to the ‘balkanization’ of the decision-making process whereby
shared governance slows down and fails to meet the immediate need of a
rapidly changing environment (Flanigan, 1994);

•

Discriminates between board members because institutions do not provide
adequate levels of training for internal members (Filan, 1992);

•

Requires recognition of the appropriate role o f administrators, faculty, staff,
students, and trustees (Wirth, 1991);

•

Suffers because it is perceived as costly in terms of time and money
(Gulassa, 1989);

•

Slows the college response to societal change and community demands,
thereby striking at the very purposes of such institutions (Nussbaum, 1995;
Baliles, 1996);

•

Results in greater difficulty for administrators in implementing new programs
and otherwise meeting their responsibilities because they have to spend
more time implementing the shared governance process (Lovas, 1994);

•

Effectiveness is hampered by the making of decisions by individuals with
limited expertise (Draper and Van Groningen);

•

Viewed by outsiders as self-serving because special interest groups have a
tendency to focus more on their needs than on the global needs of the
institution (Flanigan);
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•

Systematically undermines and weakens the office of the president through
the actions o f the other participants in the shared decision-making process
(Baliles);

•

Runs the risk that teaching and learning may become secondary priorities as
representatives spend tim e away from work and the classroom (Wirth);

•

Results in middle managers who are uninformed about matters they will be
called upon to implement on account of their potential exclusion from
decisions made through shared governance committees (Draper and Van
Groningen);

•

Tends, itself, to be bureaucratic in nature while shared governance is often
cited as the alternative to bureaucracy (Lovas); and

•

Identifying responsibility, authority, and accountability is not always clearly
managed among the range of participants and participant groups (Wirth).

Summary

The passage of time since shared governance became topical in the
community college context has made interesting reading in the considerable
amount of literature available on the subject. It seems that the tentativeness and
philosophical diversity of the 70’s was replaced by a dogged determination to
make shared governance work in the 80’s and that, in turn, has been replaced
by a period of reflection and, not a little, doubt in the 90’s. Throughout the three
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decades, authors have divided into proponents, standing on the side of
inclusiveness and even moral justification, and detractors, citing the very real
issue o f self-interest on the part of board members who coincidentally are
members of the faculty, support staff, and student constituencies. In some ways
the issues of those early days are still with us today and seem no nearer to any
satisfactory resolution.
In the midst of the confusion, however, there are several strong themes
that emerge from the writings on shared governance which served as the basis
for this particular study. One of the most basic issues is the actual role of the
board itself. Given that colleges are democratic organizations in which a good
many of the stakeholders have the ability to control their own affairs, it might
seem that boards are an unnecessary layer o f officialdom. However, there is
strong indication that the boards play an important role in providing the high
level, long term vision that colleges need but are not particularly inclined to
explore. Two further points arise from this designated purpose for boards— 1)
some body has to take the long term view because no one else will, not even the
presidents whose tenure is far too insecure to allow anything other than a short
term perspective, and 2) it seems entirely appropriate that all the stakeholders
have a say in the long term future of institutions, hence the inclusion of internal
members on boards. Shared decision-making is seen as being more ethical than
any hierarchical form o f governance and it is, at the same time, both reflective of
and a major contributory to the climate of an institution.
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There are doubts about the ability of boards. Some express concerns
about the commitment and knowledge o f the external members but acknowledge
their independence and connection to the general community. While others
acknowledge the commitment and knowledge of the internal members but
express concerns about their real or perceived conflict of interest. The two
groups, internal and external, certainly seem to exist as separate entities in
virtually all the literature. Their differences form the basis of most of the
scholarship. Perhaps the reason for the emphasis on differences is the fact
colleges are not by nature collegial organizations; and there is a long history of
confrontation between boards and administrations on one side and faculty, staff,
and students on the other. Consequently, bringing the combatants together in
the shared governance model does not necessarily make for a marriage made in
heaven. There is much said of the need for trust in the relationships that form the
structure of shared governance, but little evidence that the trust is generally
there.
Both the USA and Canada have witnessed, along with the growth in
shared decision-making, a tendency toward centralization of decision-making at
the state or provincial level. Of course, the latter serves to diminish the impact of
the former. However, it has also been recorded extensively that participative
decision-making tends to undermine the status of presidents who no longer have
virtual absolute authority. Conversely, presidents are now viewed as having a
more prominent role in dealing with external agencies, and so it is clear that they
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have been at the forefront of change during this period under review. As a result,
presidents have had to acquire new sets of leadership skills in order to fulfill the
expectations of their office.
One of the most forceful themes to emerge from the literature was the
necessity for clear procedures to make shared decision-making work. However,
opinions were split on whether such procedures should be developed internally,
to reflect the local culture, or externally, to avoid self-interest. There was virtual
unanimity that shared decision-making is a tedious, time-consuming process.
Willingness to endure such hardships clearly varies according to the degree of
philosophical value that the constituents placed on shared decision-making.
Again, however, most writers could agree on the need for the decision-making
process to be open to scrutiny through extensive communication with all the
stakeholders.
The inclusion of internal constituents—faculty, staff, and students—on
boards of governance was bound to have an impact on those people. However,
the results were surprising. Students seem to have made little headway as a
group although test scores would underline the value of a collegial atmosphere
in which to study. Support staff seem to suffer something of an inferiority
complex in terms of their relationship with external board members,
administration and faculty. Staff also appeared to have difficulty sorting out the
relationship between unions and governance bodies and the overlap o f their
interests. The pursuit of self-interests rather than the common good was a
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common charge leveled at staff and faculty board members and forms probably
the greatest general argument against shared governance. It was, of course, one
of the main themes o f this study. Faculty, who were by far the most vociferous
champions of shared governance, have also tended to make the greatest
contribution toward it from among the internal constituents. However, it is not
clear that the advancements over the past twenty-five years have brought any
greater degree o f harmony and trust to college campuses. This may be because
relatively few faculty actually want to get involved in governance in spite of the
large-scale interest in the philosophy.
This study of shared decision-making focused on general matters and
also those connected with financial affairs and labour relations. The research
questions anticipated that board members would profess problems related to the
two latter areas. That anticipation was very much underscored by the literature.
Internal members faced the strongest charge of conflict of interest in matters of
the budget where they have personal interest and several aspects of labour
relations, the most notable of which would be contract negotiations. The latter
also served to illustrate the overt alliances formed between unions and unionized
members of boards which made authors and external members uneasy. Clearly
many employees and students have viewed the changes in governance more as
a shifting of power than a sharing of power. The evolution of shared governance
remains incomplete and should provide fruitful content for study for some time to
come.
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CHAPTER III RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter details the research methodology which was applied in the
study. In a study which is based solely on the views o f a population, in this case
the board members of the colleges and university colleges covered by the
College and Institute Act o f British Columbia, it is important that the process for
gathering the views and the instrument to achieve that task are effective, fair,
totally inclusive, and easily understandable by the participants. Furthermore, the
techniques used to sort and analyze the data obtained from the participants must
be statistically sound and accurate. The research methodology in this study
contains the highest level of integrity that is obtainable and has been applied
with a similar level of rigour.
The survey questionnaire represents a refinement of the instrument used
in a similar study carried out by the researcher in early 1996. In addition, the
questionnaire was reviewed by colleagues in the British Columbia post
secondary system. Several questions were added, deleted, and modified as a
result of input from this source as well as from the researcher’s dissertation
committee. Further, the process o f distributing the questionnaires, arranging for
their collection, and following-up to encourage additional participation was similar
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to the approach adopted in the earlier study which had proved successful. As a
senior administrator in the British Columbia post-secondary education system,
the researcher is both fam iliar with the system and the structure of governing
boards within it. Accordingly, this background facilitated entry to the population
and execution of the study.

Methodological Overview

The purpose of this study was to examine three aspects of leadership
through shared governance:
•

the sharing of power,

•

the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and

•

how real or perceived conflict of interest on account of the employment
or student status o f some of the board members has been addressed.

These aspects of leadership were studied in three particular contexts:
•

board decision-making in general matters of business,

•

board decision-making in financial matters, and

•

board decision-making in the field of labour relations.

Therefore, the conceptual framework of the study took the form of a matrix with
the aspects of leadership interacting with the contexts in which they are placed.
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The views of all board members were sought relative to the contextual
aspects noted above and were gathered in such a way as to allow fo r the
following analysis and comparison:
•

between colleges, without making distinction between the

constituents;
•

between constituents, without making distinction between the

colleges they represent; and
•

by total population, in a form that permitted comparison to the

results obtained in a similar study conducted by the researcher in
early 1996.

Research Design

The focus of this investigation was to study the views of board members
in the British Columbia college system. The intended outcome of the study, in
addition to generally adding to the body of knowledge, was to essentially
evaluate the shared governance structure and procedures in the province. Both
views and attitudes toward shared governance in general and specific to the
participants’ own institutions were sought. Accordingly, the technique selected by
the researcher to best meet the requirements of the study was an explanatory
survey by way of a questionnaire. Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh (1990) noted “An
explanatory survey is a form of causal-comparative research,...[it] seeks to
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explain attitudes and behaviour on the basis of data gathered at a point in tim e”
(p. 407).The population under review encompasses the potential participation of
seventeen institutions and approximately two hundred and fifty-five members.
Therefore, the study included the entire population in the hope of obtaining an
acceptable level of representation by college and constituency of board
members from the questionnaire returns. It was felt by the researcher that even a
moderate return through the survey process would provide a richness and
breadth of information which could not be achieved using other techniques o f a
qualitative nature in association with a small sample of the population (Ary,
Jacobs, & Razavieh, 1990, p. 421).
The researcher designed the questionnaire in a series of sections which
explore the tenets o f the research questions. Each section of questions was
contextual, starting with decision-making in general matters of board business,
moving into financial matters and, finally, into labour relations. In each section,
questions were asked about the three aspects of leadership selected as the
focus of this study o f shared governance, namely sharing of power, the quality of
the shared decision-making process, and how the issue of conflict of interest
related directly to the status of the employee and student board members has
been addressed. In addition, participants were asked to indicate from a list of
suggested themes o f effective boardsmanship which, if any, were present in their
own board’s culture. This approach to eliciting a wide array of information was
considered appropriate in order to achieve a meaningful evaluation of the shared
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governance model, including its structure and procedures, from a number o f
different perspectives. Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh (1990) opined that “The most
challenging type of survey is one that seeks to measure intangibles, such as
attitudes, opinions, values, or other psychological and sociological constructs"
(p. 408).
The study was endorsed by the Advanced Education Council of British
Columbia in a similar manner to the earlier study in 1996. Such endorsement not
only indicated the interest of this organization, which represents all college
boards in the province, in the subject matter, but also served to encourage
individual board members to participate. The Council has further expressed its
interest in the area o f shared governance research by inviting the researcher to
present findings from studies at several meetings and conferences.
The process o f administering the questionnaire and gathering the data
was intended to be efficient and fair. It was important that the participants were
fully aware of the purpose of the study and the nature of their participation in it.
Accordingly, the researcher articulated procedures that not only clearly stated his
intentions but also stressed the voluntary nature of taking part and the complete
extent to which participants would enjoy personal anonymity. Furthermore, the
researcher designed a process that facilitated participation, and while being
mindful of their commitment of valuable time ensured that time was the only cost
to the participants.
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Validity and Reliability

Huck and Cormier (1996) noted useful synonyms for validity and reliability.
The former was called “accuracy" while the latter was called “consistency”.
Therefore, the data from a study should be consistent throughout to accurately
reflect the views of the participants. The means to achieve both these qualities
were through the design and application o f the measurement instrument and
careful analysis of the resultant data.
This study utilized a questionnaire containing a series of questions that
were intended to elicit clear, unambiguous answers from the participants. The
questions focused only on the aspects of leadership in the contexts of board
decision-making noted earlier. The purpose of the questionnaire was to facilitate
measurement of the views of board members in the areas contemplated in the
study and was intended to achieve the highest degree o f correlation between the
accuracy and the consistency of the data obtained. In addition, the importance of
presenting the findings of the study, based on the data obtained, in a form that
attempts to answer the research questions cannot be overemphasized. The
research questions are the raison-d’etre o f the study, and the findings are
directly related to the questions although, in the end, they may not provide the
absolute answers. The findings will, nevertheless, contribute to the growing body
of knowledge on the subject m atter-shared governance in the college setting.
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Data Collection

This quantitative study o f board members’ views on aspects o f their
leadership role within certain contexts sought to determine if differences exist in
those views between colleges, between the constituent members, and between
the whole population compared to a similar population in an earlier study. The
researcher strove for accurate and consistent data to be obtained from the
measurement instrument because that was crucial to the integrity of the study.
Therefore, the following sections describe how the appropriateness of the data
was ensured.

Entry to the Population

The researcher is employed in the British Columbia post-secondary
education system and serves as secretary to his institution’s board. Accordingly,
he is familiar with the board structure in the province and the changes that have
taken place as a result of the 1995 legislative amendment known as Bill 22. This
study focused on all college board members in British Columbia and entry to the
population was managed in two steps: (1) a general announcement at the
annual conference of board members during a presentation o f the findings of the
earlier study earned out by the researcher in 1996 in which this study was
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portrayed as a natural follow-up, and (2) a letter inviting voluntary participation
was sent to every member of each board.

Selection of Sites/Subjects

In light of the size and diversity of the potential population and the fact
that the diversity itself is the basis of one of the research questions, it was not
considered necessary to adopt any sampling methods (Huck and Cormier,
1996). Accordingly, the study was open to the entire population of board
members in the British Columbia college system, amounting to the potential of
seventeen institutions and approximately two hundred and fifty-five members.
The breakdown of members was one hundred and fifty-seven lay members
appointed by the provincial government, seventeen elected faculty members,
seventeen elected support staff members, thirty elected student members (there
were four vacancies), seventeen ex-officio presidents of the colleges and
university colleges, and seventeen chairs of education councils at each
institution. Membership of college boards is fairly volatile. Not only are the
student members subject to a one year term, but chairs of education councils
who sit on the boards ex-officio also tend to serve fairly short terms, often again
one year. In addition, in 1997 there was a much higher turnover of government
appointees than usual, including the termination o f some members mid-term,
due to a policy decision to introduce younger members onto boards. As a result
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of this increased volume o f membership changes, the researcher used both
current board membership lists and former lists. Where a change had taken
place in the two months around the time of the study, the questionnaire was
directed to the former member on the basis that his/her greater degree of
experience over the replacement would contribute to the richness of the data. It
is possible, however, that the attitudes of recently departed members,
particularly given the controversial nature of some of the changes, may have
influenced willingness to participate and some o f the responses.
Participation was entirely voluntary and the voluntary nature was stressed
by the researcher even as he endeavoured to make potential respondents fully
aware of the nature and importance of the study and the value of their
participation.
The researcher followed the undemoted steps in facilitating participation
in the study:
•

June, 1997; the researcher presented a paper at the Advanced
Education Council o f British Columbia Annual Conference on the
results of his study undertaken in early 1996 related to a
preliminary review o f the literature for this dissertation. He made
attendees aware o f the upcoming study and its relationship to both
the presentation and to the dissertation work;

•

September, 1997, the researcher sent a package to every board
member in the province (coming within the parameters of this
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study) containing a letter of explanation of the study and invitation
to participate (with clear indication of its voluntary nature)—see
Appendix A—, a questionnaire— see Appendix B—, and a
statement of informed consent—see Appendix C—to be completed
by each participant. The package also contained a mail-prepaid,
addressed envelope for the return of the questionnaire and consent
statement;
•

October, 1997, a letter—see Appendix D—was sent to all board
members in the province covered under this study thanking those
who had already returned the questionnaire and inviting those who
had not to do so or contact the researcher for another copy of the
questionnaire;

•

November, 1997, in light of a relatively low response rate at that
stage (although very close to the sort of return predicted by Ary,
Jacobs, & Razavieh, 1990, p. 408), a letter—see Appendix E—was
sent to the president and board chair of each college requesting
their assistance in encouraging their members to participate;

The researcher takes the view that the data and, particularly, the analysis and
conclusions will be of interest to the participants as well as to the researcher and
will endeavour to make the information accessible to the population.
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Protection of the Subjects

Hawley (1993) noted “If research is to benefit the scientific community and
society at large, each researcher must adhere to a strict code o f ethics”. It is for
that reason that this study had two levels of protection of subjects built into it. A
protocol statement that detailed the proposed process of protection was
submitted to the Committee on the Protection o f Human Subjects, University of
San Diego for approval and was subsequently granted. In addition, the protocol
statement was also submitted, as a requirement o f the researcher’s own
institutional policy, to the Research and Ethics Committee, Malaspina University
College, British Columbia and received the necessary approval. Finally, the
approved process was described in the statem ent o f informed consent which
each potential participant was asked to endorse and return with his/her
completed questionnaire.
The population of subjects consisted o f lay persons appointed by
the provincial government: faculty, support staff, and students elected by
their constituencies: and the college president and chair o f the education
council who hold ex-officio positions on each board o f governance. None
of the participant groups, in the context of their involvement in shared
governance, would appear to fall within the at-risk categories, however,
every precaution was taken as follows:
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Level 1 (applied to all participants).
As an addendum to the questionnaire, subjects were asked
to identify their college and constituency in order to facilitate two of
the three areas of analysis. There is only one president, one chair
of education council, one faculty member, and one staff member on
each board and, therefore, by identifying themselves they became
known to the researcher;
In the analysis of data, conclusions and recommendations,
and any other product of the study, the researcher did/will not
identify a college other than by an anonymous label and did/will not
associate the member of any constituency with any college or
otherwise serve to reveal his/her identity. Therefore, while identity
might be known to the researcher, complete anonymity was/will be
assured in the dissertation and any other report. The completed
questionnaires (except as noted in Level 2) remained in the
custody of the researcher throughout the process of analysis and
writing of the dissertation. Upon completion of the latter, the
questionnaires were destroyed.
Level 2 (applied only to the employee and student members of the
Malaspina University College Board).
In view of the researcher’s position at Malaspina, special
protection was afforded those board members who also have even
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an indirect employment or student relationship with the researcher.
Returned questionnaires from the special group, identified by
unique marking, were received, processed, loaded into a computer
program, retained, and ultimately destroyed by a special associate
in Vancouver, BC. This practice permitted the researcher to
manipulate the data and perform the analysis without ever knowing
details of the responses from any member of the special group.

Instrumentation

The researcher developed a questionnaire for the study which was,
in part, based on his instrument from a similar study carried out in
1995/96. This allowed for comparison over the period of time on specific
questions. In addition, questions in the form of statements were designed
to obtain board members’ views and attitudes which would serve to
answer the research questions posed in the study:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to
decision-making in respect to general matters o f business, financial matters, and
labour relations matters?
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2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in
certain aspects o f boardsmanship, namely the sharing o f power, the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived
conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and
how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to
general matters o f business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The study is three dimensional in nature and, therefore, each
research questions leads to three hypotheses. The following shows the
assignment of questions contained in the questionnaire—see Appendix B—to each hypothesis:
H1. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning the sharing of power in the shared governance
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour matters. (Survey questions 1-8, 22-23, 33-35, 44-45)
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H2. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning the effectiveness of the shared decision-making
process in the shared governance model for decision-making in general matters
of business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 9-15, 2432, 36-40)
H3. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among British
Columbia colleges concerning how real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members is dealt with in the shared governance
model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour matters. (Survey questions 16-21, 27-29, 41-43, 46)
H4. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the sharing of power in the
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 1-8, 22-23, 33-35, 4445)
H5. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning the effectiveness of the
shared decision-making process in the shared governance model for decision-
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making in general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters.
(Survey questions 9-15, 24-32, 36-40)
H6. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, among board
members, according to the constituency from which they are drawn i.e.
appointed members; elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students;
presidents; and education council chairs, concerning how real or perceived
conflict of interest of employee and student board members is dealt with in the
shared governance model for decision-making in general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 16-21, 27-29, 41-43,
46)
H7. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning
the sharing of power in the shared governance model for decision-making in
general matters of business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey
questions 4-8, 33-34)
H8. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning
the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the shared
governance model for decision-making in general matters of business, financial
matters, and labour matters. (Survey questions 9-10, 25-26, 30-32, 37)
H9. There is no significant difference, at the .05 confidence level, between the
views to be elicited from this study and those from an earlier study concerning
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how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members is dealt with in the shared governance model for decision-making in
general matters o f business, financial matters, and labour matters. (Survey
questions 16-20, 27, 29, 42, 46)
In addition, questions forty-seven to forty-nine on the questionnaire, which
are multi-part in nature, explore the characteristics of power sharing,
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how conflict of
interest has been addressed within the participants’ own colleges.
The questionnaire consisted of nine pages, divided into six sections
of data together with a final section containing personal details of each
participant. The latter included information on the constituency group from
which the participant was drawn, the name of their college, and the
number of years spent on the board. This information, confidential in
nature and carefully guarded throughout the study, was required to
manipulate the data to correspond to the research questions.
The questions, numbered one to forty-nine but actually totaling
sixty-seven including multi-part questions, were arranged into sections
which again corresponded to the focuses of the research questions.
These sections included 1) Board decision-making on general matters,
but excluding business related to financial matters and labour relations
matters; 2) Board decision-making related solely to financial matters; 3)
Board decision-making related solely to labour relations matters; 4) Board
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effectiveness in the sharing of power; 5) Board effectiveness in shared
decision-making; and 6) Board effectiveness in dealing with the real or
perceived conflict of interest of employee and student members. The first
three sections sought to obtain board members’ opinions, views, and
values on typical board decision-making tasks in the context of the shared
governance environment while the second three sections sought
members’ views on the existence, or otherwise, of typical shared
governance qualities within their own institutions. Thus, the first three
sections were somewhat philosophical in nature while the second three
sections were more practical. The blend of the two sets of data provided
the foundation from which to address the research questions and
generally evaluate the legislated shared governance model in British
Columbia.
Participants were asked to respond to the questions, expressed in
the form of statements, using a Lickert-type attitude inventory ranging
from strongly disagree to strongly agree in the first three sections and
from non-existence to strong-existence in the second three sections. The
use of a Lickert-type attitude inventory was considered appropriate by the
researcher because the large volume of data obtained in the study could
be made readily quantifiable using this technique, thereby facilitating
analysis of the date and determination of the findings (Huck & Cormier,
1996, p. 556). Both Huck & Cormier (p. 557) and Ary, Jacobs, & Razavieh
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(1990, p. 421) discussed the ability to accommodate a high number of
participants and a high volume of data through a Lickert-type
questionnaire, but also noted its weakness was the possibility of
misinterpretation of the questions by some participants. Accordingly, the
researcher compiled the questionnaire using already tested question from
the previous study together with questions which were intended to be
clear statements related to the research questions. The questionnaire was
reviewed in draft form by Dr. William E. Piland, Dissertation Chair, and Dr.
Jerome Della Mattia, Executive Director of the Advanced Education
Council Of British Columbia and several of their suggestions were
incorporated into the final version.

Approach to Data Analysis

The structure of the measurement instrument was based on the matrix of
aspects of leadership in shared governance and decision-making contexts.
Participants responded to a series of questions in the form of statements with
answers via a 5-point Lickert scale ranging from strongly disagree, disagree,
neutral, agree, to strongly agree. Participants were also asked to indicate from a
list of suggested characteristics of effective boardsmanship which, if any, were
present in their own board’s culture. In addition, there was the option of not
responding to any statement, for whatever reason.
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The data were entered by the researcher (except in the case o f Level 2
protection of subjects where independent data entry took place) and processed
using the Statview SE+ Graphics Program on Apple hardware . The data were
manipulated to produce the undemoted levels of analysis which permitted
comparison: (1) among colleges, (2) among constituencies, and (3) with data
collected in an earlier study. The selected techniques were standard to
quantitative research and are discussed by Huck and Cormier (1996) and Ary,
Jacobs, and Razavieh (1990):
Level A: Means and Standard Deviations for all Survey Questions
This analysis revealed the mean score on each statement
for the whole population. Where questions coincide with those
included in the earlier study, a time comparison was able to be
made.
Level B: Frequency Distributions
This analysis related to the demographics of the
respondents. Consequently, a breakdown of returns by
constituency and college was revealed.
Level C: One-Way ANOVA for each Question by Constituency
The researcher established a level of significance of .05 as
appropriate to this type of data analysis, meaning the chances of
rejecting a true null hypothesis become equal to 5 out of 100. If a
value of probability statement was revealed at less than .05 it
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indicated incidence of significant statistical difference between the
views o f the different constituents on a particular question. Such a
difference could be between at least the high and low mean scores.
However, by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type
paired contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a
significant difference emerged between any pair of the
constituents. The analysis, therefore, revealed any differences
between respondents according to constituency.
Level D: One-Way ANOVA for each Question by College
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
between the colleges on a particular question. Such a difference
could be between at least the high and low mean scores. However,
by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type paired
contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a significant
difference emerged between any pair of the colleges. The analysis,
therefore, revealed any differences between respondents
according to college.
Level E: One-Way ANOVA for Assessment of Own Board
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituency
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
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between the constituent groups on a particular statement. Such a
difference could be between at least the high and low mean scores.
However, by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type
paired contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a
significant difference emerged between any pair of the constituency
groups. The analysis, therefore, revealed any differences between
respondents according to constituency.
Level F: One-Way ANOVA for Assessment of Own Board
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
between the colleges on a particular statement. Such a difference
could be between at least the high and low mean scores. However,
by doing a Post-Hoc Analysis using the Scheffe type paired
contrasts technique, it was possible to determine if a significant
difference emerged between any pair of the colleges. The analysis,
therefore, revealed any differences between respondents
according to college.
Level G: Two-Way ANOVA for a Pre/Post Test by Constituency
Group Concerning the 1995/96 and 1997/98 Studies
A level of significance of .05 was established. A value of
probability statement at less than .05 revealed significant difference
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on a particular matched (between the two studies) statement as it
related to the pre/post test and/or the constituency groups and /or
the interaction between the two sources of study.

Background of the Researcher

Ary, Jacobs, and Razavieh (1990) noted that a research proposal should
demonstrate that the researcher knows what he is looking for, how it will be
recognized, and why it is worthwhile looking for it in the first place (p. 462). This
researcher trusts that his background and the statements o f intent that were
explicit in this study have satisfied the requirements called for above.
The researcher is vice president and bursar of a university college in
British Columbia. He is an accountant with professional designations from the
United Kingdom and Canada. In addition, he holds a master’s degree in
education with a specialty in leadership. As a member o f his college’s senior
management team and secretary to the board of governors, he has an interest in
boardsmanship in general and a particular interest in the implications of the
changes in governance which have been taking place over the last three years in
British Columbia. The researcher has constantly sought to marry academic
research with practical application in his professional capacity. Accordingly, he
has conducted research, published, and presented on various aspects of
governance including board/administration relationships and shared governance.
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Summary

This study has the clear purpose o f determining the views of board
members (based on values and practices) on the impact of shared governance
on certain aspects of leadership in prescribed contexts of decision-making. In
order to make that determination, it was crucial that the research methodology to
be used was sound and directly related to the issues in question. The structure
of the survey instrument and the specific questions asked focused solely on the
research questions and, consequently, provided accurate and consistent data to
allow concise analyses and conclusions.
The process of gathering and processing the data was efficient while
providing the appropriate level of integrity, protection, and information to the
participants. A goal of the study was to make the participants happy to have
played a part in it and to be able to place a value on the results which have
ultimately been obtained. Reaction to the findings will confirm attainment of this
goal.
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CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION
OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Introduction

This chapter and its related appendices (F through O) detail all of the data
obtained in this quantitative study; present the data in a format to permit both
descriptive and comparative analyses; and discuss the conclusions to be drawn
from the data in the context of the three research questions and the hypotheses
for each question. Presentation and discussion of the descriptive statistics focus
on the response to the questionnaires, analyzed by constituency group and
college; the length of experience of board membership among the participants;
and the grand mean and standard deviation values for all statements included in
the questionnaire (see Appendix B). Presentation and discussion of the
comparative statistics focus on the data related to the research questions
analyzed by constituent groups and colleges relative to decision-making context,
and aspect of leadership; and assessment of the participants’ own boards’
effectiveness in aspects of leadership, analyzed by constituent groups and
colleges. Thereafter follows the practical significance of the study involving the
merger of the hypotheses, data, and findings in an attempt to answer the
question “What do the results mean?”.

150
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Presentation and Discussion
of the Descriptive Statistics

Reference throughout this section of the chapter is made to the following
appendices:
•

Appendix F: Summary o f Questionnaire Returns, by Constituent
Group;

•

Appendix G: Summary o f Questionnaire Returns, by College;

•

Appendix H: Summary of Board Experience, by Years and
Percentage-Frequency Distribution;

•

Appendix I: Summary of Data by Decision-Making Context,
Aspect of Leadership, and Percentage-Frequency Distribution;
and

•

Appendix J: Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership and PercentageFrequency Distribution.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix F shows the potential count of participants based on the
established membership o f each board, the actual count o f participants, the
percentage distribution of the actual count, and the actual count expressed as a
percentage of the potential count. Further, the data were analyzed by
constituent group and by the population of the study. The distribution of the
actual count ranges from 58% for appointees to 6% for students. The actual
count as a percentage of the potential count shows a range from 77% for
presidents to 20% for students. Similarly, Appendix G shows the same data
broken down by college. Colleges are named A through Q to protect their
identity in this study. The distribution of the actual count shows a range from
10% of the total count coming from College M to 3% from College B and
College P. The actual count as a percentage of the potential count shows a
range from 69% for College M to 21% for College P.
The timing of the study coincided, unfortunately, with an unusually high
degree of instability of membership among the college boards in British
Columbia. Colleges have been inconsistent in holding elections for employee
and student members. Furthermore, education councils have also been
inconsistent in the timing o f electing their chairs. As a consequence, there were a
number of instances in certain colleges where internal members had only very
recently joined the boards. The researcher attempted, wherever possible, to
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include the form er members of boards rather than new members in order to
maximize the experience and knowledge base for the study. There was a
potential downside to this approach, however, in that retired internal board
members might have felt that their duty was over, or might have been upset by
their tenure having come to an end and, consequently, might not have been
motivated to participate in the study. The researcher concluded that the potential
richness which the experience would bring to the study justified the risk of some
non-participation. In a similar vein, the Ministry of Advanced Education, Training,
and Technology announced an unusually high number of appointments just
before the study was due to commence. While most of these appointees were
replacing members who had reached the end of their normal aggregate term of
six years, several were replacing members who had not served six years and
could reasonably have expected to be routinely reappointed or just left alone
depending on how many years they had served on their boards. This latter
action came as a result of the adoption of new government policy aimed at
increasing the number of young people on college boards. Consequently, this
high turnover of appointed members presented the same problem as for internal
members and persuaded the researcher to again attempt to include former
members rather than new members. However, there also remained the
downside of those retired members potentially lacking the motivation to
participate in the study. In addition, the potential count of participants was
already depleted before the study by several vacancies among appointed
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members (impossible to quantify due to the flexible approach of government
toward the optimum number of appointees) and student members (amounting to
four or 12% o f the potential participants).
All of these factors noted, in addition to the almost natural resistance to
complete “yet another survey”, may have served to produce a return rate o f 40%.
This rate was slightly lower than the return rate in the 1995/96 study conducted
by the researcher in 1995/96 and was somewhat disappointing given the
publicity this study had received within the provincial college system and the
interest shown in it at several education forums. However, as Ary, Jacobs, and
Razavieh (1990) noted, typically the return rate from studies adopting an
explanatory survey instrument tends to hover around the 40% level (p. 408).
What was crucial, however, to ensure that the study findings were reliable and
could be generalized to any extent was a reasonable representation of
responses across the constituent groups and colleges because these were two
of the key lenses through which the research questions were examined. (The
third lens, of course, was the matched statements in the two studies of 1995/96
and 1997/98.) And, as Appendix F shows, fair distribution across the constituent
groups was achieved ranging from 77% of presidents to 20% of students. The
latter return was disappointing considering the presence of students on boards
was identified in literature as being probably the most controversial ingredient of
shared governance. And, the views of the students would surely have enriched
the findings o f the study, however, at least six participants was better than none
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at all. The response from the other constituent groups—appointees, faculty, staff,
and education council chairs—ranged around the 40% to 50% level and,
thereby, offered good insight from each constituency. Similarly, as Appendix G
shows, all colleges and university colleges in the study were represented in the
returns. The response rate ranged from 69% of the membership o f College M to
21% of College P. Most institutions rated in the 30% to 40% range and,
therefore, permitted cautious generalization to the whole population within each
institution and to the post-secondary system as a whole.

Summary of Board Experience

The data contained in Appendix H were gathered to provide a
demographic background o f the participants in the study. The data did not play
any direct part in addressing the research questions of the study. Rather, the
purpose of collecting the data was to determine the overall level o f experience
among the board members and the extent of participation by retired appointed
members, who would tend to have served six or close to six years on their
boards. From the results, it would appear that relatively few retired members
took the opportunity to participate and the absence o f their knowledge and
experience was regrettable.
The mean experience of 2.909 years and the fact that 47% o f the
participants had less than three years experience underscored the high and
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frequent turnover o f board members of all constituencies. This is particularly true
of elected students whose term is only one year and education council chairs
whose term often only amounts to one year due to the high turnover of
membership on education councils. In addition, elected faculty and staff
members, who can serve a three year term, and presidents came onto boards in
1995 with the introduction of shared governance and now, generally, were in
their third year of membership. The present government of British Columbia,
which conceived the legislation behind shared governance, has now been in
power fo r almost seven years (after one re-election). As the sole authority for
appointing members to boards, it had exercised that right to the extent that there
were now very few, if any, members who were appointed by the previous
government. This fact was significant to the study and contrasts with the situation
when the researcher conducted a similar study in 1995/96 when at least one
third of the membership had been appointed by the previous government. If one
assumes that appointees, given that they are patronage appointments, generally
share something o f the same philosophies as the political party which has
appointed them, one might reasonably conclude that the present composition of
appointees on boards would have an impact on the views of shared governance
in principle and, perhaps, in practice at their particular sites.
In the previous study in 1995/96, when shared governance was in its
relative infancy in British Columbia, the researcher found that appointees and
presidents, interestingly those who might be described as having had to concede
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power, were generally positive toward shared governance in principle and
practice, while elected faculty, elected staff, and education council chairs, those
who might be described as having gained power, tended to be somewhat
negative, or at least cautious in their enthusiasm. Elected students had adopted
a very neutral stance, as if sitting on the fence waiting to see what was going to
unfold. The changes in the boards’ composition among the appointed members,
together with the experience acquired by the elected groups might have
suggested some shifting in the overall views on shared governance and this
emerged in the study findings. What might not have been anticipated, however,
was the dramatic change in the views of presidents with the passage of only two
years and this was further examined in detail later in this chapter.

Summary of Data, by Decision-Making C ontext
Aspect of Leadership, and Percentage-Frequency Distribution

Appendix I includes the grand mean and standard deviation values for all
statements in the first three sections of the survey questionnaire
(see Appendix B). These sections explored selected decision-making contexts—
general matters o f board business, board financial matters, and board labour
relations matters—and selected aspects of leadership—sharing o f power,
effectiveness o f the shared decision-making process and how conflict of interest
has been addressed. Further, the range of responses from strongly disagree
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though neutral to strongly agree were tabulated in a percentage frequency
distribution.

General Matters of Board Business;
Sharing of Power

Responses suggested the overall population was reasonably positive
toward this fundamental aspects of operationalizing a shared governance model.
In particular, there was a clear tendency toward agreement on the existence of a
climate of trust among all the constituents, notwithstanding their backgrounds,
and this notably coincided with the statements in literature noted in Chapter II
about such existence o f trust being absolutely crucial to successful shared
governance. Positive views (evidenced by a low percentage of negative
responses) on the contribution of ail constituency groups and the perception of
equality among them spoke further to the emergence of collaborative cultures
within the boards across British Columbia. These findings, to some extent,
contradicted the conventional wisdom offered in literature where different
constituents tended not to view themselves as equals (support staff frequently
reported a sense of marginalization), constituents did not feel that they were
making an equal contribution (a charge leveled at student members lacking the
necessary background and experience), and climates of trust were frequently
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noted as being absent (perpetuating the traditional confrontation o f values and
beliefs held by faculty and administration).
The appropriateness of the terms of office for appointed and elected
board members—an aggregate of six years for appointees, three years for
employee members, and one year for student members—also enjoyed general
agreement with low incidence of negative responses, in these cases never rising
above 25%. It might have been anticipated that the one year term for students,
particularly given the fact that five of the seventeen institutions included in the
study were four year schools, would be challenged but support fo r that term was
solid among the overall population.
Remuneration brought some interesting, and for the first tim e contrasting,
responses. Literature seemed to be divided as to whether internal board
members (as opposed, in this case, to external appointed members) should
receive monetary compensation but definitely leaned toward the notion that they
should receive release tim e from their regular instructional or service duties. The
results of this study suggested only very marginal agreement that the (currently
modest) remuneration fo r appointees is appropriate. One would assume that the
lukewarm support was due to the low level of the stipend rather than any
suggestion that it was too high, which is explored later in this chapter.
Interestingly, there was more solid agreement that the remuneration paid to
students (which is the same as that paid to appointees) was appropriate and the
relatively low number of students participating could not have accounted for the
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overall difference in views regarding payment to the two constituencies. There
was general disagreement, with a solid 30% of responses in the strongly
disagreement category, concerning the suggestion that faculty and staff
members and education council chairs should also be remunerated in the form of
a stipend like appointees and students. However, there was a clear tendency
toward agreement that those employee members should be given release time,
with 76% of the responses being in the neutral to strongly agree range.
Accordingly, these two contrasting views on a stipend and release time were
consistent with the common contentions in literature.

Board Financial Matters:
Sharing of Power

As Appendix I records, there was a solid tendency toward agreement that
internal board members have an inevitable vested interest when dealing with
budget issues, with 61% of participants expressing agreement or strong
agreement. However, there was also weak agreement that, based on the
participants’ own experiences, all board members have equal independence and
disinterest with regard to the budget. Moreover, the weakness o f the agreement
was stressed by the fact that only 40% of the respondents agreed or strongly
agreed. Finally, given the agreement in this study that internal members have
vested financial interest and statements to the same effect in literature, the
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question of whether it is more difficult to balance the budget in the period of
prolonged fiscal restraint which British Columbia has faced with boards
composed of internal and external members was examined. Participants clearly
disagreed with the assertion, 69% falling on the negative side.
It would appear, therefore, that the overall views on the sharing of power
and the accepting of roles in the often turbulent arena of financial affairs were
that they have been managed effectively by the boards. This, of course, bodes
well for institutions which continue to face enormous financial pressures (some
small colleges have been unable to balance their budgets as required by statute)
in that united boards can play the leadership role expected of them.

Board Labour Relations Matters;

Sharing of Power

In spite of strong suggestions to the contrary in literature, participants in
the study fairly clearly disagreed with a statement that shared governance as a
broad goal is difficult to achieve in a unionized environment. The 1990’s has
been a period of tense labour relations in British Columbia with a couple of
faculty strikes, a good many others headed off at the eleventh hour, and
significant power plays involving provincial unions and the provincial
government. Much of this has left not only local boards and administrations but
also local trade unions feeling marginalized and tending to direct their
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frustrations toward each other. However, the findings o f the study were that, in
general, the inclusion of internal members, often themselves trade union
executives, had not caused division among the members of boards. This
harmony might appear surprising and seemed to go against indicators emergent
in the overall labour relations climate and experiences noted in literature. Grand
means can, of course, mask wide divergences in opinion among constituencies
which were explored in the study and were examined later in this chapter.
The role of student members in the boards’ involvement in labour relations
was addressed in two statements of inquiry. This was particularly relevant given
the Canadian Federation of Students’ assertion that student unions ought to be
treated just like trade unions. The findings were clear agreement that not only
should student members play a full part in decision-making on labour relations
issues, but also that student members were, indeed, playing a full part in
colleges throughout British Columbia. In both cases, around 60% of the
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statements and, therefore, it
would appear that the students have achieved one of their stated goals since
shared governance was first contemplated.
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General Matters of Board Business:
Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process

The art of good boardsmanship is crucial to the effectiveness of boards.
Participants were asked if the composition o f their boards, obviously including
internal and external members, and the way in which their boards actually
operate contribute to the effective governance o f their institutions. The study
recorded solid agreement with both statements with only 15% and 11%,
respectively, registering disagreement or strong disagreement. Consequently,
there was a very similar level o f agreement that the conduct of boards does,
indeed, constitute good boardsmanship. It should be noted that the term “good
boardsmanship” was not defined in the study and was left to the respondents’
own interpretation. Moreover, findings suggest that good boardsmanship had
been practically exhibited because 82% of the participants agreed or strongly
agreed that their boards had managed to make some difficult decisions in the
last two years. The last few years have represented challenges fo r colleges in
British Columbia and have required that difficult decisions be made in many
facets of education. If boards were expressing a degree of satisfaction with the
process and outcome of those decisions then it is something of a testimony to
the arrival of shared governance.
The need for accountability in decision-making is constantly stressed in
literature and in the political milieu which surrounds public education. It was
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noted, particularly in the literature, that the public-at-large was skeptical about
college boards’ accountability and the arrival o f shared governance, if anything,
had exacerbated that skepticism. It was interesting, therefore, to note that there
was a tendency toward strong agreement with the statement that boards were
being accountable for their decisions, both to the internal and external
communities. Furthermore, there was even more positive contention on the part
of the constituents that boards were fulfilling their general obligations under the
College and Institute Act. Indeed, only 6% disagreed or strongly disagreed with
this statement. Another set of perspectives on the degree of accountability of
college boards, perhaps from the public-at-large, would offer a counterbalance to
those of the board members themselves, but that is a topic for further research
outside the scope of this study.
Finally, the tendency toward centralization of decision-making was
explored. It has been noted extensively in literature that, across North America,
there are clear trends o f states and provinces transferring decision-making
power from local campuses to central control. And, this had occurred, ironically,
during the same period when shared governance has taken root at the college
level. Such a contradictory trend appears to be occurring in British Columbia.
And, this was confirmed in the study with only 13% disagreeing or strongly
disagreeing with the statement that boards’ powers were being diminished as
decision-making is increasingly centralized at the provincial level. It is not clear
what impact the diminution of power was having on the acceptance of shared
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governance. Perhaps the advent o f the former actually makes it easier to
achieve the latter. Although, there is certainly a school of thought to suggest that
local decision-making, even if it is limited, is all the more complicated when other
decisions have been made centrally. This would not necessarily provide a
smooth path for the development of the shared governance model.

Board Financial Matters;
Effectiveness o f the Shared Decision-Making Process

The apparent Achilles heel of shared governance, as noted extensively in
literature, was the conflict of interest faced by internal members. And, that
inherent conflict of interest appeared to become most problematic in matters of
finance and labour relations where vested interests were potentially closest to
the surface. However, participants in the study tended solidly toward agreement
with the statement that internal members have NOT shown bias toward their own
constituency when dealing with budget issues. Furthermore, there were strong
feelings that boards have effectively discharged their fiscal responsibilities under
the College and Institute Act, as evidenced in Appendix I by 82% of the
participants expressing agreement or strong agreement. In a sim ilar vein, the
boards’ fiduciary responsibility to all students (which is a matter o f legal
contention on the grounds that boards assess and collect student union fees
from all students) when dealing with student unions on financial matters was
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tested. Testing this fiduciary obligation was particularly relevant given the
existence of students on boards who are commonly also student union
executives. There was virtual agreement that this special responsibility was
being discharged effectively by boards.
The boards’ role in the often dramatic theatre of budget preparation was
examined in the context of the shared governance model. One of the contentious
areas of boardsmanship which can be exacerbated in shared governance was
the boards’ role vis-ei-vis that of administration. The statement that the boards’
role should be to approve the parameters and underlying assumptions of the
budget, but otherwise should leave the assembly of the numbers to
administration met with clear agreement, some 78% expressing agreement or
strong agreement. Moreover, respondents solidly agreed that boards do ensure
that all stakeholder groups have the opportunity fo r advisory input to the budget
process and that all stakeholder groups have been adequately informed about
financial matters. These last two findings were particularly positive because,
while stakeholders may not seek an actual decision-making role in budgeting,
there is often the accusation that they are also denied access to the process on
an advisory or even information sharing basis.
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Board Labour Relations Matters:
Effectiveness o f the Shared Decision-Making Process

It was established earlier in this chapter that respondents confirmed the
tendency toward centralization of decision-making in British Columbia. And, this
had been particularly true in labour relations with the advent of centralized
collective bargaining and overt and covert instances o f direct government
intervention in affairs which legally and technically belonged at the campus level.
Thus, it was suggested that this tendency of centralization would mean that
boards might be spared any difficulties in decision-making due to the presence of
internal members. However, participants were virtually split down the middle with
equal numbers in agreement, neutral, and disagreement. The response begged
for further research to determine if the relative absence o f difficulties is due to the
shifting in power or other more positive reasons within the boards’ culture.
Additionally, there was clear agreement that boards had effectively discharged
their labour relations responsibilities under the College and Institute Act.
The high level role o f the boards in determining the direction of the
institutions’ labour relations policy and strategy, which was firmly established in
literature, was examined in different contexts. A clear m ajority of respondents,
62%, disagreed with the contention that boards would have adopted a different
direction in policy and strategy had the boards not included internal members.
However, there was marginal agreement that direction would have been different
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had provincial centralization of decision-making powers not been taking place.
Finally, the suggestion was made that the boards’ direction would have differed if
neither shared governance nor centralization had existed, however the
suggestion was met with a tendency toward disagreement. It would appear,
therefore, that board members fe lt that government control may have influenced
their labour relations direction in a negative way, but that the arrival of internal
members on their boards had no such negative affect.

General Matters of Board Business:
How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed

In this section o f the study, the unique status of the presidents and
education council chairs was explored. The legislation, which established shared
governance in British Columbia, designated non-voting ex-officio positions on
college boards for the chief executive officer of the institution and the chair of the
education council. The education council is a senate-like body in each institution,
which was also introduced in the same legislative amendment, known as Bill 22.
There was agreement and strong agreement, drawing 81% of the respondents,
that the non-voting ex-officio status was appropriate for presidents. Indeed,
reaction to the suggestion that presidents should be full-voting members was
strongly negative with 82% of the respondents expressing disagreement or
strong disagreement, the latter attracting 42%. Views on the role of the
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education council chairs mirrored those for the presidents, although not in such
strong terms, amounting to 64% in favour of the non-voting ex-officio status and
61% in disagreement with full-voting status. The noticeable difference between
the strength of the views on the education council chairs compared to the
presidents was interesting and perhaps suggested the possibility of voting status
for the form er in the future, presumably with the rationale that they can represent
the academic community in general in the same way as faculty, staff, and
student members represent their constituency. The complete anomaly that sees
the presidents who are hired by and report to the boards sit on such bodies with
the ability to fully participate except for voting remains just that...an anomaly.
From formal and informal feedback during the short life o f shared
governance in the province, but particularly during its early days, the drafting of
bylaws and policies on conflict of interest had been reported as being
contentious at the college level. And, the fact that the Ministry o f Advanced
Education, Training, and Technology eventually stepped in and ordered
institutions to adopt prescribed language for their conflict of interest bylaw may
have had an impact on the difficulties expressed by colleges. However, in the
study it was found that participants were close to agreement that the resultant
bylaw and policy, if colleges chose to adopt the latter, were generally accepted
by all board members as fair and workable. Accordingly, some 56% of the
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their board had not experienced any
problem with conflict o f interest in general matters of board business.
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Board Financial Matters:
How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed

The more focused issue of conflict in financial matters was examined in
the context of board dealings with student unions on decisions pertaining to
tuition fees and other items which were likely to produce friction between the two
bodies. In particular, the fact that student board members were deemed not to
be in conflict of interest in the provincially prescribed bylaw on such matters was
explored. The findings were that the participants tended toward agreement that
their boards have dealt effectively with the obvious conflict issue when it comes
to decision-making. However, there was a lukewarm tendency toward
agreement, involving only 47% of the respondents, as to the appropriateness of
student board members being able to vote on proposed tuition fee increases. In
a similar vein, there was relatively weak disagreement with the suggestion that
student board members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office
in their respective student unions. It is fair to say that the provincial government
gave students more licence than any of the other internal constituents in drafting
the legislation around shared governance. The reason for this has never been
exactly clear and could stem from recognition that education is all about students
at the end of the day and, therefore, they should enjoy a relatively larger share of
the shared governance pie or else the student population represented a
considerable voter base to be cultivated.
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Board Labour Relations Matters:
How Conflict of interest has been Addressed

Bill 22, the legislative amendment which brought shared governance to
British Columbia, included a few surprises for the education community and none
more so than the introduction o f an oath o f office to which all board members
were required to swear. The study found more than solid agreement that elected
and ex-officio members, notwithstanding any other allegiance which they might
hold or even have sworn an oath to, had lived upto their oath in dealing with the
boards’ role in labour relations. Furthermore, 75% of the responses agreed or
strongly agreed that boards had dealt effectively with the inherent conflict of
interest of internal members in matters of administering collective agreements.
However, one obvious way of dealing with such conflict, by confining decision
making to some form o f executive committee from which those in conflict might
be excluded, appeared not to have been chosen as only 36% o f the participants
attested. Finally, in a statement sim ilar to that directed at student board members
vis-a-vis financial matters, there was weak agreement that elected employee
members and ex-officio members should be disqualified from simultaneously
holding office in their respective trade unions.
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Summary of the Assessment
of Own Boards* Effectiveness
in Aspects o f Leadership
and Percentaqe-Freauencv Distribution

In this section of the study, participants were asked to review lists of the
characteristics of typical effective board leadership in a shared governance
context. Further, they were asked to indicate the degree of presence of the
characteristics in their own boards’ culture according to a Lickert-type scale
ranging from non-existence through to strong existence. The characteristics were
drawn from the themes which formed the basis of the exploratory statements in
other sections of the questionnaire (see Appendix B). Thus, the study and the
questionnaire were essentially divided into two parts, the first being a series of
statements to elicit the views of the respondents based partly on their philosophy
and partly on their practical experience, and the second being more of an audit
of board cultures in British Columbia as expressed by the members themselves.

Sharing of Power

Appendix J shows that some 74% of the participants attested to the
existence of a climate of trust among all board members within their colleges.
Trust is, of course, the most fundamental requirement of any effective
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organizational culture and especially so in the case o f a shared decision-making
model given the disparate backgrounds of the board members and the
perception, if not the reality, that members represent often competing
constituencies. Perhaps as a consequence of the existence of a climate of trust
in many of the colleges surveyed, there was confirmation that, generally, all
members have contributed equally to the functioning of their boards in spite of
the different values and expertise they brought to the role. The sharing of power
was noted in literature as being the most basic and yet most inherently difficult
element in the construction of a shared governance model. This was due to a
number of factors including the background and sometimes competing
philosophy of the board members and also, most importantly, their status within
the organization. Many writers noted the difficulties expressed by staff and
student members in term s of feelings of marginalization and tokenism and by
faculty members in term s of their historical conflict with the institutional
establishment represented by board members and administrations. All board
members in British Columbia, irrespective of their constituencies, are expected to
act as members-at-large with the common good of the institution as their
overriding goal. A truly effective shared governance model would have a unified
culture rather than one o f collective individualism and this was examined in the
study. Alas, there was only confirmation of weak existence o f all board members
maintaining an independence from their individual constituencies when it came
to practising boardsmanship. Furthermore, 51% of the respondents noted that
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board members were not bringing vested interests to the board table in their
colleges. There was also sim ilar existence (48%) expressed of board
effectiveness in the sharing o f power being enhanced because traditional
(confrontational) labour/management relationships were not allowed to infiltrate
the expanded boards’ culture.

Effectiveness of the Shared
Decision-Making Process

There was strong existence, identified by 75% of the participants, o f clear
rules of boardsmanship which were consistently applied in colleges where
shared decision-making processes were considered effective. This characteristic
was noted extensively in literature as being important for the orderly transition to
and maintenance of shared governance, although there were differing views on
how the rules should be drawn up. Similar strong expressions o f the existence of
accountability for board decision-making and board compliance with the
obligations of the College and Institute Act were confirmed in boards which were
considered effective. It was suggested that a further characteristic of effective
boards would be their ability to cope with the tendency toward centralized
decision-making at the provincial level. Subsequently, only 12% of the
respondents recorded no existence o f this characteristic at their colleges,
suggesting not only widespread recognition of the trend toward taking power
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away from the local boards but also that boards were dealing with the issue. This
is a potential area of further research as institutions evolve from being
hierarchical organizations with substantial local power to become democratic
organizations within a hierarchical education system where the power resides
elsewhere.
Strong existence was attested to of both the fact that no bias had been
shown by employee board members in dealing with budget issues and the
allocation o f resources and neither had bias been shown by student board
members in the same tasks. The characteristic of members keeping their vested
interests in check and acting for the common good of their institution was, of
course, central to the success o f the shared decision-making model. And, the
strong existence of this characteristic spoke well to the likely success of systemic
change in the province. Further, some 63% of the participants recorded
existence, within their boards’ membership, of an understanding of the distinction
between leadership and management and a consequent acknowledgment of the
respective roles of the boards and administrations. This confirmed the extent to
which the influence of John Carver and his book Boards that make a difference:
A new design for leadership in nonprofit and public orqanizations(2nd ed., 1997)
has had on board philosophy in British Columbia. Finally, and one might have
anticipated a different answer considering the generally positive responses in
this section, there was only very moderate expression of existence of colleges
having a history of informal shared governance before the legislation, which
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would have provided a natural launching pad to the formal model and would
have tended to make the transition easier. However, the fact that the largest
number of respondents, 35%, were neutral on a statement of historical fact might
suggest more of a lack of knowledge on the part of the board members,
particularly the new external members, than anything else.

How Conflict of Interest
has been Addressed

There were a number of references in literature to the need fo r clear
operating procedures and regulations within which the effective shared decision
making model would function. Accordingly, some 74% of the participants noted
the existence or strong existence of clearly understood and accepted (by all
constituent groups) bylaws and/or policies on conflict of interest relating to the
internal members at their institutions. Furthermore, the suggestion that effective
boards in a shared governance environment would include internal members
who act in an at-large capacity and did not represent their constituencies was
recognized, the mean of responses here tending toward strong existence at their
institutions. Some 59% of the respondents cited the existence of the oath of
office as a factor which had prevented historical labour /management problems
from surfacing among the constituencies of board members. And, only 25%
admitted the existence of an executive committee, from which internal members
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might be excluded, as a possible vehicle to deal with the inherent conflict of
interest faced by internal members by simply circumventing them. The apparent
importance of the oath of office represented quite a cultural change in a short
period of time. Such oaths are not part of the Canadian culture and their
introduction was criticized not only on principle but also due to the practical
problem that many unionized board members felt that they also owed a sworn or
implied allegiance to their unions and should not be compelled to divide their
loyalties. This dilemma, of course, illustrated the very difficulty of at-large
membership versus representation in shared governance. One is, however, left
to wonder how the dilemma of conscience had been resolved, given the finding
that the oath of office to the board was viewed as an important characteristic of
effective boards.
Finally, participants noted the strong existence of presidents and
education council chairs, albeit with their non-voting status or perhaps even
because of it, being able to make a full contribution to the execution of board
affairs as other characteristics of effective boards in the shared governance
model. There was more than a little anecdotal suggestion that, in some colleges,
the president and the education council chair have taken their unusual roles
within the shared decision-making model and used them to forge close working
relationships which have not only contributed to the governance of the institution
but also its management.
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Summary

It was important, in this study of potential differences in the views among
constituent groups and among colleges, that both sectors were reasonably well
represented in the questionnaire returns. Fortunately, this proved to be the case
with all constituent groups covered, ranging from a 77% return rate for presidents
to 20% for students, and all colleges covered, ranging from a 69% return rate
from College M to 21% for College P. Furthermore, the mean years of
experience at 2.909 years underscored the high turnover of board members and
relative inexperience of the study participants.
In overall terms, the analysis of the grand means obtained in the study
revealed positive views to be held by the board members about various aspects
of shared governance. The participants were in agreement with the different
lengths of term for constituents but differed on the issue o f remuneration.
Specifically, they were virtually neutral on the level of stipend currently received
by appointees, against faculty, staff, and education council chairs receiving
stipends, and in support of those three constituent groups receiving release time
as well as students continuing to receive their current stipend.
Positive expressions were made about the contribution of all constituent
groups to financial matters including the budget, and the presence of internal
members was not seen as a problem in this context. Similarly, participants were
positive about all constituents’ contribution to labour relations matters. There was
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strong support for student involvement in this area. Members felt that the newly
constituted boards were fulfilling their fiscal, labour relations, and general
obligations under the College and Institute Act and internal members were not
showing any signs of bias in performance of their duties. Participants expressed
clarity concerning the role of the board and its relationship to administration and
other bodies within the institution.
There was feeling among the participants that the direction of labour
relations at the college level has not been overly influenced by the presence of
internal members on the boards, but that the provincial government has imposed
change that would not have happened naturally. Respondents were in favour of
the non-voting ex-officio status of the presidents and education council chairs on
boards and strongly against changing to voting status, particularly with respect to
presidents.
There were several confirmations that rules around conflict of interest
have been effective and few problems had been experienced with this potential
sore point of shared governance. The oath of office was also cited as an
effective prevention of problems. There was disagreement with the suggestion
that student members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office
in their respective student unions but slight agreement that employee members
should be barred from holding trade union office. Finally, there was a consistent
confirmation of the existence of the typical characteristics of effective shared
governance among the participants’ own institutions.
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Analysis of the grand mean values establishes global trends in the
findings and sets the scene for the more in-depth comparative analysis between
constituent groups, colleges, and the studies of 1997/98 and 1995/96 that
follows in this chapter.

Presentation and Discussion
of the Comparative Statistics

In this section o f the chapter, the data obtained from the survey
questionnaire were analyzed to provide the three lenses through which the
research questions, noted below, could be addressed:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects of
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared
decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members has been addressed when it comes to
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and
labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the constituency
from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected faculty; elected
support staff; elected students; presidents; and education council chairs, in
certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived
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conflict of interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of business,
financial matters, and labour relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and those from
an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the
sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and
how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in respect to
general matters o f business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The data were, therefore, analyzed by constituency group—appointees,
elected faculty, elected staff, elected students, presidents, and education council
chairs—, by college (seventeen colleges and university colleges took part in the
study), and through several matched questions comparison was possible
between this study and a similar study earned out by the researcher in 1995/96.
The presentation and discussion of the comparative statistics, which follow,
focus on each statement of the questionnaire (see Appendix B) through the three
areas of comparison, namely constituency, college, and the passage of time.
The data were sorted according to decision-making context and aspect of
leadership to complete the three dimensional focus of the study, illustrated in
Diagram 3 on page 23.
Reference throughout this section of the chapter is made to the following
appendices:
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Appendix K: Summary of Data by Constituent Group, Decision-Making
Context, and Aspect of Leadership;

•

Appendix L: Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituent Group;

•

Appendix M: Summary of Data by College (A to Q), Decision-Making
Context, and Aspect of Leadership;

•

Appendix N: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College (A to Q); and

•

Appendix O: Summary of Matched Statements in the 1995/96 and
1997/98 Studies, by Constituent Group.
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Summary o f Data by Decision-Making Context
and Aspect of Leadership

In this section, there are nine combinations of decision-making context
and aspect of leadership and forty-eight questions contained within them.

General Matters of Board Business:

Sharing.of Power

1...My board has established a climate of trust among all the
members (irrespective of the constituency they come from).

W hile all constituents agreed with the statement, presidents were the least
convinced, being barely over neutral, and contrasted with students and
education council chairs who were the most positive. Among colleges, the one
way ANOVA revealed a significant difference. However, when a post-hoc
analysis was carried out, using the Scheffe technique, it failed to identify any
significant difference between the pairs of colleges. (The Scheffe test is very
conservative in nature and appropriate to this study given the relatively small
population sizes at the college level.) However, the findings did reveal a range of
views among colleges from disagreement to strong agreement. A climate of trust
is the most basic of requirements for effective shared governance and the
disparity of views among constituents (relating to the presidents) and,
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particularly, among colleges is worthy of note. Negative views among the
colleges were very likely rooted in particular local experiences rather than on any
philosophical basis and may be an indicator of other issues of note to emerge
later in the study.

2...Board members mav bring different values and expertise
but all generally contribute equally to the functioning of the
board.

This statement, like the previous one, brought a grand mean tending
toward agreement but with wide variation among the constituents’ responses,
falling short, however, of any significant difference. While appointees, staff,
students, and education council chairs were solidly in agreement, faculty and
presidents tended toward disagreement. In the analysis of college responses, it
was again the same story as in the previous statement. Significant difference
was revealed in the one-way ANOVA but no significant difference was found
between any of the pairs of colleges in the post-hoc test. However, there was
again a wide range of responses from almost strong agreement (College A,
College G, and College K as they had indicated on the first statement) to
disagreement (College P again). Clearly, even after only two statements, trends
were beginning to emerge—constituents were generally positive except for
presidents and colleges were showing a wide array of views with the same
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colleges positive toward the introduction of shared governance and the same
colleges negative.

3...Board members view themselves as equals.

Again, the grand mean was a fairly solid agreement. Faculty were the only
constituent group to disagree and the most interesting finding was that staff were
the most positive of all the respondents. Yet, literature suggested that support
staff often viewed shared governance in a cautious light and complained of
feeling undervalued or token representatives. Colleges, on the other hand,
behaved very much as they had in the two previous statements. Significant
difference was revealed in the one-way ANOVA, which one might have expected
to be between at the highest mean score and the lowest mean score. However,
the Scheffe test did not identify any pairs of significant difference, probably
because of the small population size of the extreme institutions. As before, there
was quite a range from strong agreement (College A, College B, College K, and
College N) to disagreement (College P). College P provided the fewest returns
but, obviously, those who did respond had quite negative views on these very
fundamental factors of shared decision-making.
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4...The six year term for appointed board members is
appropriate.

The grand mean and the responses from all groups but the students were
solidly in agreement that the aggregate of six years was an appropriate term for
appointed members. The term is not embodied in the College and Institute Act
(uniike those of employees and students) but has generally been followed by
government until, ironically, several appointments of less than six years were not
renewed or merely canceled ju st immediately prior to the study. The views of
some of these recently “retired” members may be included in the appointees’
responses, which were, nevertheless, solidly in agreement with the six year term.
There was a slightly narrower range of responses among colleges compared to
previous statements. College A and College K were, again, the most positive
with mean scores tending toward strong agreement. College F and College M
were the only ones to tend toward disagreement. This statement was also
subjected to a two-way ANOVA to compare the data from the present study with
that of a sim ilar study undertaken by the researcher in 1995/96. Significant
difference was revealed between the two studies and among the constituent
groups, however, there was no significant difference in the interaction between
the two sources o f data. The constituents’ means showed some interesting shifts
over the two studies with faculty and, in particular, education council chairs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187
acquiring a more positive view on the subject of the appointees’ term of office,
while the students retained a negative view.

5...The three year term for elected board members is
appropriate.

The grand mean was closer to agreement than for the appointees’ term
and all constituent groups were in agreement. Staff were the most positive in
responding to their own situation. Similarly, faculty were solidly in agreement.
Colleges were also firm ly in agreement, save for one, College P, which was in
disagreement. This college was clearly at odds with all the other institutions
whose means scored in the upper reaches of agreement or strong agreement.
Comparison of the two studies revealed no significant difference between the
studies, among the constituents, or in the interaction between the sources o f
data. The means of the constituents showed remarkable consistency over the
two-year period between the studies.

6...The one year term for student board members is

appropriate.

For this statement, there was again generally positive response with the
grand mean being virtually on agreement. The students were the least positive
about their own term. One would assume that the concern was directed to the
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shortness of the duration of one year and the view was perhaps reflective of the
fact that five of the seventeen reporting institutions were university colleges, four
year schools, which may have fostered the notion of two or even three year
terms as appropriate for students. Conversely, education council chairs were the
most positive about the one year term, and this, perhaps, reflected the feeling
noted in literature among faculty in general that students were not natural (or
legitimate) partners in shared governance and, therefore, a one year turnaround
was appropriate. Analysis of the colleges’ responses again revealed significant
difference within the wide range of values. However, the post hoc test did not
reveal significant difference between any of the pairs of institutions. College I
was strongly in agreement, as were College N and College Q to a lesser extent,
while College B, College F, College G, and College H all tended toward
disagreement. The university colleges’ responses mirrored the overall
responses, ranging from strongly agree to disagree, and, therefore, there was no
discernible correlation between four year schools and calls for longer terms for
students. Finally, there was no significant difference revealed in the two-way
ANOVA between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction
between the two sources of data. The views of the appointees, students,
presidents, and education council chairs remained fairly consistent over the two
years between the studies, however, faculty and staff both amended their views
from strong agreement to a weaker tendency toward agreement. The response
of the faculty might not support the earlier suggestion that the positive view of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189
education council chairs reflected hesitance in seeing students as natural
partners in shared governance.

7(a)...The remuneration for appointed board members is
appropriate.

The grand mean was a very weak tendency toward agreement, indeed it
was closer to neutrality, which masked a fair range of responses. Staff and
students were in agreement, while faculty and presidents ended up strictly
neutral and appointees, the object of the question, and education council chairs
tended toward disagreement. The stipends for board members and board chairs
are very modest in comparison to similar remuneration levels for governors in
other public sectors. Further research would be necessary, however, to
determine if appointees and education council chairs had the same reasons for
being negative toward the remuneration level of the former.
In a similar vein to responses to earlier questions, significant difference
was revealed by the one-way ANOVA among colleges. However, the Scheffe
test did not identify significant difference among any of the pairs of institutions.
Responses ranged from agreement (College B, College I, and College Q) to
strong disagreement (College D and College G). Stipends for appointees are
controlled by the provincial government and are the same at each college
irrespective of its size or mandate. The divergence of views among colleges was,
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therefore, probably only a personal reaction on the part of the participants honed
into an institutional trend by discussion around the board table.

7(b)...The remuneration for student board members is
appropriate.

The responses, overall, were slightly more positive toward the level of
remuneration being appropriate for students compared to appointees. (Students
and appointees receive the same level of stipend.) In this case, the views of the
constituent groups were all very similar except presidents, who were slightly
more positive in regard to students and education council chairs who moved
noticeably from disagreement on appointees to agreement on students.
Interestingly, students were in agreement with the level of stipend for both
appointees and themselves, while appointees were in disagreement with both.
Colleges again revealed a range of responses, without any significant difference
from strong agreement (College I and College Q) to strong disagreement
(College G). College I and College Q were consistent in their support of the
levels o f remuneration for both appointees and students, while College G was
consistent in its condemnation of the same.
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8(a)...Faculty and support staff members and the chairs of the
education council should be remunerated by way of a stipend

The notion of the stipend being extended to faculty, staff, and education
council chairs produced a grand mean solidly in the direction of disagreement.
(These employee members of boards currently receive no compensation.)
Interestingly, only students bucked the trend and were solidly in favour of the
notion, however, faculty were mildly in favour and staff were strictly neutral.
Perhaps, this was an example of the union solidarity that had been the stated
goal of those constituents. Colleges were also fairly consistent in their
disagreement with the suggestion. Only College E with a tendency toward strong
agreement and College A, College C, and College F in strong disagreement
were outside the main cluster of institutions.

8(b)...Faculty and support staff members and the chairs of the
education council should be remunerated by way of release
time.

The suggestion that faculty, staff, and education council chairs should be
remunerated for their sen/ice to the board with release time from instructional or
service duties brought a grand mean tending toward agreement, but the one-way
ANOVA revealed significant difference among the constituent groups. A post-hoc
analysis, using the Scheffe technique, indicated that the difference existed
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between appointees (agreement) and presidents (strong disagreement), staff
(strong agreement) and presidents, and education council chairs (strong
agreement) and presidents. Thus, the presidents were revealed to be totally out
of line with all the other constituents in their opposition to release time. It should
be noted that the presidents had also disagreed with the suggestion of a stipend
for the same employee members. Interesting too was the strongly positive
position of staff members on release time, because this is not the traditional form
of remuneration for this group of employees. Colleges ranged widely from
disagreement (College E, College I, and College P) to College B with a perfect
mean score of 5.000 indicating strong agreement. The majority of colleges fell
into the agreement range of values.

Summary

Generally, all constituent groups were positive toward elements of power
sharing connected with general matters of board business. These elements
included boards’ climate of trust, members’ contribution, members’ equity, and
the various terms of office of the members. In addition, constituents were positive
toward existing levels of remuneration for appointees and students. However,
they were not all of one mind on the issue of remuneration for faculty, staff, and
education council chairs. While generally negative toward the suggestion of a
stipend for the employee members, all but the presidents were in agreement that
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the employees should be granted release time. The presidents were in strong
disagreement causing significant statistical difference with three other constituent
groups. There was usually a wide range of responses among colleges on each
question with a fair bit of variation from question to question. However, in the
area of sharing of power overall, College B, College K, and College L emerged
as the most positive institutions while College F, College G, and College P were
the least positive. In the comparison of the two studies, the only areas of
significant difference emerged on the issue of the appropriateness of the six year
term for appointees between the two studies and among the constituent groups.
In conclusion, participants were generally positive toward the elements of
sharing of power which contribute to an effective shared governance
environment in the context of matters of general board business.

Board Financial Matters;
Sharing o f Power

22...AII members of my board have equal independence and
disinterest when it comes to dealing with budget issues.

The grand mean on this statement showed a very weak tendency toward
agreement and reflected similar tendencies from all constituents except
presidents who were in solid disagreement. This result proved to be the second
of a series of instances where the presidents expressed a negative view that was
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totally different from all of the other participants. The implications o f this trend on
a value based question such as this are, indeed, troubling. W hile the views of the
other respondents were not particularly positive, the highest being stafF with a
mean score of 3.571, the fact that the presidents were suggesting that conflict of
interest is affecting the budget process may be a harbinger of further issues to
come. In a manner sim ilar to the constituent groups, most colleges’ mean scores
hovered around neutral and marginally toward agreement. However, College K
stood out in absolute agreement whereas College L, College O, College P, and
College Q tended toward disagreement.

23...Elected and ex-officio board members have an inevitable
vested interest when dealing with budget issues.

This statement is really a matter of fact and was included to test the level
o f acknowledgment of such among the constituents. The outcome was general
agreement except for the education council chairs who remained neutral.
Interestingly, staff provided the most positive responses. Colleges’ means were
far more widely dispersed than the constituents and included three colleges,
College B, College H, and College L, which tended toward strong agreement
while College Q came out solidly in disagreement. The disparity o f responses on
this question was quite surprising and may have influenced some o f the more
value based questions to follow.
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33...The composition of the board has made it more difficult to
balance the budget fn these tight financial times.

The grand mean tended solidly toward disagreement, suggesting that the
composition of boards in this shared governance era has not made it more
difficult to balance budgets. Colleges in British Columbia have gone through five
years of serious fiscal restraint and have found it increasingly difficult to balance
budgets, so much so that in the current year several small colleges have had to
request government intervention. Among the constituents, the presidents again
stood out clearly by agreeing with the statement, while all the others tended
toward disagreement or strong disagreement (the latter espoused by faculty and
students). The one-way ANOVA signaled a significant difference but the posthoc analysis did not reveal any significant statistical difference between the
presidents and any of the other participants. In the case of the responses from
colleges, most means tended toward disagreement, as would be expected from
the value of the grand mean. However, College B, College E, College F, and
College Q tended toward agreement and College 0, College G, College H,
College J, College M, and College O tended toward strong disagreement.

Summary

The sharing o f power in the context of board financial matters was the
beginning of consideration of the tension that most likely exists in any shared
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governance model according to literature. The reason for this, apart from the fact
that financial affairs can be difficult at the best of times and can bring out
extreme bahaviours, was the background and occasional agendas brought to the
boards by the internal members. The participants in the study generally agreed
that internal members have an inevitable vested interested in matters of the
budget, however, all but the presidents agreed that all the constituents had
demonstrated independence from their constituencies in actual decision-making
and disagreed that the composition of the boards, specifically the inclusion of
internal members, had made it more difficult to balance the budget. The
presidents were very clearly at odds with their colleagues on the above
statements and opined disagreement and agreement, respectively. This isolation
of their views, while not amounting to significant difference, was an indicator of
the kind of tension which authors noted in literature. However, what was absent
in the study was anticipated concurrence with the presidents’ views by the
appointees. The literature would have suggested that external members would
have shared the caution about the sharing of power on financial decision
making, but British Columbia appointees did not follow this trend and clearly
concurred with the views of the internal members. Colleges continued to produce
a wide array of responses on all three statements. Some suggestion o f trends
continued to emerge with College G, College J, and College K generally
adopting the most positive stance on the issue of power sharing in the context of
board decision-making on financial matters. Conversely, College B, College H,
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and College P were the most negative in this section. Looking at the trends over
the two contexts reviewed so far, i.e. general board matters and financial
matters, College A, College K, and College L emerged as the most positive
colleges while College E, College F, and College P were consistently tending
toward negative.

Board Labour Realtions Matters;
Sharing of Power

34...Shared governance as a broad goal is difficult to achieve in a
unionized environment

The issue of shared governance in a unionized environment was
discussed extensively in the literature with most authors identifying ensuing
difficulties, although there were some views that the two can coexist and even, in
some few instances, stimulate one another. The issue was, of course,
particularly pertinent to the college system (and the school system) where
unionism has established a strong foothold as opposed to the university system
where shared governance has the established position over unionism. In the
British Columbia college system, the unions had established a position of
considerable strength long before shared governance. And additionally, the
introduction of shared governance had coincided with a relative surge in the
powers o f the unions through the government orchestrated centralization of
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collective bargaining. Perhaps not surprisingly, the statem ent that shared
governance is difficult to achieve in a unionized environment brought a grand
mean tending toward disagreement, however, the one-way ANOVA indicated a
significant difference with all constituent groups on the disagreement side except
for the presidents. The post-hoc analysis revealed significant difference between
faculty (strong disagreement) and presidents (agreement) and between
appointees (disagreement) and presidents. The latter difference signaled the
start of a trend in this study which was completely at odds with the findings in the
1995/96 study. In the earlier study, the researcher found that appointees and
presidents, those who m ight be considered to have conceded power with the
advent of shared governance, were noticeably more positive toward the new
governance model than the internal members, those who might be considered to
have gained power. This alliance of appointees and presidents was not so
surprising and was noted in literature as often being the backbone of a shared
governance model. However, it was a very clear that a different pattern was
emerging in this study with the internal members joining the appointees on the
positive side while the presidents were beginning to stand alone on the negative
side.
Colleges, again, reported differing values ranging from agreement
(College A and College C) to strong disagreement (College G, College K, and
College P). The majority o f colleges tended toward disagreement and one has to
assume that their views would be largely built upon their own experiences within
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their own institutions. This statement had also been examined in the 1995/96
study and permitted comparison through the passage of time. The two-way
ANOVA revealed no significant difference between the two studies, significant
difference among the constituent groups, and no significant interaction between
the two sources of study. The trends over the passage of time among the
constituents were interesting to note. While appointees and students shifted from
positions of agreement to disagreement and faculty shifted from disagreement to
strong disagreement, the presidents simply strengthened their agreement with
the statement. Thus the movement in values between the two studies had begun
to crystallize.

35...Labour relations, in particular the negotiation and administering
of collective agreements, has caused division among the members
of my board.

There was close to disagreement overall on the suggestion that labour
relations has caused division among the board members in spite of their
disparate backgrounds. But, as has been noted already as a trend, the
presidents were out of step even in expressing very weak agreement in contrast
to all the other constituent groups who expressed disagreement or strong
disagreement in the case of the support staff. Again, in the analysis of colleges,
there emerged the now familiar pattern of most colleges being clustered around
the mean, in this case signifying disagreement with the statement, and a few
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colleges expressing extreme views. The latter included College C, College E,
and College Q on the side o f neutrality or agreement and College G, College K,
and College P on the side of strong disagreement. The last named college was
absolute in its rejection of the statement scoring a mean o f 1.000.

44...Student board members should play a full part in decision
making on labour relations issues.

There was almost universal support for the notion of student board
members playing a full part in decision-making on labour relations issues. The
Ministry of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology directed all colleges
to adopt a prescribed conflict o f interest bylaw which provided fo r students to be
involved in decision-making, notwithstanding any direct or indirect conflict of
interest which they might be perceived to have. There was agreement from
appointees, presidents, and education council chairs; tendency toward strong
agreement from faculty; and totally strong agreement from students themselves
(scoring a mean of 5.000). However, support staff were in disagreement with the
suggestion and, presumably, that part of the legislation. This outcome was
interesting and might be due to the somewhat traditional view o f labour relations,
some would say an industrial view, which staff tend to hold as opposed to faculty
who can be quite pragmatic. In that traditional view o f labour relations, it was
probably difficult to envision a presence for students.
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The one-way ANOVA of college responses revealed a significant
difference, however, the Scheffe post-hoc test did not identify any significant
difference among the pairs of colleges in spite of the divergent views. The grand
mean, which indicated solid agreement with the statement, masked more
extreme views including tendency toward strong agreement (College A, College
C, College F, College J, College K, College L, and College P) and tendency
toward disagreement (College B, and College I). This statement, therefore,
brought a wider range of responses than most of the statements illustrating the
relative uncertainty among institutions on the role of student board members.

45...Student members on my board do play a full part in decision
making on labour relations issues.

This statement moved beyond the philosophical focus of the previous
statement and rested on the actual role which student board members have
assumed in the boards’ involvement in labour relations. Because it was based on
the actual role of students, one might have assumed that the study would have
revealed little dispersion from the mean among constituent groups but the
possibility of wider dispersion among colleges depending on their practices.
However, while the grand mean among constituents indicated solid agreement
with the statement, there was a surprising range of responses from
disagreement (from staff, and mirroring their philosophical views) to tendency
toward strong agreement (from students).
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There was significant difference indicated among colleges’ responses but
the post-hoc analysis failed to reveal any significant difference among the pairs
of colleges. The views of colleges on this statem ent very much mirrored their
responses on the previous statement suggesting that board members might be
able to generally practise what they believe. Accordingly, College A, College C,
College D, College J, College K, College O, and College P expressed tendency
toward agreement while College B, College H, College I, and College Q came
out on the disagreement side.

Summary

Three themes were seen to emerge among constituents on the issue of
sharing power in the context of labour relations matters at the college board
level. The strong view held in literature that shared governance is inherently
difficult to introduce into a unionized environment was rejected by all the
constituent groups except the presidents, who once again stood alone on this
issue. In spite of the disparity in background of the constituencies, and
particularly the often strong ties between employee members and trade unions,
there was general agreement that labour relations has not caused any serious
divisions at the board level. Close examination o f the student members’ role in
labour relations brought interesting results with staff appearing to oppose the
legislated role that students have been given while the other constituent groups
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supported the students’ involvement. This may speak to the somewhat traditional
values that staff hold toward labour relations compared to faculty.
Colleges continued to offer differing views depending on the subject but
some trends did emerge on their views o f the labour relations environment.
College D, College K, and College P espoused generally positive views on the
sharing of power, while College B, College I, and College Q were the most
negative. In considering ail three contexts of power sharing, i.e. general board
matters, financial matters, and labour relations matters, College D, College K,
and College L emerged as most positive and College E, College F, and College
P remained negative.

General Matters of Board Business;
Effectiveness o f the Shared
Decision-Making Process

9...The composition of my board makes an effective contribution to
the governance of the institution.

The grand mean of responses to this statement about the inclusion of
both external and internal members on college boards tended solidly toward
agreement. However, the one-way ANOVA indicated a significant difference
among the constituent groups which the Scheffe test revealed to be between the
students (strong agreement) and the presidents (weak tendency toward
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disagreement). The other constituents were also on the positive side leaving the
presidents, once again, on their own. M ost colleges were positive in their views
with only two, College F and College P, tending toward disagreement. There was
also strong agreement indicated by College G, College J, and College M.
The two-way ANOVA o f matched statements in the 1995/96 and 1997/98
studies revealed no significant difference between the studies or among the
constituent groups, but significant interaction between the two sources was
recorded. The interaction was likely due to the movement on the part of the
students over the two studies. While the appointees, faculty, staff, and
presidents all shifted from positions o f strong agreement to agreement, the
students shifted from a position of agreement to strong agreement.

1Q...The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to
the governance o f the institution.

This statement made the distinction between the composition of boards
and how they actually perform. As in the case of the previous statement, there
was overall agreement that the way the boards operate makes a positive
contribution to the governance of institutions. Again, there was also indication of
significant difference among the constituents, but the post-hoc analysis did not
identify any pairs where significant difference existed. There was, however, a
noticeable range of responses from strong agreement on the part of students all
the way to disagreement on the part o f faculty. The negative opinion expressed
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by the faculty was the first real indication that this group was not consistently
supportive of shared governance in theory and in practice.
The one-way ANOVA of college responses also indicated significant
difference among the colleges, but again the Scheffe test did not reveal anything
among the pairs. However as usual, there was a fair range among the responses
from strong agreement (College A, College D, College G, College J, College K,
and College L) to disagreement (College E, College P, and College Q). The
analysis of colleges over various statements seemed to consistently produce
some quite varied results but also some discernible positive and negative trends
on the part of certain institutions. The two-way ANOVA produced a similar set of
results to the previous question with no significant difference between the two
studies or among the constituents, however, there was significant interaction
between the two sources of data. In this case, there was a good deal of shifting
among the constituents over the two studies—students moving in a positive
direction and appointees, faculty, staff, and presidents moving in a negative
direction while education council chairs remained very constant. This interaction
affect very much mirrored the affect on the previous statement which related to
the composition of boards.
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11...The conduct o f my board represents good boardsmanship.

This rather open question brought a response grand mean tending toward
agreement and this was echoed by all the constituent groups, except the
students who were even more positive with a strong agreement. Good
boardsmanship, o f course, was not defined in the study and it was left to the
interpretation of the participants. However, the researcher would assume that
most participants would connect the kinds of qualities referred to in the study as
the ingredients of good boardsmanship. These qualities would include instilling a
climate of trust, making all board members feel equal, accommodating the
different constituents’ backgrounds and dealing with their inherent conflict of
interest in certain aspects o f board business, and being accountable as boards
to the internal and external communities including government, ft was, therefore,
reassuring that all constituency groups thought that their boards’ conduct was
consistent with, at least, most o f these values. However, among colleges there
was not the same universally positive view. Accordingly, the one-way ANOVA
revealed a significant difference. Thirteen of the seventeen institutions
expressed positive views with College A, College G, College J, College K, and
College L espousing strong agreement. O f the remainder, one college was
neutral and College F, College P, and College Q disagreed. However, the
Scheffe test did not reveal significant difference between any o f the pairs of
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institutions. It should be noted that College F and College P had consistently
expressed somewhat negative views so far in this analysis and, therefore, their
low esteem concerning the conduct o f their boards was not altogether surprising.

12...My board has managed to make some difficult decisions in the

last twq years.

This statement was intended to ascertain whether it was possible to
attach some practical experience to the more philosophical side of making
shared governance work. In other words, the effectiveness of the shared
decision-making process has to be measured against actual outcomes. It is fair
to say that recent years have been difficult for college boards, having to face the
issues of fiscal restraint, inadequate funding, burgeoning demand for educational
services, tense labour and governmental relations, and general questions about
the relevancy and currency of college missions. Therefore, one would assume
that all boards have had to face difficult decisions during this period when shared
governance was being established in British Columbia. And the study found that
all constituent groups were in agreement or strong agreement that their boards
had managed to make some difficult decisions in this period with a grand mean
score of 4.141. Alas, there was significant difference even within the overall
positive response between the appointees (strong agreement) and the
presidents (weakest of those in agreement). It was interesting to note that the
students' responses came very close to absolute strong agreement, however
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they were not identified in the post-hoc test probably because of the relatively
small population size. It may be the case that their lack o f experience at the
board level of decision-making would render questionable their interpretation of
what would constitute difficult decisions.
In spite of trends emerging from previous statements to suggest
inconsistency among colleges as to harmony among constituents and
effectiveness of decision-making, all colleges were positive that difficult decisions
have been managed at their board tables. Within the positive responses, eleven
of the seventeen institutions tended toward strong agreement, indicating a high
level o f board esteem in actual decision-making.

13...My board is accountable for its decisions to the internal and
external communities.

The Ministry of Advanced Education, Training, and Technology has been
placing increased emphasis on the need for colleges to be held accountable, not
only to their government funders but also to the public-at-large. This focus was
prominent in the m inistry’s strategic plan entitled Charting a New Course (1996).
This issue elicited a grand mean of strong agreement, and all constituent groups
expressed agreement or strong agreement. However, there was again significant
difference between the appointees (strong agreement) and the presidents
(weakest of those in agreement). This finding continued the emerging trend of a
deep gulf between these two constituents, who had been noted in literature as
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natural partners and had been so philosophically close in the 1995/96 study
undertaken by the researcher. Analysis of the college responses also indicated
significant difference and, while the conservative Scheffe post-hoc test did not
identify any pairs of colleges, it was clear that there was a wide range of
opinions. Twelve of the seventeen institutions tended toward strong agreement
and only one institution, College Q, was in disagreement. However College Q
was in absolute disagreement (mean score of 2.000) and, clearly, that institution
has a problem with its internal or external communications, at least as identified
by a sample of board members.

14...I feel my board is fulfilling its obligations under the College
and Institute A ct

There was overall strong agreement that boards are meeting this
fundamental requirement, however, again there was significant difference
between two of the pairs of constituents. In this case, difference emerged
between the appointees (tending toward strong agreement) and the presidents
(again the weakest of those in agreement) and between the students (close to
absolute strong agreement) and the presidents. Thus, the isolation of the
presidents from the other constituent groups was continued on matters not only
of a philosophical basis but also of a more practical basis. Responses among
colleges very much mirrored those of the previous statement on accountability
with all institutions expressing agreement or strong agreement except for College
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Q which was again in disagreement. Conversely, several colleges, including
College A, College D, College G, College K, and College L, were very close to
absolute strong agreement indicating that some boards are fully complying with
the obligations of the College and Institute Act.

15...I feel the powers o f the board are being diminished as more
decisions are being centralized at the provincial level.

Much has been made in literature o f the tendency across North America
for provinces and states to be taking decision-making powers away from
institutional boards in favour o f locating them within the halls o f government.
Ironically, this centralization trend has been occurring at the same tim e as the
establishment of shared decision-making within the governance structures of
colleges. On the face of it, these two trends tend to be somewhat self defeating,
and there were signs that they are about to be repeated in British Columbia. The
statement was intended to find out if board members were conscious o f the shift
of power and the affect on boards. The grand mean indicated solid tendency
toward agreement among all constituents and, indeed, all of them did confirm
that centralization is taking place. The one-way ANOVA of college responses,
similarly, revealed that all colleges in the study either agreed or strongly agreed
with the statement. Accordingly, there appears to be clear evidence that the very
thing which tends to undermine shared governance is happening in the province.
One is left to wonder whether politicians consciously plan policies which are self
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defeating or whether they simply emerge accidentally from the labyrinth of
political priority setting.

Summary

Three themes seemed to emerge from the examination of the shared
decision-making process in the context of general board matters. The constituent
groups were largely positive about both the composition and actions o f their
boards, although the enthusiasm o f the presidents might be described as
lukewarm. Furthermore, all constituents were positive about the boards’
achievements in making difficult decisions, the boards’ accountability to the
internal and external communities, and their compliance with the obligations of
the College and Institute Act. However, even within these positive responses,
there emerged frequent significant differences between the appointees and the
presidents with the form er espousing strong agreement with the statements
while the latter were, at best, lukewarm again. This section of the study really
started to underline the gap between the values of the shared governance model
held by the government appointed members of the boards and the institutions’
chief executive officers. Finally, all constituents confirmed that they felt the
powers of the boards were being diminished as more decisions were being
centralized at the provincial level.
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The analysis of colleges’ responses continued to produce a wide array of
views within the overall positive outcomes to the questions. The issue of the
shared decision-making process in the context of general board affairs revealed
several very positive institutions, namely College G, College K, and College L.
However, there also emerged several noticeably negative colleges where the
workings of the boards has not been smooth sailing in the shared governance
era. These colleges were College F, College P, and College Q. After four of the
nine main sections to the study, it was evident that College G, College K, and
College L were tending to consistently express positive views toward the aspects
of shared governance, while College F, College P, and College Q were clearly
less enthusiastic about the whole concept of shared governance.

Board Financial Matters:
Effectiveness of the Shared
Decision-Making Process

24...I feel that elected and ex-officio board members have generally
NOT shown bias towards their own departm ent area, or
constituency (trade or student union) when dealing with budget

issues,

The grand mean was close to agreement, however, a significant
difference among the responses was indicated by the one-way ANOVA. Posthoc testing failed to reveal significant difference between any of the pairs of
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constituents, but it was noticeable that the presidents ended up on one side,
tending toward disagreement, while all the others were positive in agreement or
strong agreement. The issue of whether internal members of boards show bias
toward their own department or constituency in the budget process is one of the
fundamental litmus tests o f the shared governance models. And, unfortunately,
the presidents did not think that internal members had been displaying the
necessary degree of independence. This was an important finding and was all
the more troubling because none of the other constituent groups, notably the
appointees, concurred with the presidents’ views. In addition, the strength o f the
opposing views of the faculty, staff, and education councils made the presidents’
views all the more stark.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses brought the now fam iliar
range of views contributing to overall agreement. College D, College K, College
L, and College N were in strong agreement, while College A, and College E were
tending toward disagreement. It was interesting to note that College A had,
hitherto, been identified as one of the consistently positive institutions but was
obviously troubled by the stance of internal members in budget matters.

25...I feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal responsibilities
under the College and Institute A c t

There was overall strong agreement that boards are meeting their
legislated obligations in fiscal matters, however a significant difference among
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the responses was indicated. Subsequent post-hoc testing did not reveal any
significant difference between the pairs of constituents who expressed strong
agreement (appointees, faculty, and staff) or agreement (students, presidents,
and education council chairs). In the case of colleges, significant difference was
indicated among the seventeen reporting institutions, however, the conservative
Scheffe technique did not reveal anything between the pairs of colleges.
Nevertheless, responses ranged from strong agreement (College A, College B,
College C, College D, College G—with a mean score o f 5.000— College H,
College I, College K, College L, College M, College N. College O, and College P)
compared to the neutral stance adopted by College F and College Q, both of
which had been previously targeted as colleges holding largely negative views of
shared governance. A two-way ANOVA was carried out to examine the data
from the matched question in the two studies. The analysis revealed no
significant difference between the studies, significant difference among the
constituents, and no significant interaction between the sources of data. The
shifting views of the constituents was worthy of note with appointees, faculty,
staff, and students becoming more positive over the passage of time, while
presidents and education council chairs became more negative.
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26...My board discharges its fiduciary responsibility to all students
from whom it collects student union fees when dealing with that
organization.

This is a rather complex issue wherein, by virtue of the fact that college
boards assess and collect student union fees from most, in not all, students,
boards have a fiduciary responsibility in law to the students regarding the use of
those fees. Therefore, when boards interact with student unions on financial
matters, particularly those matters related directly to the fees collected from
students, the boards have this unusual and awkward responsibility to take into
account the interests o f students-at-large even though the students unions would
claim that they, too, have the same responsibility. The arrival of student
members on the boards, who commonly are student union executives, has just
served to complicate an already complicated situation. The constituent groups
agreed with the statement of fiduciary responsibility, although the student
members remained neutral. It is not clear whether their neutrality was founded
on lack of knowledge o f the legal obligation of boards or reservation as to its
appropriateness or reservation as to whether the boards had discharged the
obligation.
Colleges, on the other hand, produced a range of responses among
which there was significant difference. The Scheffe test did not reveal significant
difference between any of the pairs of institutions. However, the range of
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responses extended from strong agreement (College A, College C, College D,
College H, College I, College K, and College M) through to disagreement
(College Q). Again, one was left with the unanswered question in the case of
negative responses as to whether the board members believe they have not met
the fiduciary responsibility or whether they do not believe they have the
responsibility in the first place. Obviously, this question could only be answered
with further research. The two-way ANOVA of responses to this matched
statement in the studies of 1995/96 and 1997/98 revealed no significant
difference between the studies, significant difference among the constituent
groups, and no significant interaction between the two sources of data. In regard
to the shift in opinions over the passage of time, faculty, staff, and education
council chairs became more positive, presidents became more negative, while
appointees and students basically maintained the same positions. Accordingly,
over the two studies, appointees tended toward strong agreement and students
tended toward disagreement, while the other groups were in agreement.

30...The board’s role is to approve the parameters and underlying
assumptions of the budget but otherwise to leave assembly of the
numbers to administration.

This statement spoke to the issue of leadership versus management
which is never far from the centre of any discussion of boardsmanship in
general, and in particular when considered in a shared governance context. The
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issue also touched on the often strong relationship between boards and their
senior administrators which have come under closer scrutiny in the era of board
decision-making shared with faculty, staff, and students. Prior to the study, one
might have expected to find the appointees and the presidents with a more finely
honed distinction of the leadership and management roles in the budget process
than the less experienced internal members. And, that is how it turned out. There
was general agreement with the statement among the constituent groups with
the appointees and the presidents (along with staff) being noticeably more
affirmative than the others. This proved to be one of the few instances where the
appointees and presidents espoused similar strong views throughout the study.
Colleges were similarly positive toward the notion o f budget roles, with
most colleges in the position of agreement or tendency toward strong
agreement. However, College B disagreed with the statement and had,
obviously, adopted a different board philosophy toward budget. The leadership/
management distinction was much in keeping with ends and means distinction
espoused by John Carver (Boards that make a difference: A new design for
leadership in nonprofit and public organizations [2nd ed.], 1997). Carver’s
philosophy had been adopted by several, but not all, boards in British Columbia.
Analysis of this matched statement in the two studies did not produce any
significant difference between the two studies, among the constituent groups or
any significant interaction between the two sources o f data. There was
somewhat marked movement in the views o f the constituent groups over the two
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years between the studies. Accordingly, the appointees, faculty, students, and
education council chairs appeared to become marginally less positive, while the
staff and presidents became more positive.

31 ...My board ensures that all stakeholder groups have advisory
input into the budget process.

The budget process calls for a level of involvement and participation
which often goes beyond even the principles o f a shared governance model.
Many evaluations and studies of colleges, whether they are conducted internally
or externally, cite the importance o f ensuring that all stakeholder groups have the
opportunity to be informed about the budget and to provide input, if even on an
advisory basis. The budget is simply the numerical representation of the
institution’s plans, dreams, and fears. And, it is important that those who have a
stake in the institution also have a stake in the exercise o f allocating the
resources to pursue those plans.
The grand mean indicated tendency toward agreement with the statement
that boards did ensure that stakeholder groups have advisory input into the
budget process. Appointees and presidents were again the most positive of the
constituent groups in agreement. And, only education council chairs were in
disagreement. It was interesting that this particular constituent group chose this
particular aspect of board activity to express a negative view because, by and
large, it had tended to be positive on most aspects of board decision-making in a
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shared governance context. The colleges followed the same sort o f pattern as
the constituent groups, with fifteen of the seventeen institutions expressing
agreement or strong agreement. One college remained neutral, while College N
tended toward disagreement.

32...I feel that all stakeholder groups are adequately informed about

financial matter?.

This statement was the second half of the issue of involvement of
stakeholders in not only the budget but all aspects of financial affairs. Literature
had noted how stakeholders looked to the boards for reassurance that all is well
in fiscal terms. Therefore, the boards face clear expectations on
communications. The constituent groups in the study produced very similar
results to those for the previous statement, however, there was a significant
difference identified in the one-way ANOVA. Although the post-hoc analysis did
not reveal any significant difference between the pairs of constituent groups, it
was noticeable that the presidents tended toward strong agreement while the
education council chairs tended toward disagreement. Thus, the latter continued
their negative view on boards’fiscal accountability and access.
The two-way ANOVA of college responses revealed significant difference
but further post-hoc analysis did not identify any pair o f institutions. The mean
scores ranged from strong agreement (College A, College B, College C, College
D, College G, College H, College I, College M, and College P) through to
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disagreement (College F) with the remainder o f the institutions tending to be
around the weak end of agreement.

Summary

This section of the study focused on the effectiveness of the decision
making process in the context of the boards’ role in financial matters. The
College and Institute Act of British Columbia prescribes specific fiscal
responsibilities for college boards, and, in addition, literature looks to boards to
provide fiscal leadership for institutions, generally in association with their
administrators. Hence, the importance of the financial environment at the board
table was evident. However, the overlay of a shared governance structure likely
has a significant impact on fiscal decision-making because the internal members
bring different values to the board table. Employee and student members are far
more affected by most financial decisions than external board members, whether
it be in relation to their employment tenure, working conditions, cost of education,
or program options. In addition, the internal members’ relationships to the
constituencies from which they have been elected would also have a bearing on
how they tend to react to boards’ fiscal decision-making.
The constituent groups were found to be fairly positive overall toward their
boards’ financial processes. The lowest level of comfort was related to the most
fundamental issue of whether internal members had shown bias toward their
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obvious affiliations when dealing with the budget. Although the grand mean
tended toward agreement and faculty even tended toward strong agreement that
internal members had NOT shown bias, the presidents tended weakly toward
disagreement. This single assessment of the shared governance culture was
very important because it touched on its integrity, and if that should be in doubt
one could foresee extreme difficulties ahead. Further examination o f the boards'
role in ensuring accessibility and openness to financial affairs found that it was
generally endorsed by the constituents, but with two notable observations. The
appointees and the presidents were found by the researcher in the 1995/96
study to be the most positive about the fledgling shared governance model in
British Columbia. However, in this study, a very noticeable gap had developed
between the two constituents on a number of statements so far, with appointees
remaining positive while presidents frequently expressed negative views. This
new trend did not occur in these two statements related to the boards' ensuring
openness of financial affairs, rather the appointees and the presidents were very
positive on their boards’ performances. However, the education council chairs,
who by and large were positive in this study about shared governance,
expressed quite negative views on the openness issue. It is not clear what
prompted this isolated negative assessment.
Colleges continued to show variable results on different sections of the
study and even on statements within a particular section. This volatility was, no
doubt, reflective of the specific nuances present in each institution’s board. In
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this section on effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the
context of board financial matters, College D, College G, and College H
appeared to be most positive about their performance, while college E, College
F, and College Q were most negative. On an overall basis having examined five
of the nine sections of the study, discernible trends had emerged from the
volatile data to suggest that College D, College G, and College K were most
positive toward the shared governance model. Conversely, College F, College P,
and College Q had generally expressed the most negative views.

Board Labour Relations Matters:
Effectiveness of the Shared
Decision-Making Process

36...Labour relations has largely become a centralized provincial
issue, hence my board has not experienced any difficulties in
decision-making due to the presence of elected and ex-officio
members.

This opening statement in the section of the study on decision-making
process in the context of board labour relations matters continued the
exploration of the affects o f provincial centralization. The statement suggested
that the presence of employee members possibly causing difficulty on boards
due to their conflict of interest was a moot point anyhow because the
centralization of collective bargaining had reduced the boards’ involvement. The
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grand mean was a very weak tendency toward disagreement, but really more of
a neutral stance. The conclusions from this answer were somewhat ambiguous—
-it could suggest disagreement that centralization had taken place, it could
suggest that the internal members had caused difficulties, and it was unclear
whether the two outcomes have been dependent upon one another. Further
questions in this section attempted to unravel the mystery. Meanwhile, the
constituents’ responses were clustered closely around the mean with no
discernible trends to interpret. The one-way ANOVA of college responses
revealed significant difference and, although the post-hoc test did not identify
any pairs of institutions, there was a far greater dispersal from the mean than
there had been for the constituent groups. College K, consistently one of the
most positive colleges, strongly agreed with the statement. Thereafter, eight
colleges tended toward agreement while eight colleges tended toward
disagreement. Many of the mean scores on both sides of neutral were,
nevertheless, very close to 3.000 and the general conclusion on this statement
was that constituent groups and colleges were neutral.

37...I feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations
responsibilities under the College and Institute A c t

In spite of the fact that much of the colleges’ labour relations had come
under the control of the provincial government and was being transacted at a
central table rather than at each campus, the College and Institute Act does
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clearly lay out responsibilities for boards. The researcher would suggest that the
centralization tendency has made the boards' tasks more difficult rather than
easier, and it was with that underlying premise that this statement was explored.
There was strong agreement that legislative responsibilities have been
discharged by boards. However, the one-way ANOVA indicated significant
difference among the responses. The post-hoc analysis did not reveal significant
difference between pairs of responses, but it was clear that the constituents fell
into two camps. The appointees and students tended toward strong agreement
while the other groups all tended toward agreement.
All colleges expressed agreement or strong agreement with the exception
of College Q which remained neutral. This suggested, very clearly, that
notwithstanding the provincial centralization taking place, both constituent
groups and colleges were more than satisfied that boards were fulfilling their
obligations in an effective manner. The two-way ANOVA of the data from the
present study and the earlier study conducted in 1995/96 indicated no significant
difference between the studies, but there was significant difference among the
constituent groups and significant interaction between the two sources o f study.
The strong interaction confirmed much position shifting among the constituents
over the passage of time. Faculty and education council chairs became
marginally more positive over the period, staff and students became notably
more positive, while appointees retained just about the same views and
presidents became notably less positive. Therefore, the very general trend
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emerging in the study of the presidents losing confidence in the shared
governance model manifested itself in this important assessment o f boards’
performances.

38...I feel my board would have generally adopted a different
direction in labour relations over the last two years if the board did
not include elected and ex-officio members.

The issue of the possible interaction between the centralization of the
boards’ powers of decision-making on labour relations matters and the impact of
local shared governance on such decision making continued to be explored in
the next three statements. There was a solid tendency toward disagreement with
suggestion that boards’ may have pursued different policy on labour matters if
their membership had not included employees. However, the one-way ANOVA
indicated significant difference among the constituents’ responses. The Scheffe
test revealed significant difference between the appointees ( tending toward
strong disagreement) and the education council chairs (tending toward
agreement). This was an interesting opinion from the latter, who were joined on
the agreement side by the staff group, because it also was at variance with the
views of the faculty group. Most, but not all, education council chairs are elected
from the faculty.
Colleges were emphatic in their disagreement with the suggestion that
internal members had influenced boards’ direction in labour relations. Only
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College C remained neutral, while thirteen institutions tended toward
disagreement. W hat was more notable was the fact that three colleges (College
K, College L, and College P) expressed strong disagreement and the mean
score o f the last named was 1.000. Clearly, there no evidence in the minds of
those board members that the boards’ integrity toward labour relations had been
compromised through shared governance.

39...I feel my board would have generally adopted a different
direction in labour relations over the last two years if provincial

centralization had not taken place.

This statem ent explored the second potential influence on the direction in
labour relations adopted by colleges. Centralization has amounted to the
creation of tw o-tier collective bargaining in which the main issues, including all
monetary items, were moved from local tables to a provincial setting and an
increase generally in the influence of the government and provincial unions to
the exclusion o f college boards and union locals at the campus level.
There was the weakest tendency toward agreement with the statement,
really not amounting to more than a neutral position. However, there was
significant difference among the constituents. And, this proved to be between
faculty (tending toward strong disagreement) and presidents (tending toward
agreement) and between faculty and education council chairs (also tending
toward agreement). Again, the disparity between faculty and education council
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chairs was interesting. As was the analysis of the other constituents—the
provincially appointed members disagreed with the statement about government
influence, while the unionized stafF and students agreed with it. Colleges, again,
provided a wide array of responses, albeit without any significant difference.
College B had a mean score of 4.000 indicating absolute agreement and was
joined by seven other institutions tending toward agreement. Conversely, while
two colleges were neutral, six tended toward disagreement and College P
tended toward strong disagreement. The reason for the difference between
College B and College P not being of statistical significance was probably due to
the small population sizes.

40..I feel my board would have generally adopted a different
direction in labour relations over the last two years if the board did
not include elected and ex-officio members and if provincial
centralization had not taken place.

The final statement in this section of the study pieced together the two
factors which potentially had influenced labour relations at the board level. The
contention that the direction adopted by boards would have been different if both
the influences had been absent was not supported, the grand mean tending
toward disagreement. However, there were significant differences, this time
again being between faculty (tending toward strong disagreement) and
presidents (tending toward agreement) and between faculty and education
council chairs (tending toward agreement). College patterns were somewhat
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similar to the previous statement with three institutions in agreement, two
remaining neutral, and twelve on the negative side with College P again in strong
disagreement. The conclusion, therefore, appears to be that neither shared
governance nor provincial centralization had affected the direction that boards
had set in relation to their labour relations.

Summary

The board members’ overall views on how boards had met their
obligations under the College and Institute Act were positive. This finding was
important because boards have a key role in labour relations, the most notable
aspect of which is the fact they are the employers of reference under the
provincial labour code. Two factors were suggested by the researcher as having
had a significant impact on how boards deal with labour matters, namely the
trend toward centralization by the provincial government and the presence of
employee members on boards as a result of shared governance. The overall
responses were fairly firm rejection of the suggestions, however, both the
presidents and the education council chairs agreed that boards might have taken
a different direction if either or both of the factors had not been present. That
said, the other constituent groups were quite clear that boards would not have
changed their approach to labour relations in the different circumstances
contemplated. Colleges tended to follow the patterns that had been established
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in earlier sections of the study. Consequently, College G and College K, two of
the three most positive institutions toward shared governance throughout the
study, were most positive in this section also, along with College P. Similarly,
College E and College F, two of the three least positive institutions, were least
positive here along with College M.

General Matters of Board Business:
How Conflict of Interest
has been Addressed

16...The president should be a non-voting ex-officio member of the
baaed,

This final part of the study looked at conflict of interest as it might affect
the internal members in the shared governance structure. In this section, the
unusual status of the presidents and the education council chairs, which was of
course legislated, was examined. In regard to the non-voting ex-officio status of
presidents, there was strong agreement, overall, with education council chairs
being the most enthusiastic and the presidents, themselves, being the least
enthusiastic, although still in agreement. Colleges were similarly supportive of
the status quo with all institutions either agreeing or strongly agreeing. College G
and College P had mean scores of 5.000 signaling absolute strong agreement.
Finally, the two-way ANOVA of responses from the two studies did not reveal
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any significant difference between the studies, among the constituent groups, or
in the interaction between the two sources of data. These latter findings
suggested that there had been no material shifts in views with the passage of
time and, obviously, the experience gained of seeing the presidents function
within their prescribed status. However, it is fair to note that appointees, faculty,
staff, students and presidents all showed marginal movement toward
disagreement with the status, but not to any significant effect.

17...The president should be a full voting member of the board.

This statement was, of course, the opposite of the previous statement and
the researcher anticipated the opposite responses. And indeed, that was the way
it turned out, with strong disagreement from all but the presidents, who
nevertheless did disagree. Therefore, it can be safely assumed that the
constituent groups support the status quo as far as the presidents’ role on the
boards is concerned. The colleges responded in much the same manner as the
constituent groups with all mean scores being in the disagree and strongly
disagree range. Two colleges, College F and College O, were in absolute
disagreement. Interestingly, they were not the institutions which had been in
absolute agreement on the previous statement. Finally, there was no significant
difference indicated in the comparison between the 1995/96 study and the
1997/98 study. However, appointees, staff, students, and presidents expressed
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very marginal movement toward agreement with the statement and education
council chairs actually moved in the opposite direction, although again not in any
statistically significant way.

18...The chair of the education council should be a non-voting ex
officio member of the board.

Attention now turned to the education council chairs. And, the outcome
very much mirrored that of the presidents, albeit with less enthusiasm. The grand
mean and the means of most the constituents were in the agreement range, but
the education council chairs actually tended toward disagreement. The colleges
were a little less emphatic on this statement than they had been toward the
presidents. Within an overall tendency toward agreement, there were four strong
agreements, including a mean score o f 5.000 from College P (as it had in regard
to presidents). However, there were also two colleges, College J and College Q,
which disagreed with the status quo in this case. The two-way ANOVA of
responses from the two studies revealed significant difference between the two
studies amounting to a discernible weakening in the degree of overall
agreement, but no significant difference among the constituent groups or in the
interaction between the two sources. Faculty, staff, students, presidents, and
education council chairs all expressed less positive views with the passage of
time.
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19...The chair of the education council should be a full voting
member of the board.

The grand mean on this suggestion that education council chairs should
be full voting members of boards was a solid disagreement, but again it was
nowhere near as emphatic as it had been for the presidents. All constituent
groups were in disagreement except the education council chairs who tended
toward agreement. It was noted that the chairs clearly advocated full
membership for themselves and non-voting status for the presidents. It would be
interesting, in a follow-up study, to ascertain the rationale for the distinction.
The analysis of the colleges revealed some extreme views along with the
general opinion of disagreement (expressed by nine institutions). College Q, a
not infrequent provider of extreme views, was in absolute agreement with the
statement, while College J and College K tended toward agreement and College
I remained neutral. On the negative side, College D, College F, and College Q
tended toward strong disagreement, while College G was in absolute
disagreement. Therefore, colleges differed greatly in their views on this issue,
although not with any statistical significance, again probably because of the
population sizes. Comparative analysis of this matched question in the two
studies revealed significant difference between the studies amounting to a
discernible weakening in the degree of overall disagreement, but no significant
difference among the constituent groups or in the interaction between the two
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sources. A ll of the constituents, with the exception o f the presidents, expressed
marginally more positive views over the passage o f tim e on the notion o f voting
status for the education council chairs.

2Q...The bylaw and/or policy regarding conflict o f interest adopted
at my institution is generally accepted by all board members as fair
and workable.

When shared governance was introduced into British Columbia by way of
Bill 22, colleges immediately set about drawing up bylaws to manage their
process and, in particular, to address the inherent conflict that internal board
members brought to the table. Under the College and Institute Act, bylaws are
required to be approved by the Minister o f Advanced Education, Training, and
Technology. Subsequently, government decided to hand down a prescribed
bylaw for all institutions to adopt which limited the circumstances in which
employee members could be considered in conflict of interest and, virtually,
absolved student members in all circumstances. W hy the government chose this
approach is not known by the researcher, but one can only assume that it was
receiving informal feedback from interested parties when colleges were
attempting to draft their own bylaws. In any case, a number o f colleges felt that,
although the government’s intentions were clear in its bylaw, the language had
ambiguities. Consequently, a few colleges developed custom policy to expand
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the position on conflict of interest contained in the bylaw. College policies do not
require approval o f the Minister.
The one-way ANOVA of responses from the constituent groups produced
a grand mean indicating solid agreement with the suggestion that the bylaw, and
policy if appropriate, on conflict of interest was fair and workable. Significant
difference was suggested among the constituents, but the post-hoc analysis
failed to reveal any matched pairs. However, while all constituents gave positive
responses there was a wide range o f convictions from the appointees (tending
toward strong agreement) to the presidents (with the weakest tendency toward
agreement). It was notable that the students, who had been given something of
a “carte blanche” in the bylaw, were not particularly enthusiastically in agreement
either.
This statement brought a wide array of views from colleges and, for the
first time in the study, the post-hoc analysis revealed several significant
differences between pairs of institutions. Responses ranged from tendency
toward strong agreement to tendency toward disagreement. Specifically,
significant difference was identified between College A (strong agreement) and
College M (disagreement); between College D (strong agreement) and College
M; between College G (strong agreement) and College M; between College I
(strong agreement) and College M; between College K (strong agreement) and
College M; between College L (strong agreement) and College M; and between
College N (strong agreement) and College M. It is not known by the researcher

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235
which colleges had developed policy to augment their bylaw and whether this
would have had a bearing on the responses. Moreover, further research in this
area would be warranted to determine if the negative views o f College M, and
College P which expressed similar opinions, were based on actual experiences
with the bylaw or just in principle.
This was a matched statement in the two studies and allowed for a twoway ANOVA. No significant difference was revealed between the studies, among
the constituent groups, or in the interaction between the sources of data.
However, it was noted that the constituents experienced differing shifts of
opinion between the studies. Appointees, faculty, and education council chairs
became more positive about the suggestion that the bylaw was fair and
workable, while staff, students, and presidents became less positive. This issue
is obviously still volatile within constituent groups and within particular colleges
four years after the bylaw was handed down by the provincial government.

21 ...Conflict of interest has not been a problem with my board.

Many authors in literature reviewed in Chapter II suggested that the issue
of conflict of interest which is attached to the internal members o f boards was the
single greatest threat to successful shared governance. This final statement in
this section of the study was plain and simple. Had conflict o f interest been a
problem? The grand mean of responses from the constituent groups was a fairly
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solid tendency toward agreement that conflict of interest had NOT been a
problem. Four of the constituents—appointees; faculty; staff; and education
council chairs—signaled agreement, while students and presidents tended
toward disagreement. The disparity between the appointees and the presidents,
as the “independent reporters” on potential “unionized members’ conflict of
interest”, was interesting. Of course, presidents, even without any union
affiliation might also be considered as internal members with conflict of interest.
But somehow, at least in literature, the presidents were seen to be on a higher
ground solely in pursuit of the common good. It all depends how they are
perceived by their board colleagues. The position of the students was equally
interesting and worthy of further study to determine the nature of the problem
they had acknowledged.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses indicated significant
difference within the wide range of opinions. The Scheffe test revealed
significant difference between College K (strong agreement) and College M
(strong disagreement). Both colleges had, of course, differed on the previous
statement concerning the fairness and workability of their bylaw on conflict of
interest. Consequently, the difference on de facto conflict of interest was perhaps
not so surprising. Three other colleges were in the strong agreement range,
seven colleges were in agreement, two colleges were neutral, two colleges were
in disagreement, and one other college was in strong disagreement. Hence,
there was a very wide range of responses indicating very differing climates at
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campuses. This volatility was subsequently examined in the financial and labour
relations environments.

Summary

In this section, clear, unanimous support was found for the non-voting
status of the presidents on college boards in preference to any contemplation of
voting status. In contrast, there was less em phatic support for similar treatment
of the education council chairs, and that support was changing overtim e
suggesting that we may not be far away from the point where voting status would
be advocated. Indeed, the education council chairs, themselves, had shifted over
the two studies to now be in support of full voting status. All constituent groups,
with varying degrees of enthusiasm, agreed that their bylaw, and policy if it
existed, on conflict of interest was considered to be fair and workable. However,
only four of the constituents agreed that conflict of interest has not been a
problem in their institutions. Students and presidents suggested that there had
been problems. And, that suggestion also emerged among colleges. Four
institutions strongly disagreed on the statem ent and significant difference was
revealed between College M (among the four) and seven colleges which agreed
with the statement. This polarization of opinions on one of the most contentious
aspects of shared governance would be further explored later in the study to
seek reasons for the different outcomes on certain campuses.
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In this section, the most positive colleges were College G, College N, and
College P and, taking into account all the data so far, College A, College G, and
College K had emerged as the most positive institutions toward shared
governance in general. In contrast, the most negative colleges, in this section,
were College J, College M, and College Q, while overall College E, College F,
and College Q were as the most negative. Thus, several colleges were having
different experiences on conflict of interest in general board decision-making
matters. Perhaps this was due simply to their culture and history or perhaps it
was also due to the prescribed nature of the conflict of interest bylaw under
which each institution must operate. The application of this regulation in the more
volatile environments of financial affairs and labour relations matters was further
explored in this study.

Board Financial M atters:
How C o n flict o f Intere st
has been Addressed

27...My board has dealt effective ly w ith the issue o f c o n flic t o f
in te rest as it relates to stu d e n t board m em bers w ith respect to
fina ncial m atters between th e board and the studen t union, such as
tu itio n and o th e r fees.

The government prescribed bylaw on conflict of interest stated that
student board members were not to be considered in conflict of interest and
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should be allowed to vote on tuition fee issues. The rationale for this clause was
that tuition decisions affect all students, not just the student board members
themselves. In addition, many student board members are also student union
executives which makes for a potentially difficult time when boards are engaged
in discussions with student unions over financial matters, including potential
tuition fee increases. (It should be noted that tuition had been frozen in British
Columbia by the provincial government for the last two years for reasons
including heavy lobbying by the Canadian Federation of Students.) This potential
area of tension for boards was examined in this question. The grand mean
indicated solid agreement with the suggestion that boards had handled the
situation effectively. Furthermore, all constituent groups were in agreement
including the appointees, who tended toward strong agreement. Given the
expansive nature of the conflict of interest bylaw in terms of student members’
rights, it was somewhat surprising that all board members felt that they had
effectively dealt with the issue of conflict of interest.
Colleges were also positive about how the student situation had been
handled. Five colleges expressed strong agreement, while nine colleges
expressed agreement. Further, two colleges remained neutral, and one college,
College Q, tended toward disagreement. The two-way ANOVA of data from the
two studies indicated that there was no significant difference between the
studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction between the two
sources of study. The individual groups reported very marginal shifts in their
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views between the two studies, although some moved in a positive direction and
others toward negative.

28...The College and Institute Act provision that students may vote
on proposed tuition fee increases is appropriate.

This question was a straight forward exploration of views o f the
appropriateness of the government prescribed bylaw which allows student board
members to vote on tuition issues. This provision appeared to fly in the face of
accepted standards of conflict of interest with regard to pecuniary interests in an
issue to which board members were being asked to vote. The study found very
modest agreement overall with the appropriateness of the provision. The one
way ANOVA, however, indicated significant difference among the respondents.
And, the post-hoc analysis revealed the difference between appointees (showing
solid tendency toward agreement) and the presidents (tendency toward strong
disagreement). Thus, the erstwhile joint proponents of shared governance in the
previous study and the natural allies according to the literature appeared once
again to be headed in different philosophical directions. Furthermore, staff also
disagreed with the statement and, hence, not for the first time in this study sided
with the presidents. Faculty, students, and education council chairs were all fairly
solidly in agreement.
The one-way ANOVA o f colleges’ responses also revealed significant
difference, but this could not be pinpointed among any pairs of institutions in the
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post-hoc analysis. However, the analysis revealed a range o f responses from a
tendency toward strong agreement (College K and College L) to a tendency
toward disagreement (College E, College H, College M, College N, and College
O) and strong disagreement from College F. Therefore, this issue produced a set
of fairly polarized responses to what was a question of principle but may have
been answered based on particular experiences at individual campuses.

29...Elected stu d e n t board mem bers should be d isqualified from
sim ultaneously h o ld in g o ffice in th e ir respective student unions
because o f the perceived co n flic t o f in te rest on f inancial m atters.

This final question in this section on conflict of interest in the context of
financial decision-making was, again, an issue of principle, although the
responses were always likely to be influenced by particular experiences at the
local board level. The Canadian Federation o f Students, the parent body of some
but not ail local student unions, made it very clear from the minute that shared
governance was contemplated in British Columbia that it saw the opportunity to
unite with the trade unions in order to wrest power away from appointed boards,
and probably administrators as well. In addition, it was clear that the Federation
saw its board members as being representative of the union movement rather
than in pursuit of the common good. Consequently, a large number of student
board members are also student union executives. The study found a weak
tendency overall toward disagreement with the notion that students should be
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disqualified from simultaneously holding office in both organizations. However,
again staff and presidents went against the tide to agree with the statement.
Perhaps the form er felt the way they did through a sense of what is appropriate
based on old fashioned union values of labour and management roles. That
would be tested in a later question. Other constituent groups were all in
agreement with the statement.
The one-way ANOVA of colleges’ views again indicated significant
difference, but the conservative Scheffe test did not reveal any differences
among the matched pairs of colleges, probably due to small population sizes.
However, the analysis did produce a wide range of responses from tendency to
strong agreement (College H) and agreement (College P and College Q) through
to disagreement (10 colleges) and strong disagreement (College K). The twoway ANOVA o f responses from the two studies revealed no significant difference
between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the interaction between
the two sources of data. However, the means indicated that staff and presidents
had experienced modest movement toward agreement with the statement over
the two studies, while students and education council chairs had experienced
modest movement in the opposite direction.
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Summ ary

This section on conflict o f interest in the context of the boards’ financial
decision-making concentrated on the role of the student members. Weak
agreement overall was recorded on the appropriateness o f students being able
to vote on matters concerning tuition, a provision prescribed by the provincial
government. This issue brought out significant difference between the oft cited
allies, appointees and presidents, with the latter being in strong disagreement.
Similarly, there was weak disagreement with the notion that student members
should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office on the boards and
student unions. However, both staff and presidents dissented from the general
views on both the issue of voting and dual office. All constituent groups felt that
boards had effectively handled the de facto conflict of interest of student
members when dealing with the student unions on financial matters.
Colleges continued, in this area of examination of conflict of interest, to
exhibit trends which reflected the overall trends in the study to a large extent.
Accordingly, two of the three most positive colleges in this section (College A
and College K) were also the most positive overall. Further, College L emerged
as positive here but College G remained, on average, more positive overall. On
the negative side, College F, College M, and College Q emerged in this section
with College F and College M continuing their trend over all sections so far.
College E had also shown consistent negative trends overall.
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Board Labour Relations:
How Conflict o f Interest
has been Addressed

41 ...The elected and ex-officio board members have lived up to their
oath o f office to the board in contributing to my board’s role in
labour relations.

The inclusion o f an oath of office for all board members to swear was a
controversial and surprising element of Bill 22, the legislation which introduced
shared governance to British Columbia. Oaths of office are not a big part of
Canadian culture, being more common in American public life. No doubt,
however, the insertion of an oath into the college governance environment was
intended to head off problems faced by the new internal members with their
almost inherent perceived conflict of interest. What the oath did not really
address was the fundamental ethical dilemma of whether a person can serve two
causes when they might be in competition with one another. That point was not
lost on some union executives who expressed concern with the need to swear
allegiance to their boards (as well as to their unions).
The study found that there was overall tendency toward strong agreement
that the elected and ex-officio board members had lived upto their oath of office
in contributing to their boards’ role in labour relations. However, there was a
significant difference among the responses and the Scheffe post-hoc test
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revealed it to be between the appointees (strong agreement) and the presidents
(very weak tendency toward agreement) and between the faculty (strong
agreement) and the presidents. Thus, the presidents extremely lukewarm
acknowledgment of the internal members’ honouring of the oath set the chief
executive officers aside from ail the other constituent groups and continued to
demonstrate their diminishing values of shared governance in general and the
ethical performance o f the internal members in particular.
The one-way ANOVA o f responses by colleges also indicated significant
difference. However, the post-hoc analysis did not reveal any difference between
the matched pairs of colleges, all of which were in agreement or strong
agreement with the exception o f College F which remained neutral. Eleven of the
institutions indicated strong agreement with the statement, suggesting clear
compliance with the oath of office at those campuses.

42...My board has dealt effectively with the issue o f conflict of
interest as it relates to elected and ex-officio board members with
respect to matters of administering collective agreements.

This question built on the oath of office issue and really approached
conflict of interest from another angle, namely have boards taken adequate
steps to eliminate conflict of interest from decision-making on labour matters?
The constituent groups produced a grand mean which tended solidly toward
agreement with the statement. However, once again there was significant
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difference between the appointed members, tending toward strong agreement,
and the presidents, tending toward disagreement. Accordingly, the once strong
allies were again tom apart on a fundamental issue surrounding shared
governance, demonstrating the philosophical and practical gulf which had
developed between the two constituents.
Responses from the colleges produces a number o f significant differences
reflecting the varying experiences at the campus level. The differences were
between College A (strong agreement) and College Q (strong disagreement),
between College D (strong agreement) and College M (disagreement), Between
College D and College Q, between College I (strong agreement) and College Q,
between College K (strong agreement) and College M, between College K and
College Q, and between College L (strong disagreement) and College Q.
Clearly, College M and College Q, in particular, had developed very tense labour
relations environments in the context of shared governance. The two-way
ANOVA of responses from the 1995/96 and current studies revealed no
significant difference between the two studies, among the constituent groups, or
in the interaction between the two sources of data. The means of the constituent
groups over the two studies showed that there had been very marginal positive
and negative shifts among the respondents.
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43...My board has employed a personnel or labour relations
committee from which some board members are excluded on the
basis of their perceived or real conflict of interest

One possible avenue available to boards within the provisions of the
College and Institute Act and the provincially prescribed conflict of interest bylaw,
should they wish to isolate internal members from labour relations decision
making, was to create an executive committee for that purpose. For, the
composition of that committee would be at the discretion of the majority of board
members. The findings of the study were disagreement with the statement that
the option had been taken. Strangely though, there was a range to the
responses of what was a question of fact, with faculty tending toward agreement
and students remaining neutral.
Local differences in approach to this issue were always more likely to be
revealed in the analysis of colleges’ responses. And, that emerged in the
findings with significant difference between College I, in strong agreement, and
College M, in strong disagreement. In addition, two other institutions indicated by
their strong agreement that they had adopted the executive committee model.
The vast majority of colleges indicated, however, that had not gone that route.
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46...Elected employee members and ex-officio members should be
disqualified from simultaneously holding office in their respective
trade unions.

This final question in the section on labour relations was similar to that
concerning student members in financial affairs in that it suggested employee
members should be disqualified from simultaneously holding office on boards
and trade unions. The grand mean indicated weak tendency toward agreement
but consisted of an even split in views between appointees, students, and
presidents (in agreement) and faculty, staff, and education council chairs (in
disagreement). Accordingly, the results meant that staff had favoured student
disqualification but not their own, while students had favoured staff
disqualification but not their own. Interesting too, was the agreement on the part
of the three non-trade union constituent groups as to the proposed
disqualification of the three trade union groups.
Colleges’ responses were well spread out, with College M indicating
strong agreement and seven institutions in agreement. Conversely, in addition to
two neutral colleges, six colleges were in disagreement and College K strongly
disagreed. Therefore, this philosophical issue, which may well have been
influenced by local experiences, produced quite a split among the colleges. The
two-way ANOVA of responses from the two studies did not reveal any significant
difference between the studies, among the constituent groups, or in the
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interaction between the two sources of data. There was very little movement on
the constituents’ views over the two studies with the exception of students who
changed from disagreement to agreement and education council chairs who
changed in the opposite direction.

Summary

This was the ninth and final section of the study to explore decision
making and aspects of leadership by constituent group and college. In this case,
labour relations matters and how conflict of interest has been addressed were
the areas of focus. Constituent groups were in strong agreement that the internal
members have lived upto their oath of office when being involved in decision
making concerning labour relations and, in particular, their own collective
agreements. Further, the constituents were in agreement that boards had dealt
effectively with the inherent conflict of interest faced by internal members in the
same area of board business. However, both statements once again brought out
significant difference in the views between the appointees and the presidents,
with the latter very weakly agreeing with the first statement and disagreeing with
the second statement. These findings were final confirmation of the extreme
reservation, and at times outright disagreement, about the ability o f the internal
members to lay aside their personal agendas in favour o f the pursuit o f the
common good. These fundamental weaknesses in the shared governance
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infrastructure appeared to exist in principle and in practice according to the
presidents. There was disagreement among the constituents that boards have
chosen to adopt executive committees, which would exclude those members
deemed to be in conflict o f interest, as the vehicle for dealing with labour
relations matters. And, this was confirmed in the analysis of college returns
where it was suggested that only three colleges had formed such committees
while fourteen colleges had not. Finally, there was weak agreement among the
constituents that internal employee members should be disqualified from
simultaneously holding office on boards and trade unions. This view contrasted
with the view on student members in regard to student unions which met with
weak disagreement. However, the statement firm ly divided the constituents with
the non-trade union members—appointees, students, and presidents—being in
favour and the trade-union members—faculty, staff, and education council chairs
(the latter most likely drawn from faculty)—being against the notion. The
alignment of the students on this issue was surprising and out of character with
the rest of the findings in the study.
Analysis of the colleges’ returns revealed consistency of responses over
the statements concerning conflict of interest in the labour relations context, but
in patterns which were not necessarily totally consistent over the entire study.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the impact of shared governance on aspects
of leadership and decision-making contexts was situational and affected different
colleges differently, both in principle and in practice, to a certain extent.
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However, there were also discernible trends o f generally positive views and
negative views. College G, College K, and College L were the most positive
colleges with regard to addressing conflict of interest in labour relations, and they
proved also to be the most positive institutions overall. Conversely, College H,
College I, and College Q were the least positive, with the last named also being
one of the three least positive overall. College E and College F were the other
two institutions to fall into the category of least positive throughout this entire
section of the study.

Summary of the Assessment
of Own Boards’ Effectiveness
in Aspects of Leadership

In this section of the study, participants were asked to indicate the extent
of the existence in their own boards’ culture o f various themes, which the
researcher contended would contribute to a board’s effectiveness in certain
aspects of leadership within a shared governance model. A range of responses
was possible from non-existence, minimal existence, neutral, moderate
existence though to strong existence. The aspects of leadership covered were
the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process,
and how conflict o f interest has been addressed.
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The themes suggested by the researcher in this section o f the study were
drawn from the first section. So, in effect, the first section o f the study was
somewhat philosophical in nature and called for responses from the participants
which were both value and experience based. And, in the second section,
participants were asked to reflect on the actual existence of selected themes in
their own particular boards.
Throughout this section o f the chapter relating to own boards’
effectiveness, reference should be made to the following appendices:
•

Appendix L: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by Constituent Group; and

•

Appendix N: Summary of the Assessment o f Own Boards’
Effectiveness in Aspects of Leadership, by College (A to Q).

Sharing of Power

The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s
effectiveness in the sharing o f power in a shared governance model:
•

A climate of trust among all board members;

•

Equal contribution by all board members;

•

Independence of all board members from their constituency;

•

Board members not bringing vested interests to the board table; and

•

Management/labour relations not infiltrating the board culture.
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The grand means o f constituent groups indicated moderate existence o f all the
themes within their own boards’ cultures. There were no significant differences
among the constituents and, in fact, relatively few examples o f any notable
dispersion from the mean. Exceptions to the trend included education council
chairs who noted strong existence of the climate o f trust and faculty who noted
minimal existence o f equal contribution by all members. Additionally, both faculty
and presidents cited minimal existence of independence of members from their
constituencies. Constituents, therefore, appeared to be relatively comfortable
with the existence o f contributors to effective power sharing at the local level.
These sentiments were largely shared by the colleges. The one-way
ANOVA indicated a significant difference among colleges only on the issue of a
climate trust. However, the post-hoc test did not identify any matched pairs. As
in the case of the analysis of constituent groups, there was relatively little
dispersion from the means o f moderate existence on all themes, indicating
homogeneity among colleges which might not have been forecasted. However,
there were exceptions as always. Seven institutions noted a strong existence of
a climate of trust and, conversely, two institutions expressed minimal trust. On
the question of equal contribution, three colleges cited strong existence but four
colleges opted fo r minimal existence as the descriptor for their own experience.
Similarly, the them e o f independence had strong existence at one institution, yet
minimal existence at five other institutions. Two colleges noted minimal existence
of members not bringing vested interests to the table, while two colleges were
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split on the issue o f management/ labour relations with one citing strong
existence and the other citing minimal existence. There was, therefore,
confirmation of the moderate existence across the colleges of the themes that
contribute to effective sharing of power. If strong existence of these themes is
characterized as evidence of colleges which are positive toward shared
governance in general, the section on sharing of power indicated that College A,
College D, and College G emerged as the most positive while College F, College
O, and College Q were the least positive.

Effectiveness o f the Shared
Decision-Making Process

The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s
effectiveness in the shared decision-making process in a shared governance
model:
•

Clear rules of boardsmanship, consistently applied;

•

Accountability for board decision-making;

•

Meeting obligations of the College and Institute Act;

•

Coping with the tendency toward centralized (provincial) decision
making;

•

No bias shown by employee board members in dealing with budget
issues and distribution of resources;
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•

No bias shown by student board members in dealing with budget
issues and distribution of resources;

•

Understanding the distinction between leadership and management
and acknowledging the role o f the board and administration; and

•

The college having a history o f informal shared governance thereby
easing the introduction of legislated shared decision-making.

All of the responses from the constituent groups were positive overall in this
section of the study. Moderate existence was noted for all themes except for
meeting legislative obligations, which rated a strong existence and would be of
comfort to the provincial government. No significant differences were revealed
among the constituents, illustrating again the commonality of the views on
shared governance in actual practice as opposed to any philosophical
differences identified earlier in the study. In the case of clear rules, consistently
applied, both appointees and staff expressed strong existence and those two
constituent groups noted the same for accountability. The grand mean for
meeting legislative obligations was strong existence although students,
presidents, and education council chairs were slightly less positive, each citing
moderate existence. In the case of no bias being shown by employee board
members, only staff, who expressed strong existence, differed from the rest of
the groups. And finally, faculty and education council chairs noted only minimal
existence of a history of informal shared governance in contrast to the other
constituents who cited moderate existence. So, again there was a sense of
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general comfort with the shared decision-making processes adopted at local
campuses with virtually no indication of problem areas.
The findings from the one-way ANOVA of colleges’ responses suggested
slightly less unified views with four o f the eight themes revealing significant
differences among the institutions. However, the Scheffe test did not identify any
significant difference at all between the matched pairs. There was a fair range of
responses on some of the themes as might have been expected, given the
uniqueness of the institutions and the looseness of the shared governance
legislation. In the case o f clear rules, consistently applied, seven colleges noted
strong existence, while two colleges leaned toward only minimal existence.
Similarly, the same seven institutions expressed strong existence of
accountability, while one institution again expressed minimal existence. That
latter college was only neutral on meeting legislative obligations unlike all the
other colleges which identified moderate or strong existence. In the case of
coping with the tendency toward centralized decision-making, one college noted
strong existence, fifteen colleges noted moderate existence, while one college
(College Q) maintained its negative views in this section by noting only minimal
existence. Four colleges cited strong existence of no bias being shown by
employee board members, while all the other colleges cited moderate existence.
The similar theme of no bias being shown by student members was noted in
moderate existence by all colleges, except one which noted strong existence
and an other which noted only minimal existence. The theme of understanding
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roles brought a slightly more dispersed response with five institutions expressing
strong existence, nine institutions expressing moderate existence, one institution
remaining neutral, and two institutions expressing minimal existence. Finally, two
colleges cited strong existence of a past history o f informal shared governance,
while three colleges cited minimal existence. Thus, there again was fairly
consistent reporting among the colleges toward solid existence of the themes
which would contribute to effective shared decision-making processes. There
were very few instances of minimal existence expressed, except consistently
from College Q whose reporting members obviously were not supportive of the
practices in effect at their institution. This section on decision-making process
revealed College G, College K, and College L as the most positive toward
shared governance at the local level, while College B, College F, and, as
previously noted, College Q were revealed as the least positive. Over the two
sections relating to sharing of power and decision-making process, College D,
College G, and College L appeared to be most positive in contrast to College F,
College O, and College Q, which were the least positive.

How Conflict of Interest
has been Addressed

The undemoted themes were suggested as contributing to a board’s
effectiveness in addressing conflict of interest in a shared governance model:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

258
•

A clearly understood and accepted bylaw and/or policy on conflict of
interest having been developed by the board;

•

Elected board members as members-at-large and not representing
their constituencies;

•

The oath o f office, sworn by each member, preventing
management/labour problems among board members;

•

A personnel or labour relations committee, with restricted membership,
preventing management/labour problems among board members;

•

The president being able to make a full contribution to board affairs;
and

•

The education council chair being able to make a full contribution to
board affairs.

In this section on conflict of interest, grand means ranged from minimal existence
to strong existence according to the theme discussed. The clearly understood
and accepted bylaw elicited a grand mean of moderate existence, a view shared
by all the constituents except students who noted strong existence. Both the
members-at-large and oath themes resulted in all constituents citing moderate
existence, however, the labour relations committee brought a minimal existence
response from all constituents except students who remained neutral. And
finally, both themes concerning full participation by presidents and education
council chairs, respectively, elicited responses of strong existence from all
constituents except presidents who accorded both themes moderate existence
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and faculty who gave presidents only moderate existence. The one-way ANOVA
identified significant difference in the case of the presidents’ contribution,
however, the post-hoc analysis did not identify any o f the matched pairs. There
was considerable consensus among the constituent groups in this potentially
volatile area of boardsmanship in contrast to the first section of the study where
participants were expressing their personal values to a greater extent.
The one-way ANOVA o f colleges’ responses revealed an anticipated
wider array of views than for the constituent groups with four of the six themes
indicating significant difference, one of which was confirmed by the Scheffe test.
The most volatile theme, by far, in this section for colleges was that o f a clearly
understood and accepted bylaw. The grand mean was moderate existence, but
views ranged from absolute strong existence (mean score of 5.000) all the way
down to tendency toward non-existence. The post-hoc analysis revealed the
following significant differences: between College A (strong existence) and
College M (non-existence): between College A and College Q (non-existence):
between College C (strong existence) and College M; between College D (strong
existence) and College M; between College D and College Q; between College
E (strong existence) and College M; between College G (strong existence) and
College M; between College I (moderate existence) and College M; between
College J (strong existence) and College M; between College K (strong
existence) and College M; between College L (strong existence) and College M;
between College L and College Q: between College M and College N (strong
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existence); between College M and College O (moderate existence); and finally
between College N and College Q. Accordingly, the large number o f significant
differences were due to the extreme views, focusing on College M and College
Q, both of which tended to non-existence of an understood and accepted bylaw.
The members-at-large theme, in contrast, elicited a response of moderate
existence from all the colleges, with exception of one college which cited minimal
existence. The oath of office theme produced an array of responses, with
significant difference indicated. However, the post-hoc test did not reveal any
significant difference between the pairs of institutions. Nevertheless, the range
was considerable with five colleges citing strong existence, ten colleges citing
moderate existence, one college citing minimal existence, and one college citing
non-existence. Clearly, the oath has had different impacts at different institutions.
The theme of an executive committee produced an obvious split between the
institutions, with three colleges noting moderate existence and all the other
noting minimal and non-existence. Finally, the two themes of contribution to
boards by the presidents and the education council chairs, respectively, elicited
the same kind of responses from colleges as they did from the constituent
groups. All institutions were positive, citing either moderate or strong existence
with the exception of one college which remained neutral on both themes. This
section on how conflict has been addressed produced more extreme views than
the other two aspects of leadership. Accordingly, College A, College G, and
College L emerged as the most positive toward shared governance in this
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section in contrast to College B, College M, and College Q which were the least
positive. Taking the three aspects of leadership overall, the most positive
institutions were College A, College D, and College G, while the least positive
were College F, College H, and College Q. Thus, College M's noticeable
difficulties with the conflict of interest were not repeated elsewhere.

Summary

Analysis of the data from both the constituent groups and the colleges
appeared to confirm the existence at the local campuses of all of the themes
identified by the researcher as contributing to effective shared governance.
Among the constituents, there was considerable consensus on the moderate
existence of most themes and there was next to no instance of extreme views or
any trends in views away from the mainstream.
Colleges, inevitably, were a little more disparate in their views, but really
aside from the extreme negative views of College F and College Q, in general,
and College M, in relation to the conflict of interest issue, there was a fair degree
of consensus among the institutions as well. These findings bode well for the
future of shared governance in British Columbia based on the actual trends to
date.
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Practical Significance of the Study

Shared governance will only be successful as a leadership model in the
college setting if all the constituent groups believe what they are doing is
important and is contributing to a common good of scholarship and student
learning success. Furthermore, it will only be successful if the constituents
practise diligently all of the characteristics of open, honest, effective shared
decision making. As Fife (1998) remarked “shared governance...has a purpose
and a mission. With shared governance there must be shared values and vision
for the organization” (p. 2). Thus, a governance structure, and in particular how it
functions, reflects the culture of a college. And if the structure is truly to be one of
shared governance, then the culture must be collegial with all constituents on a
board of governors—appointees, faculty, staff, students, presidents, and
education council chairs—willing to work together in pursuit of common goals.
This study sought the views of the board members themselves. So, it is a
one-dimensional perspective, which could in time be augmented by the views of
other stakeholders. But, it is likely to be a very important indicator of how
successful shared governance is, and will be, in British Columbia. For, it is an
expression of the views o f the very participants who can make shared
governance successful or unsuccessful. Government can legislate shared
decision-making, but it cannot legislate successful shared decision-making. The
study was focused on the following desired outcomes:
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•

Obtaining board members’ views of how boards are constituted and
how they operate, on both a philosophical and practical level and over
studies two years apart, the study sought to determine if the
commitment and the accomplishment of members was in evidence to
assure effective shared governance;

•

Analyzing the considerable amount of data derived from the sixtyseven statement questionnaire as well as nineteen matched
statements from the previous study, the study sought to reveal findings
of significant difference and other findings of comparative value in
order to chart the progress of shared governance and provide some
prediction of its future development;

•

Individual board members and constituent groups will be able to
ascertain how they compare to their colleagues. Such information, and
the ramifications of their values and actions to date, may serve to tailor
their own future behaviour and thereby influence the direction and
effectiveness of shared decision-making in the post-secondary
education sector;

•

Interested and associated parties, such as the Government of British
Columbia, the Canadian Federation of Students, and faculty and staff
unions at both the local and provincial level may be able to evaluate
the affect of their influence on shared decision-making through the
views and actions of their appointees and elected members. Such
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evaluation may serve to focus future influence on pursuit of the
common good and to the betterment of all parties associated with
higher education.
Colleges, in common with universities and schools, are organizations of varying
democratic degree, depending upon their history and the nature of the
relationships among their constituent groups. However, irrespective o f whether
any particular college falls into the very democratic or the not-so democratic
variety, it is probable that it has a governance structure that is more open and
accessible if not participative than its counterparts in business, industry, and
government. Such is the nature of the shared governance environment. And yet,
colleges are coming under increasing pressure from the outside to act like
businesses rather than the self-serving, non-accountable, gourmands of the
public trough that they are all too frequently perceived to be. Unfortunately, if
colleges are to become corporations, they are in danger of having to abandon
their democratic cultures. As Newquist (1998) noted “Collegiality, which means
shared governance or shared authority, is a casualty of applying corporate
management concepts to universities [and colleges]" (p. 1). This changing
environment in which colleges find themselves was the backdrop to how the
institutions in British Columbia entered the era of shared governance. In addition,
they faced the compounding pressures of a government set on transferring
power from the local campuses to the capitol and significant change occurring
rapidly in the deeply rooted labour relations of the province.
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Thus, legislated shared governance was bom. The legislation, itself, was
alternatively loose and highly prescriptive. That ambiguity, together with colleges’
natural propensity to develop things like governance structures to suit their
individual identities and cultures provided the distinct likelihood o f differing
results of success and failure. The study, therefore, was further focused on the
following outcomes:
•

Identifying colleges’ views, on both a philosophical and a practical
level, the study sought to determine the degree of commonality among
the institutions of British Columbia;

•

Analyzing the comprehensive data, the study sought to reveal findings
of significant difference and other differences of comparative value in
order to chart the progress of shared governance and to provide
indicators as to the future development of shared governance at the
institutional level;

•

In spite of the anonymity afforded them in the findings, college board
members probably have a sense of which boards are doing well in
their governance development and which are not doing well. The
results of more successful institutions emerging in this study,
particularly in terms o f their identified strengths, may stimulate others
to change their approach based on philosophy and themes of
effectiveness; and
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•

As noted previously, associated bodies, such as the government of
British Columbia and the unions, may be able to draw on the findings
from college to college to shape the kind of influence they will have in
the future in regard to institutional governance.

The overriding purpose of the study, therefore, was to provide the beginnings of
an evaluation process that will serve to further strengthen the governance
structure and process throughout the post-secondary system. The findings will
provide as many questions as they do answers, but will, hopefully, generate the
stimulus among all the players to seek continuous improvement. Furthermore,
the findings will contribute to the growing body of knowledge which will have
some application beyond the province of British Columbia.

Summary

This chapter contained analysis of the considerable volume of data
derived from the study. The descriptive statistics section revealed adequate
representation from the six constituent groups and seventeen colleges and
university colleges in terms of questionnaire returns to permit meaningful findings
to be extracted from the data. These findings not only served to explain the
British Columbia situation under review but also allowed additions to the body of
knowledge and some generalization to post-secondary systems throughout
North America.
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The summary of board experience showed that there has been
considerable turnover in all areas of constituent membership and, therefore, the
relative inexperience of board members would have had some impact on the
responses offered. However, the volume and quality of actual responses would
suggest that the steep learning curve in college boardsmanship is fairly
manageable and board members seemed to feel comfortable and qualified in
completing the questionnaire judging by the comments attached to many
submissions.
Analysis of the comparative statistics was divided into two sections. The
first section tracked three aspects of leadership, namely sharing of power; the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process; and how conflict of interest
has been addressed, within three distinct board decision-making contexts,
namely general matters; financial matters; and labour relations matters. The
three dimensional focus of the study was completed by comparing data among
the constituent groups, among the colleges, and among the constituent groups in
certain matched statements contained in the current study and in a similar study
earned out by the researcher in 1995/96. The second section contained the
participants’ assessments of their own boards’ effectiveness in the same three
aspects of leadership noted above. The data were analyzed by constituent
groups and colleges.
The comparative data produced a great number of differences among the
constituents and among the colleges, and between the two studies which served
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to explain the varied evolution o f shared governance in British Columbia and to
provide pointers to its future development. In addition, a good number of
statistically significant differences were revealed throughout the findings. In fact,
the diagram below illustrates that significant differences were found in fourteen of
the twenty-seven areas of the three dimensional model o f inquiry.

Diagram 4: Location of Significant Differences
in the Study
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These significant differences, which are fully explored in Chapter V, provide the
basis for evaluating the development of the shared governance model in
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colleges in British Columbia over the past four years. In addition, the significant
differences suggest the areas that are going to be contentious as boards
continue to refine their structures and methods of operating. However, there is
also information in the findings to suggest that the introduction o f shared
governance has been successful and has contributed to the ongoing
effectiveness o f the institutions and enriched their cultures. It is hoped by the
researcher that the findings of the study will not only serve as simple results but
will also be seen as tools which can be used to further develop the governance
structure in the province.
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CHAPTER V SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

In this chapter, the summary, conclusions, and recommendations are
presented. The summary is a condensed version of the contents o f Chapter I, II,
III, and IV containing discussion of the problem under review in this study, a
review of literature germane to the research questions prompted by the problem,
details of the methodology adopted by the researcher to provide the data from
which the findings could be elicited, and, finally, discussion of the findings in the
context of the research questions. The conclusions were based on an in-depth
exposure of the study findings to the nine hypotheses, spawned from the
research questions, and are discussed in the context of generalizability to the
post-secondary education system of British Columbia and beyond to that of
North America. Finally, the recommendations take the form of two sets of
practical suggestions. The first set includes recommendations to the colleges
and university colleges of British Columbia on how their shared governance
development could be enriched and enhanced through the knowledge gained
from the findings o f the study. And, the second set of recommendations relates
to that body of knowledge which has been accumulated through this study and
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offers suggestions as to how and where that body o f knowledge might be
enlarged through additional research. Thus, the culmination o f this study
represents not the beginning of the end, but, rather, the end o f the beginning of
building a body of knowledge which will inform and support the continuous
improvement process in relation to governance of the province’s public colleges
and university colleges.

Summary

This study focused on the legislated shared governance system which
was introduced to post-secondary education in British Columbia in early 1995.
Change within institutions touched the composition and powers of the governing
boards and spawned the creation of education councils (which are senate-like
bodies) to assume some of the former powers of boards and to share with
boards in decision-making in certain areas. The study concentrated on the
boards and how they have dealt with this significant change according to the
perceptions of the board members themselves. It examined the impacts of
change through selected aspects of leadership—sharing of power, the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how conflict of interest
has been addressed—in the context of selected areas of decision-making—
general board matters, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
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The legislative amendment to the College and Institute Act o f British
Columbia, known as Bill 22, was a mixture o f heavily prescribed elements, such
as the rules on how to consider internal members’ real or perceived conflict of
interest, and loosely described elements, such as the new powers of the boards
in relation to education councils and the Ministry of Advanced Education,
Training, and Technology. Accordingly, the legislation deliberately allowed
colleges to develop their own variations on the shared governance model.
However, there was no real mechanism to carry out systemic evaluation of the
new governance structure with all its potential local differences and this study
sought to begin that process.
In addition to the potential uniqueness of the shared governance model
on each campus, it should also be noted that the new legislation came about
during a period of volatility and change in the provincial post-secondary
education sector. Fiscal restraint, labour relations unrest, labour relations
centralization, centralization of individual college boards' powers in general, and
an open alliance between trade unions and student unions to wrest power away
from appointed boards and administrations all served as a backdrop to the arrival
of shared governance. And, all of these ingredients provided much of the focus
for the study and constituted the basis for the research questions to be explored:
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain
aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness
of the shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict
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of interest o f employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members; elected
faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and education
council chairs, in certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of
power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process, and how
real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and student board
members has been addressed when it comes to decision-making in
respect to general matters of business, financial matters, and labour
relations matters?
3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects of
boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of
interest of employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters.
The study was limited to the views of board members by design and
encountered several factors along the way which placed further limitations on its
scope. These factors included an unusually high instance o f turnover of board
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membership just around the time of the study and the exceptional occurrence of
five of the potential seventeen participating college presidents announcing their
retirement or resignation during the same period. All o f these limitations may
have had a positive or negative affect on the study and its results, but it is
extremely difficult to quantify the affect. In addition, the closeness of the
researcher to the subject matter on account of his position and the highly
charged political nature of the subject matter also may have had some impact on
the study.
An extensive review of literature revealed a wealth o f information about
the gradual evolution of shared governance, initially in the university setting and
later in the college setting. Shared governance may be seen as the epitome of
democracy in higher education and its path to the present day appears to have
been as rocky as that of societal democracy. This was particularly true of
colleges and the passage of time since shared governance became topical in
the community college context has made interesting reading in the considerable
amount of literature available on the subject. It seems that the tentativeness and
philosophical diversity of the 70’s was replaced by a dogged determination to
make shared governance work in the 80’s and that, in turn, has been replaced
by a period of reflection and, not a little, doubt in the 90’s. Throughout the three
decades, authors have divided into proponents, standing on the side of
inclusiveness and even moral justification, and detractors, citing the very real
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issue of self-interest on the part of board members who coincidentally are
members of the faculty, support staff, and student constituencies.
There has been much questioning of the role of boards of governance in
colleges. And, if one is to accept that the role is one of adopting the high level,
long term perspective in setting the direction of colleges (a view which is not
universally shared), and one is prepared to acknowledge the moral right of the
stakeholders to be included in such direction setting, then most authors
concluded that the notion of shared governance is appropriate. However, it was
noted that the combination of internal, usually elected, members and external,
appointed or elected, members does not necessarily make for a marriage made
in heaven. A clear and ongoing, if not permanent, clash of values between the
internal and external members was cited in terms of commitment to the board
mission, knowledge of boardsmanship, philosophical foundation, and actual
behaviour at the board table. In addition, it was suggested that the very
existence of shared governance has been instrumental in undermining the office
of the presidents, regardless of their actual role in shared decision-making.
The consistent message that emerged from literature was that for shared
governance to stand any chance of operating effectively in a college, there must
be clear, accepted, and consistently applied procedures on shared decision
making that firm ly establish responsibilities and roles. In addition, the issue of the
inherent conflict of interest faced by the internal members must be addressed if
the governance model is to have integrity. The importance of these requirements
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has been stressed since the inception o f shared governance and yet they seem
to be still cited today, across the continent, as problematic and the barrier to
effective and harmonious institutional democracy. Authors noted that students
have really made little progress in becoming accepted as equal members of the
governing family, while support staff suffer from a form o f inferiority complex
when it comes to interaction with faculty and external members. Staff, and to
some degree faculty, have had difficulty dealing with the overlapping interests of
boards and trade unions which is a more prominent issue in colleges than
universities due to the firm foothold which unions have established in the former.
Pursuit of self interest rather than that of the common good has long been the
charge leveled at internal members and this, perhaps, has been the greatest
challenge to the general acceptance of shared governance. The areas where
friction has been most pronounced have been financial affairs and labour
relations, two areas where personal gain for internal members might be seen as
most likely. These challenges to the notion of democratic governance which
abounded in literature became the main focus of inquiry in this study.
The methodology adopted for the study was intended to provide a
rigorous examination of shared governance in British Columbia, based on a
three dimensional model o f inquiry. The model allowed forevaluation o f the
governance experience through three lenses, namely three aspects o f board
leadership in three decision-making contexts examined by constituent group,
college, and through the passage o f time between two sim ilar studies carried out
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by the researcher. The study centred around a sixty-seven item questionnaire
based on a Lickert-type attitude inventory, which included statements related to
nine hypotheses drawn from the three research questions. The researcher’s
familiarity with the provincial post-secondary education system facilitated access
to the board member population and, consequently seventeen colleges and
university colleges and two hundred and fifty-five members were included in the
study. The participants’ personal identity and the identity o f the colleges were
protected in the study process and all subsequent reports. A protocol statement
that detailed the proposed process of protection was submitted to the Committee
on the Protection of Human Subjects, University o f San Diego for approval and
was subsequently granted. In addition, the protocol statement was also
submitted, as a requirement of the researcher’s own institutional policy, to the
Research and Ethics Committee, Malaspina University College, British Columbia
and received the necessary approval. Finally, the approved process was
described in the statement o f informed consent which each potential participant
was asked to endorse and return with his/her completed questionnaire. Special
additional protection was afforded the internal members o f the researcher’s own
college in order to avoid any sense of pressure emanating from his position in
the organization.
All o f the data from the surveys was processed using the Statview SE+
Graphics Program on Apple hardware. Manipulation of the data permitted one
way ANOVA statements to be produced by constituency group and college.
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Furthermore, a two-way ANOVA o f matched statements from this study and the
1995/96 study was prepared. The structure of the survey instrument and the
specific questions asked focused solely on the research questions and,
consequently, provided accurate and consistent data to allow concise analyses
and conclusions.
The return rate o f questionnaires was 40% with all constituent groups
represented, ranging from 77% o f the presidents to 20% of the students. In
addition, all colleges were represented with the range extending from 69% of the
College M membership to 21% of the College P membership. The mean of years
of experience on boards came in at 2.909 underscoring the high turnover rate of
board membership and the relative inexperience of participating members.
Analysis of the data produced a great many trends, both o f a positive and
negative variety toward shared governance, and also a substantial amount of
differences, many of a statistically significant nature, among constituent groups
and colleges, and between the two studies. Colleges tended to vary a little in
specific areas but, overall, clear trends emerged as to several consistently
positive institutions and several consistently negative institutions in regard to
shared governance from a philosophical standpoint. And, these views were
essentially repeated when participants assessed their own particular boards’
characteristics in shared decision-making. The most positive institutions were
College D, College G, College K, and College L and the least positive institutions
were College E, College F, and College Q.
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The grand means of the constituent groups generally tended toward
positive attitudes on all of the aspects of shared governance, however there
were several areas where one or another of the constituents had dissimilar views
and there emerged a very obvious trend of presidents espousing no more than
lukewarm responses and occasional very negative responses. The presidents
were particularly concerned about the lack of independence from their
constituencies shown by internal members, the impact of the heavily unionized
environment on the governance environment, the actions and accountability of
the democratized boards, internal members showing bias in relation to the
budget process, the (legislated) ability of student members to vote on tuition
issues, and the questions as to whether the internal members have lived up to
their oath of office. The last concern struck at the very integrity of the
governance process and coincided with the contentious issues raised in
literature. The presidents’ dramatic shift in their views was noted as one of the
changes between the two studies. In 1995/96, presidents and appointees were
noted as being clearly positive about the fledgling governance structures, while
students were neutral and faculty, staff, and education council chairs were
decidedly cautious. Little more than two years later, appointees had largely been
joined by all the constituents, except the presidents, on the positive side while
the presidents stood alone, generally neutral and frequently negative. The very
stark gulf in philosophical and practical values between the appointees and the
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presidents in the current study appeared to contradict the traditional alliance
noted in literature as crucial to the success of shared governance.
Other less dramatic trends to emerge included overall concern about the
diminution of the boards’ powers as a result of governmental centralization,
general unease around the government prescribed treatm ent of conflict of
interest, and the widespread practice of internal members simultaneously holding
office in their respective trades and student unions. On a more narrow focus,
staff seemed to have trouble with aspects of the students’ approach to
governance, in particular their role in labour relations, and education council
chairs were quite negative toward the democratized boards’ openness and
accountability on financial matters. Generally, all constituent groups assessed
that their own particular boards were demonstrating moderate existence of the
various qualities identified by the researcher in this study as contributing to the
effectiveness o f governing boards. Confirmation o f the existence of these
qualities, while it might have flown in the face of some of the philosophical values
espoused, did suggest reasonable progress had been made in the development
of shared governance in British Columbia.
The significance of this study was the attempt to understand the values,
commitment, and actions of board members in the shared governance structure
in order to evaluate the progress to date and to provide some prediction for the
future of shared decision-making in the province. In addition, the identification of
views and practices within constituent groups and colleges m ight serve to
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influence the behaviour of not only the direct governance players, the members
themselves, but also the indirect players which have an influence on the
outcomes, such as government and the trades and student unions.

Conclusions

This study focused on three specific questions in order to assess how
shared governance has been developed in British Columbia. Those three
questions each spawned three hypotheses for a total of nine hypotheses.
Further, each hypothesis existed in three decision-making contexts resulting in
twenty-seven variables within the three-dimensional model of inquiry. This
section o f the chapter condensed all of the findings into the structure of the
primary research questions.
1. Is there a difference among British Columbia colleges in certain aspects
of boardsmanship, namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the
shared decision-making process, and how real or perceived conflict of
interest o f employee and student board members has been addressed
when it comes to decision-making in respect to general matters of
business, financial matters, and labour relations matters?
Analysis of the data found that there were no significant differences
among colleges on the sharing of power in any one of the three decision-making
contexts. The null hypothesis was, therefore, tenable. Local differences and
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nuances notwithstanding, it was reasonable to conclude that all colleges were
generally comfortable with the fundamental requirement of distributing authority
in a fair and equitable manner. This level of comfort, which is crucial to the
existence of shared governance, seemed to extend beyond decision-making on
general matters to the more contentious areas of financial matters and labour
relations matters.
No significant differences were found among the colleges concerning the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process. Accordingly, it could be
assumed that colleges were generally comfortable with the processes of shared
decision-making which have evolved in each of the three contexts under review.
In the context of general matters of board business, significant difference
was found among eight colleges on the issue of whether the conflict o f interest
bylaw was generally accepted by all board members as fair and workable. There
was, also, significant difference between two colleges on whether conflict of
interest in this decision-making context has been an actual problem at the
campus level. Further, there were no significant differences among colleges
relating to conflict of interest in the context of financial decision making.
However, there was significant difference among eight colleges on whether
boards had dealt effectively with the inherent conflict of interest of internal
members in decision-making on labour relations matters. And, in addition, there
was significant difference between two colleges on whether an executive
committee, excluding internal members, should be adopted to deal with labour
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relations matters. Furthermore, there was significant difference among thirteen
colleges on whether an executive committee had actually been adopted at the
local site. On the basis of finding powerful disparities among colleges in two of
the three decision-making contexts, it was reasonable to reject the null
hypothesis and conclude that conflict of interest had caused differences among
the institutions.
It can be concluded that there was no discernible difference among
colleges in two of the aspects o f board leadership, namely the sharing of power
and the creation of effective shared decision-making processes. However, there
was significant difference with profound undertones among the colleges on how
conflict of interest has been addressed. The importance of the third aspect of
leadership is such that it must be concluded that there was, indeed, far-reaching
difference among colleges, overall, even though it was not evident in the other
two aspects. The rationale for this conclusion is that dealing with conflict of
interest has been noted in the literature in Chapter II as fundamental to the
success of shared governance and lack of consensus among the colleges as to
how it has been addressed represents a serious division within the postsecondary education system.

2. Is there a difference among board members, according to the
constituency from which they are drawn, i.e. appointed members;
elected faculty; elected support staff; elected students; presidents; and
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education council chairs, in certain aspects of boardsmanship, namely
the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision-making
process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee and
student board members has been addressed when it comes to decision
making in respect to general matters o f business, financial matters, and
labour relations matters?
Analysis o f the data revealed significant difference on the issue of power
sharing in the context of decision-making on general matters between
appointees and the presidents and between support staff and the presidents.
This occurred in the matter of whether employee board members should get
release time as compensation for board service and showed staff to be in strong
agreement, appointees in agreement, and presidents in strong disagreement.
There was no significant difference among the constituent groups on sharing of
power in financial decision-making. Finally, significant difference was revealed
between appointees and presidents and between faculty and presidents in terms
of labour relations. This occurred in the proposition that shared governance is
inherently difficult in a unionized environment with presidents expressing
agreement, appointees expressing disagreement, and faculty expressing strong
disagreement. On the basis of the differences revealed, chiefly involving
appointees and presidents, it was reasonable to reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that there was difference among constituent groups on the sharing of
power.
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Four separate instances of significant difference were found among
constituent groups in the context of the shared decision-making process on
general matters. Student board members differed with the presidents on the
contention that the (democratic) composition of boards makes a contribution
toward effective governance, with the former in strong agreement and the latter
in strong disagreement. There was significant difference between the appointees
(strong agreement) and the presidents (weak agreement) on the question of
whether the newly constituted boards had managed to make some difficult
decisions during the last two years. Furthermore, there was again difference
between the appointees and the presidents on whether boards had been
accountable to their internal and external communities. On this issue, appointees
again expressed strong agreement while presidents again offered only weak
agreement. Finally, there was significant difference on the question of whether
boards had fulfilled their general obligations under the College and Institute Act
between appointees and presidents and between students and presidents with
the positive constituents expressing strong agreement and the presidents, with
considerable reserve, noting only weak agreement. There were no significant
differences on the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process in the
context of financial matters. This result was somewhat surprising given the
suggestion in Chapter II that shared governance commonly comes under threat
in the financial decision-making area. However, there were three examples of
significant difference related to labour relations matters. On the issue of whether
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boards would have adopted a different labour relations direction had there been
no internal members, appointees and education council chairs differed with the
former disagreeing and the latter agreeing. There was significant difference
between the faculty and presidents and between the faculty and education
council chairs on the contention that boards would have adopted a different
labour relation direction had the tendency toward provincial centralization of
decision-making not been in evidence. This difference was revealed as strong
disagreement from faculty and agreement from presidents and education council
chairs. Lastly, the suggestion that boards would have adopted a different
direction in labour relations had neither internal members nor centralization of
decision-making existed brought significant difference again between faculty, in
strong disagreement, and presidents and education council chairs, both in
agreement. The overwhelming evidence of significant differences in both general
board matters and labour relations matters substantiated the conclusion that the
null hypothesis should be rejected and that difference among constituent groups
was considerable in relation to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making
process in the shared governance model.
There were no significant differences among the constituent groups in
how conflict of interest had been addressed in the area of general decision
making. However, in the financial context, the issue of the appropriateness of the
student members being able to vote on tuition matters revealed difference
between appointees and presidents, with the former agreeing but the latter
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strongly disagreeing. There were two instances of significant difference in the
area o f decision-making on labour relations, the first of which concerned whether
internal members had lived upto their oath of office. This issue which strikes at
the very integrity of the shared governance model revealed appointees and
faculty to be in strong agreement but presidents expressed only weak
agreement. Appointees and presidents also differed on whether boards had
dealt effectively with the conflict of interest inherent to internal members with the
form er espousing strong agreement in contrast to the presidents’ disagreement.
In light of yet another series of examples of significant difference between
appointees and presidents, it appears prudent to reject the null hypothesis in
favour of a conclusion that there was, indeed, noticeable difference among
constituents on how conflict of interest had been addressed.
It can safely be concluded that there was profound and widespread
difference among the constituent groups relative to shared governance in British
Columbia. The consistent divergence between appointees and presidents and
the frequent isolation of the latter in contrast to all the other constituent groups
served to underscore the sense of deep division that appeared to exist.
Furthermore, the largely negative opinions o f the titular educational leaders, that
the presidents represent, does not bode well for the future success of shared
governance in the province nor, perhaps, for education in general.
In contrast, however, most of the other constituent groups consistently
reported positive views toward the aspects of shared governance, in particular
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the appointees and the faculty members. The concurrence o f views among the
appointees and internal members in general is somewhat surprising given the
trends suggested in Chapter II and may be attributable to the fact that the
government in power, which is making the appointments, would be described as
left-of-centre and more likely to have philosophies parallel to those o f the internal
members than might a right-of-centre government.

3. Is there a difference between the views elicited from this study and
those from an earlier study in respect to certain aspects o f boardsmanship,
namely the sharing of power, the effectiveness of the shared decision
making process, and how real or perceived conflict of interest of employee
and student board members has been addressed when it comes to
decision-making in respect to general matters of business, financial
matters, and labour relations matters.
Analysis of the data confirmed that there was significant difference
between the 1995/96 study and the current study on the sharing o f power in
general board matters, and more specifically in relation to the appropriateness of
the six year aggregate term for appointees. The 1997/98 study showed a
generally more positive response from all constituents within the area of
agreement. Furthermore, the same statement resulted in significant difference
among the constituent groups over the two studies with appointees, staff and
presidents expressing agreement, faculty and education council chairs remaining
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neutral, and students expressing disagreement. There were no significant
differences in relation to the sharing of power on financial matters. However,
there was significant difference relative to labour relations on the contention that
shared governance is inherently difficult to develop in a unionized environment.
The difference was among the constituents over the two studies and extended to
agreement (presidents and students), disagreement (appointees, staff, and
education council chairs) and strong disagreement (faculty). The existence of
significant difference in two of the three decision-making contexts was
considered sufficient to suggest that the null hypothesis should be rejected.
Consequently, it would appear that there was difference between the two studies
on the sharing o f power, mainly relating to the relationship among the constituent
groups.
Areas o f significant difference were discovered in all three decision
making contexts relative to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making
process. In the case of general board matters, there was significant interaction
among the constituents on the contention that the new composition of boards
made a contribution toward effective governance. While four of the constituent
groups moved in a negative direction between the two studies, students and
education council chairs moved in a positive direction thereby causing the
interaction affect (see Appendix Q). Similarly, there was significant interaction on
the companion statement that the manner in which boards operated made a
contribution to effective governance (see Appendix R). In this case, the same
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four groups moved in a negative direction over the two studies while students
again moved in a positive direction. There were two significant differences within
the financial decision-making context. The first was among constituents over the
two studies on whether boards had fulfilled their fiscal obligations under the
College and Institute Act. Students and education council chairs, who expressed
weakish agreement, contrasted with the other groups’ strong agreement. The
second instance of difference was again among constituents on the contention
that boards had discharged their fiduciary responsibilities to the student
population at large in relation to matters concerning fees collected. With the
exception of student members who were in disagreement, all other groups
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. In the case of decision-making on
labour relations matters, there were two significant differences related to the
question of whether boards had fulfilled their labour relation obligations under the
College and Institute Act. In the first difference, among the constituent groups
over the two studies, appointees were in strong agreement while all the other
groups were in agreement. In addition, there was significant interaction with
presidents adopting a more negative position in the later study while all the other
groups adopted a more positive position (see Appendix S). The extent of the
significant differences and interactions prompted the researcher to conclude that
this null hypothesis should be rejected, and, rather, that it was reasonable to
infer that there was discernible difference between the findings of the two studies
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in relation to the effectiveness of the shared decision-making process and its
impact on shared governance.
Analysis of the data revealed two significant differences between the
studies on how conflict of interest has been addressed in relation to general
board decision-making. The first occurred on the contention that education
council chairs should be non-voting members of boards, as they are currently
legislated. The grand mean of responses moved from 3.916 in the earlier study
to 3.578 in the current study signaling a noticeable shift in thinking on the matter.
In a similar vein, there was also significant difference on the contention that
education council chairs should be full voting members. In this case, the grand
mean shifted from 2.075 to 2.485 indicating change of opinion which was the
reciprocal of the previous statement. There were no significant differences in
either financial matters or labour relations matters. As a consequence of these
findings, it would appear that this hypothesis was tenable and, indeed, there was
no difference between the studies on how conflict of interest had been
addressed.
There were a considerable number of significant differences and
interactions in the leadership aspects of power sharing and ensuring the
effectiveness of the shared decision-making process to outweigh the relative
absence of differences in how conflict of interest had been addressed.
Consequently, the researcher would argue that there was a marginal overall
difference in the findings from the two studies. And, on balance, the general
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direction o f the findings was toward a more positive attitude, overall, on shared
governance emerging in the current study. This direction was established in spite
o f the fact that the presidents’ views had clearly moved from a positive position in
1995/96 to a negative position in 1997/98.

The following findings from the study fell short of statistical significance
but were, nevertheless, worthy o f note because they underscore the main
conclusions that have been reached in relation to the research questions:
1. All differences, both significant and otherwise, among colleges tended to
establish identifiable trends which separated colleges with generally positive
attitudes toward shared governance from colleges with less than positive
attitudes. Those trends are tabulated in Appendix P.
2. Similarly, Appendix P also illustrates how all the differences among
constituent groups conformed to very clear patterns. The most stark
observation from this table is the consistent placement of the presidents as
the least positive of the constituent groups. In addition, the following trends
were noted:
•

Appointees and presidents were generally far apart on philosophical
matters unlike the findings in the 1995/96 study which placed them
close together and positive toward shared governance.

•

Support staff and presidents shared some general skepticism toward
the role of students on college boards in relation to the students’ ability
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to vote on tuition matters and their right to simultaneously hold office
on boards and student union executive committees..
•

Although not causing significant statistical difference, presidents
believed that budgets were more difficult to balance in a shared
governance environment. They also disagreed with the suggestion that
internal members had not shown bias in financial matters, thereby
striking at the integrity of the shared decision-making ideal.

•

Education council chairs were quite negative toward boards having
ensured access of stakeholders to financial information and boards
having kept stakeholders adequately informed about financial matters.
This negativity was, however, largely out of character for this
constituent group.

•

Faculty and education council chairs frequently differed even though
the latter are most commonly also faculty members.

3. There was only one significant difference in the assessment of own boards’
effectiveness in aspects of leadership, pertaining to thirteen colleges and the
existence of a clearly understood and accepted bylaw on conflict if interest.
Further, in spite of widely differing philosophies on the characteristics of
effective shared governance revealed among colleges and constituent
groups, there was almost total agreement that colleges were actually
exhibiting those characteristics in practice. This particular set of findings
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would be very appropriate to test against the views of other stakeholder
groups.
In conclusion, the findings of the study were that material differences
existed between both colleges and constituent groups, and to a lesser extent
between the two studies, in relation to all three important aspects of board
leadership. The sharing of power was marginally less problematic than the
effectiveness o f the shared decision-making process and how conflict of interest
had been addressed. In addition, there were also material differences among the
three decision-making contexts, but, surprisingly, financial matters appeared to
be noticeably less problematic than general matters and labour relations matters.
The degree o f differences, as expressed in the number with statistical
significance, would appear to present clear warning to everyone associated with
education in British Columbia. And, that warning would be that, although much
progress has been made, the development of shared governance is not
proceeding as smoothly and evenly as might have been desired. But then again,
it might be concluded that the progress to date is conforming very closely to the
pattern throughout North America as evidenced in thirty years of literature.
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Recommendations

This final section of the chapter contains practical suggestions for
implementation and further pursuit o f the findings from the study and
suggestions for areas of further research to build upon those findings.
A study which is evaluative in nature should be expected to produce
findings which can be applied in a practical way to improve the subject under
review. And, that is the case with this study of shared governance in the British
Columbia post-secondary education system. There were clear messages to
emerge from the findings and these should be directed back to the system from
which they were drawn. First, it is important to note that shared governance has
been relatively well introduced to the province. That was confirmed by the board
members in noting the moderate existence at each college site of most of the
qualities associated with successful shared decision-making. However, not all
qualities were recognized at all campuses and, in addition, there were very
different philosophical views expressed by constituent groups and colleges. It is
in this area of personal values that most attention should be paid because these
personal values held by board members are likely to become the actual
characteristics of tomorrow’s governing boards. There are clear divergences of
values held by the presidents of institutions and in certain colleges.
Conflict of interest in principle, directed at the internal members, is an
obvious problem area, as is the shared decision-making process which is often
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affected by conflict of interest. The fundamental sharing o f power appears not to
be such a great problem, although the role o f students did come under some
critical scrutiny. Problems were detected in two of the decision-making areas,
namely general matters and, in particular, labour relations matters. Somewhat
surprisingly, financial matters did not seem to be such a problem, but must
inevitably be impacted by the conflict o f interest issue noted earlier.

Suggestions for Implementation and Further Pursuit
o f the Findings o f the Study

1. College trustees should study the results of this evaluation carefully.
Notwithstanding the anonymity, boards can probably relate their own known
culture to the findings. Colleges should use the findings as building blocks for
the future, starting with structured evaluation of their own performance. And,
the evaluation would be most effective were it to include all stakeholder
groups including the public-at-large and perhaps even representatives o f the
provincial government. In this case, the Advanced Education Council of
British Columbia could assume a leadership role in facilitating the
development of common evaluation tools to assist boards. This evaluation
task should be separate from the all-encompassing, and relatively ineffectual,
five-year self studies which colleges presently undertake.
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2. Out of the evaluation should come, as a minimum, action plans to draw up
clear rules of operating and responsibilities including policy on conflict of
interest, even if the universal conflict o f interest bylaw cannot be changed
immediately. The bylaw should, however, be subjected to rigorous review as
it clearly is a bone of contention and, perhaps, the Achilles heel of shared
governance right now. The more clarity that can be instilled in board
objectives and procedures, the less likelihood there is of ongoing problems.
3. If colleges can establish cultural norms of shared governance, not only might
some o f teething problems, currently being experienced, tend to diminish but
also the problems of frequent turnover of the memberships may be alleviated.
Orientation of new members, and this is just as important for internal
members as external members, would be an effective tool in creating and
sustaining a democratic culture. Again, AECBC would appear to have a role
to play whether it is in focusing more on the issues of shared governance in
the orientation sessions which it sponsors in Vancouver or assisting in the
development of orientation packages which can be used at the local board
level where all members are more likely to be in attendance.
4. Finally, it would appear that boards need to revisit their relationships with the
constituencies that have impact on them, including education councils; the
Ministry o f Advanced Education, Training, and Technology, and other
branches of government; and student and trade unions, on both a local and
provincial level. Development of those relationships would surely lead to
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better definition of the roles of internal members on college boards and,
thereby, address one of the fundamental weaknesses o f shared governance
which was identified in literature and is now manifesting itself in British
Columbia. That weakness relates to the tendency of internal members to
pursue the interest of their constituencies rather than that of the common
good. One obvious solution to the problem might lie in consideration of the
notion that employees and students serving simultaneously as board
members and union officials is an impossible and undesirable clash of
interests and loyalties.
5. The presidents have to regroup and consider what would improve their views
and actions in shared decision-making. Clearly, given the power of their
office, shared governance will not fully prosper if they continue to see it in a
negative light. However, the governance structure is sufficiently well
established already to suggest that change will not come about if the
presidents take a back seat. It would appear that some presidents, at least,
have adopted what was identified in literature as bury-one’s-head-in-the-sand
response to the perception of having their power changed in shared
governance. The presidents need to reassess this inactivity and explore the
value of taking charge, of assuming a leadership role in engaging the other
constituents to work together in pursuit of a common good. This engagement
resonates with the notion of collaborative leadership espoused by Rost
(1993) and Scherr (1994). Arguably, the presidents have the station and the
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reputation fo r independence to provide the spark for true democratization of
all the players and the pursuit o f the advantages of shared decision-making.
The current structure in British Columbia which sees the Council of Chief
Executive Officers and the Council o f Board Governors meet individually and
jointly under the auspices of AECBC would provide the ideal vehicle for initial
exploration o f the kind of governance development envisaged. And, it would
also present the opportunity to start to close the gap which has emerged
between the presidents and provincially appointed members in particular. Key
players among the presidents group could well be the five newly hired
presidents who should bring a fresh perspective and, thus, start to turn
around an apparently deteriorating situation.

Suggestions for Areas of Further Research

Shared governance is an evolving concept, even with thirty years
experience in some provinces and states. Its continued evolution is very
dependent upon the changes going on in education as a whole as well as the
real world outside of education. This study merely scratches the surface as
others have done before. And, it poses more questions at its conclusion than it
does provide answers.
1. In terms of a total perspective on shared governance in British Columbia,
there is a fruitful field of research possible in examining the subject through

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

300
other stakeholder groups, individually or as a whole. The views of the general
populations of faculty, staff, and students as well those of the public-at-large,
media, and government would provide a rich and, in all probability,
contrasting picture to augment the findings of this study.
2. In addition, a follow-up on this study in approximately three years, which
could include both current board members and former members, would
expand the knowledge base o f this study and determine if patterns of views
and behaviours are still in a fluid mode. Such a study would also serve to
allay any concerns about the relative inexperience of the current study’s
participants, expressed in a grand mean of 2.909 years.
3. The apparent extreme negative views of the college presidents toward
shared governance would suggest that a more intensive qualitative study of
their views might reveal what can be done to bring the presidents on-side.
One would imagine that the provincial government might be interested in
sponsoring such research given the importance of the presidents at the heart
of the education system.
4. Conflict of interest is well documented as perhaps the greatest barrier to truly
effective shared governance. Consequently, this issue represents a
potentially fruitful area of research, particularly in examining where there has
been successful introduction o f shared governance into a highly unionized
environment elsewhere in North America.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

301
5. The findings of this study revealed colleges which were positive toward
shared governance, both philosophically and in practice, and colleges which
were negative. A case study of one or more of the positive colleges may well
reveal the cultural characteristics and established procedures which could be
developed as standards for the less positive colleges to adopt. This would, of
course, require some colleges to waive the anonymity which they were given
in this study.
Several specific areas were identified during the analysis o f the data in the
study which prompted the need for further research. This research could be done
independently or be part of the basis for a follow-up study.
•

The participants were firmly split down the middle (positive, neutral, and
negative) on whether the tendency toward provincial centralization of boards’
decision-making powers had spared the boards, to any extent, difficulties in
decision-making due to the inclusion o f internal members. Further research
should be undertaken to determine if the absence of difficulties, where noted,
was due to the centralization or any other positive factors within a board’s
culture.

•

Since most colleges reported that they had been able to deal with the trend
toward provincial centralization and, consequent, diminution o f their powers,
further research might reveal how institutions are evolving from being
hierarchical organizations with substantial local power to become democratic
organizations within a hierarchical education system where power
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increasingly resides elsewhere, such as with the provincial government both
within the Ministry of Advanced Education, Training and Technology and
other ministries. This type of inquiry would lend itself to a qualitative study.
•

Appointees and education council chairs tended toward disagreement that
the remuneration of the former was appropriate. It would be interesting to
determine if the two constituents had the same reason for their negative view
toward the level of remuneration.

•

The issue of boards meeting their fiduciary obligations to the student
population in terms of dealing with student unions when two students are
frequently members of both bodies prompted the need for more information
than was forthcoming in the study. Student respondents were neutral and it
would take further research to determine if the reason for neutrality went
along with a lack of knowledge of the boards’ legal fiduciary obligations,
reservation as to the appropriateness of those obligations, or reservation as
to whether boards had, indeed, discharged the obligations.

•

Finally, the general disquiet around conflict of interest, which permeates the
findings of this study, would naturally prompt further questions:
•

Two colleges disagreed that the bylaw was accepted as fair and
workable. Further research to determine if the opinions were founded
on principle only or on practical experiences at their particular
campuses might provide new information which would assist colleges
in dealing with this major issue. Such findings might form the basis of
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new local policies to codify the responsibilities and expectations of
internal members.
•

Similarly, the students stood out in isolation in disagreeing with the
contention that conflict o f interest had not been a de facto problem at
campuses. It would interesting to find out more about the problems
observed by this unique group of board members.

Consequently, the questions posed above would appear to confirm that the
quest for information on the shared governance concept is not yet at an end.
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September 17,1997

«Title»«FirstName» «LastName»
«Address1»
«Address2»
«City», «State»
«PostalCode»
Dear «FirstName» «LastName»:
As a current member of the board o f a community college or university college,
you are invited to participate in my research study on shared governance in the
British Columbia post-secondary system. In addition to my position as Vice
President and Bursar of Malaspina University College, I am a doctoral student at
the University o f San Diego and this study will form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate,
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you
are acquiring as a board member, and I sincerely hope that you w ill volunteer to
participate. If you have any questions or comments please contact me at my
home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my dissertation director, Dr.
William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego State University ([619]-5943071).
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Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope
provided no later than O ctober 10,1997. Thank you, in advance, for your
participation.

Yours Sincerely,

Edwin Deas
Enclosures
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September 17, 1997

«FirstName» «LastName»
«Address1»
«Address2»
«City», «State»
«PostalCode»
Dear «FirstName» «LastName»:
As a recent member of the board of a community college or university college,
you are invited to participate in my research study on shared governance in the
British Columbia post-secondary system. In addition to my position as Vice
President and Bursar of Malaspina University College, I am a doctoral student at
the University of San Diego and this study will form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate,
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you
have acquired as a board member, and I sincerely hope that you will volunteer to
participate. If you have any questions or comments please contact me at my
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home ([250J-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my dissertation director, Dr.
William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego State University ([619]-5943071).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope
provided no later than O ctober 10,1997. Thank you, in advance, for your
participation.

Yours Sincerely,

Edwin Deas
Enclosures
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September 17, 1997

«FirstName» «LastName»
«Address1»
«Address2»
«City», «State»
«PostalCode»
Dear «FirstName» «LastName»:
As a current or recent, elected or ex-officio member of the board of Malaspina
University College, you are invited to participate in my research study on shared
governance in the British Columbia post-secondary system. As you know, in
addition to my position as Vice President and Bursar of Malaspina University
College, I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego and this study will
form the basis of my dissertation.
Enclosed with this letter, you will find a form of consent to act as a research
subject, a questionnaire, and a postage paid, return envelope. The consent form
serves two purposes. Firstly, more information about the purpose and
procedures of the study is detailed. Secondly, should you agree to participate,
and I want to stress strongly that participation is entirely voluntary, you are
requested to indicate to that affect on the form and return it with the completed
questionnaire in the envelope provided as noted below.
Please be aware that I have included additional safeguards in the study process
to protect your anonymity given our close on-going relationship. Your envelope
containing the completed consent form and questionnaire will be directed
unopened to a consultant in Vancouver who is responsible for the processing of
all data. The consultant, not I, will input your data and process it along with all
the other data which I will input. When I receive the processed data, it should be
virtually impossible for me to identify your input. Therefore, not only will your
anonymity be maintained in my dissertation and any other reports (as w ill that of
other participants), in your case I will also not be personally aware of any of the
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content. In addition, your questionnaire will be retained in Vancouver and
ultimately disposed of once the study has been concluded.
It is my hope that this study will not only provide the basis for the completion of
my degree but will also contribute to the body of knowledge which will assist
governance in particular, and post-secondary education in general, areas in
which we share a common interest. I should add that I have received every
encouragement in my endeavor from the Advanced Education Council of British
Columbia and look forward to sharing the results of the study with members in
various forums.
This field of research is entirely grounded in the knowledge and views which you
are acquiring or have acquired as a board member and I sincerely hope that you
will volunteer to participate. If you have any questions or comments please
contact me at my home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730) or my
dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, Professor of Education, San Diego
State University ([619J-594-3071).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope
provided no later than O ctober 10,1997. Thank you, in advance, for your
participation.

Yours Sincerely,

Edwin Deas
Enclosures
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Section 1 : Board decision-making on general matters, but excluding business
related to financial matters and labour relations matters.

1. .. My board has established a climate of

Strongly

.

trust among all the members (irrespective
of the constituency they come from).

2 ... Board members may bring different
values and expertise but all generally
contribute equally to the functioning of the
board.

1

3 ... Board members view themselves as
equals.

Strongly
Disagree

4 .. .The six year term for appointed board
members is appropriate.

5 ... The three year term for elected board
members is appropriate.

6 ... The one year term for student board
members is appropriate.

7 ... The remuneration for appointed and
student board members is appropriate.
(a)----appointed members
(b )----student members

2

3

Strongly
Agree
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8 .. .Faculty and support staff members and
the chairs of the education council should
be remunerated by way of:
(a)----a stipend
(b )----release time.
9 ... The composition of my board makes an
effective contribution to the governance of
the institution.

10 ... The way my board operates makes an
effective contribution to the governance of
the institution.

Strongly
Agree

11... The conduct of my board represents
good boardsmanship.

12 ... My board has managed to make some
difficult decisions in the last two years.

13 ... My board is accountable for its
decisions to the internal and external
communities.

Strongly
Disagree

14 .. .I feel my board is fulfilling its
obligations under the College and Institute
Act.

1
15 .. .I feel the powers of the board are being
diminished as more decisions are being
centralized at the provincial level.

l

3

4

5
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16 ...The president should be a non-voting
ex-officio member of the board.

Strongly
Disagree
1

17 ... The president should be a full voting
member of the board.

2

3

4

Strongly
Disagree
1

18 .. .The chair of the education council
should be a non-voting ex-officio member
of the board.

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Agree

2

3

4

Strongly
Disagree
1

s
Strongly
Agree

l

3

4

19 ... The chair of the education council
should be a full voting member of the
board.

s
Strongly
Agree

1

2

20 .. .The bylaw and/or policy regarding
Strongly
conflict of interest adopted at my institution Disagree
is generally accepted by all board members
as fair and workable.
1
l
21...Conflict of interest has not been a
problem with my board.

s

3

4

5

Strongly
Agree

3

4

Strongly
Disagree

5

Strongly
Agree

1

4

s

Section 2 : Board decision-makin~ related solely to financial matters

22 ... All members of my board have equal
Strongly
independence and disinterest when it comes Disagree
to dealing with budget issues.

1

Strongly
Agree

l

3

4

s
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23 ... Elected and ex-officio board members
have an inevitable vested interest when
dealing with budget issues.

329

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

24 .. .1 feel that elected and ex-officio board
members have generally NOT shown bias
towards their own department, area, or
constituency (trade or student union) when
dealing with budget issues.
25 .. .I feel my board effectively discharges
its fiscal responsibilities under the College
and Institute Act.

2
26 ... My board discharges its fiduciary
responsibility to all students from whom it
collects student union fees when dealing
with that organization.
27 ... My board has dealt effectively with the
issue of conflict of interest as it relates to
student board members with respect to
financial matters between the board and the
student union, such as tuition and other
fees.

28 ... The College and Institute Act
provision that students may vote on
proposed tuition fee increases is
appropriate.
29 .. .Elected student board members should
be disqualified from simultaneously
holding office in their respective student
unions because of the perceived conflict of
interest on financial matters.
30 ... The board' s role is to approve the
parameters and underlying assumptions of
the budget, but otherwise to leave assembly
of the numbers to administration.

Strongly
Disagree

1

Strongly
Agree

2

3

4

5
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31 ... My board ensures that all stakeholder
groups have advisory input into the budget
process.

32 ...I feel that all stakeholder groups are
adequately informed about financial
matters.

1

2

3

4

33 ... The composition of the board has
made it more difficult to balance the budget
in these tight financial times.

5

Strongly
Agree

Section 3 : Board decision-making related solely to labour relations matters

34 ... Shared governance as a broad goal is
difficult to achieve in a unionized
environment.

Strongly
Duagree
1

3 5 ... Labour relations, in particular the
negotiation and administering of collective
agreements, has caused division among the
members of my board.
36 ... Labour relations has largely become a
centralized provincial issue, hence my
board has not experienced any difficulties
in decision-making due to the presence of
elected and ex-officio members.

2

5

Strongly
Disagr.ee

Strongly
Agree

1

5

3 7 .. .I feel my board effectively discharges
its labour relations responsibilities under
the College and Institute Act.

1

2

3

4

5
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38 .. .1 feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two years if the board
did not include elected and ex-officio
members.

1

2

3

4

5

39 .. .1 feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two years if
provincial centralization had not taken
place.
40 ..I feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two years if the board
did not include elected and ex-officio
members and if provincial centralization
had not taken place.
41.. .The elected and ex-officio board
members have lived up to their oath of
office to the board in contributing to my
board's role in labour relations.

Strongly
Agree

42 ... My board has dealt effectively with the
issue of conflict of interest as it relates to
elected and ex-officio board members with
respect to matters of administering
collective agreements.
43 ... My board has employed a personnel or
labour relations committee from which
some board members are excluded on the
basis of their perceived or real conflict of
interest.
44 ...Student board members should play a
full part in decision-making on labour
relations issues.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
~gree
5
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45 ... Student members on my board do play
a full part in decision-making on labour
relations issues.

46 .. .Elected employee members and exofficio members should be disqualified
from simultaneously holding office in their
respective trade unions.

Section 4 : Board effectiveness in the sharing of power

4 7 .. .The undernoted themes can be
considered to contribute to a board's
effectiveness in dealing with the sharing of
power in a shared governance model.
Please indicate the degree to which these
themes contribute to your board's success:
(a) ... A climate of trust among all board
members;
(b ) ... Equal contribution by all board
members;
(c) .. .Independence of all board members
from their constituency;
(d) ... Board members not bringing vested
interests to the board table;
(e) ... Management/labour relations not
infiltrating the board culture; and
(f) ... Other themes (please list).

NonExistence

Strong
E · tence

Appendix B

Sections : Board effectiveness in shared decision-making
48 .. .The undernoted themes can be
considered to contribute to a board's
effectiveness in ensuring appropriate
shared decision-making process. Please
indicate the degree to which these themes
contribute to your own board' s success:
(a) ... Clear rules of boardsmanship,
consistently applied;
(b ) ... Accountability for board decisionmaking;
(c) ... Meeting obligations of the College and
Institute Act;
(d) ... Coping with the tendency toward
centralized (provincial) decision-making;
(e) ... No bias shown by employee board
members in dealing with budget issues and
distribution of resources;
(f) ... No bias shown by student board
members in dealing with budget issues and
distribution of resources;
(g) ... Understanding the distinction between
leadership and management and
acknowledging the roles of the board and
administration;
(h) ... The college having a history of
informal shared governance, therefore, the
introduction of legislated shared decisionmaking was not difficult; and
(i) ...Other themes (pleasy list).
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Section 6: Board effectiveness in dealing with the real or 12erceived conflict of interest of
em12loyee and student board members
49 ... The under noted themes can be
considered to contribute to a board' s
effectiveness in dealing with the real or
perceived conflict of interest of employee
and student board members in a shared
governance model. Please indicate the
degree to which these themes contribute to
your board' s success:

NonExistence

Strong
Existence

(a) ... A clearly understood and accepted
bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest
having been developed by the board;

1

2

3

4

5

(b) ... Elected board members as membersat-large and not representing their
constituencies;

1

2

3

4

5

(c) ...The oath of office, sworn by each
member, preventing management/ labour
problems among board members;

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

(e) ... The president being able to make a full
contribution to board affairs;

1

2

3

4

5

(f) ...The education council chair being able
to make a full contribution to board affairs;
and

1

2

3

4

5

---------------------------------------------------

I

2

3

4

5

---------------------------------------------------

1

2

3

4

5

(d) ... A personnel or labour relations
committee, with restricted membership,
preventing management/labour problems
among board members;
I':

(g) ... Other themes (please list).
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PERSONAL PARAMETERS
(OF PARTICIPANTS)

Status of board membership

Check Where Applicable

Appointed

_____

Elected - Faculty________________________________________
- Support Staff

_____

- Student

_____

President
Chair of Education Council

Name of Institution
Number o f Years on Board of Current Institution

IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR THE PARTICIPANT :
Details concerning your status and the name of your institution are crucial to this study
because two of the main focuses are to look at comparisons between members of different
status and between institutions. The researcher is aware that there is only one faculty
member, one support staff, one president, and one education council chair on each board
and by giving the above information your identity may be revealed. However, the
researcher undertakes to all participants to maintain complete anonymity o f person and
institution in the study findings, dissertation, and any other paper or presentation resulting
from the study. For more information on this issue, please refer to the Consent to Act as a
Research Subject form or contact the researcher, Edwin Deas, at [250J-758-3853 or
[250J-755-8730 or his dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, at [619]-594-3071.
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UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
CONSENT TO ACT AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT

Edwin Deas, a doctoral student in the School o f Education at the University of
San Diego, is conducting a research study of shared governance in the British Columbia
post-education system. The purpose o f this study is to examine three aspects of
leadership through shared governance, namely the sharing of power, the quality of the
shared decision-making process, and the dealing with real or perceived conflict of interest
on account of the employment or student status of some of the board members. These
aspects of leadership will be studied in three particular contexts; board decision-making
in general matters o f business, in financial matters, and in the field of labour relations.
The impact of the change in membership of the boards as a result o f the legislative
amendment. Bill 22, will be ascertained through the views and experiences of board
members. The researcher will seek to find if differences emerge among colleges and
board members, the latter according to their status. Finally, the results of the study will
be compared with a similar study conducted by the researcher in early 1996 to see if the
passage of time since Bill 22 has changed board members’ views.
As a participant in this study, I understand that I will be completing a survey
questionnaire containing forty nine questions. The duration of the exercise for me should
be between thirty and forty five minutes and only one such exercise will be required of
me. Participation will not involve any added risks or discomforts to me other than the
commitment of time. I can benefit from the opportunity to be part of the study by
contributing what I have learned during my tenure as a board member and by receiving
the analysis of the data collected from around the province which may assist my
boardsmanship in the future.
My participation in this study is totally voluntary and I understand my choice to
participate is completely unrelated to my status as a board member and, where applicable,
to my status as an employee or student o f a college or institute included in this study.
Further, I understand that I may refuse to participate by simply not completing the
questionnaire and I may withdraw at any time without jeopardy by inform in g the
researcher, whereupon my questionnaire and all data from it will be removed from the
study and destroyed.
I understand that my questionnaire will be kept completely confidential and all
data derived from it will not reveal my name or that of my institution or any other
information that would purport to be attributable to me personally. All questionnaires
will be destroyed at the conclusion o f the study. I acknowledge that my identity may be
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known to the researcher and accept his assurance that I shall enjoy complete anonymity in
all reports of this study. [N.B. In the case o f elected employee and student members and
ex-officio members of the Malaspina University-College board, special arrangements will
be made so that even their identity is not revealed to the researcher.]
Further information on this study, or on any aspect of participation in it, will
readily be made available by Edwin Deas at his home ([250]-758-3853) or office ([250]755-8730), or by his dissertation director, Dr. William E. Piland, Professor of Education.
San Diego State University ([619]-594-3071 ).
There are no other agreements, written or verbal, related to this study beyond that
expressed on this consent form, and I have received a copy of this consent document.
I, the undersigned, understand the above explanations and, on that basis, I give
consent to my voluntary participation in this research.

Signature of Subject

Date

Signature of Researcher
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October 14, 1997

«FirstName» «LastName»
«Address1»
«Address2»
«City», «State»
«PostalCode»
Dear «FirstName» «LastName»:
In September 1997, I wrote to you to invite you to participate in my research
study on shared governance in the British Columbia post-secondary system. In
addition to my position as Vice President and Bursar of Malaspina University
College, I am a doctoral student at the University of San Diego and this study will
form the basis of my dissertation. It is my hope that this study will not only
provide the basis for the completion of my degree but will also contribute to the
body of knowledge which will assist governance in particular, and post
secondary education in general, areas in which we share a common interest.
Because of the nature of the study process, I have no way of knowing whether or
not you have participated. However, if you have participated I would like to thank
you sincerely for taking the trouble. If you have not yet done so, for whatever
reason, I would like to ask you one more time to consider volunteering. Your
views and knowledge of shared governance are important and can contribute to
the richness of the study. Participation is entirely voluntary but I hope you will
give it serious consideration. Should you wish to discuss the study or need
another consent form and questionnaire, please contact me at my home ([250]758-3853) or office ([250]-755-8730).
Completed consent forms and questionnaires should be returned in the envelope
provided no later than O ctober 31,1997. Thank you very much.
Yours sincerely,

Edwin Deas
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Memo
To:

Board Chairs and College & Institute Presidents(as noted below)

From : Edwin Deas, Vice-President Administration
D ate:

March 20,1998

Ra:

Research Study of Shared Governance in the BC Post-Secondary Education System

I want to take the opportunity to provide a progress report on my study and with it extend thanks to all
those board members who have participated to date. As of October 31, 1997, the original deadline,
questionnaire returns have been received from the undemoted institutions:
Name of College/Institute

Number of Returns

Camosun College

4

Capilano College

1

College of New Caledonia

5

College of the Rockies

1

Douglas College

6

Emily Carr

3

Kwantlen University-College

4

Langara College

4

Malaspina University-College

7

North Island College

3

Northern Lights College

5

Northwest Community College

5

Okanagan University College

7

Selkirk Community College

6

University College of the Cariboo

7

University College of the Fraser Valley

2

Vancouver Community College

3

Unspecified

J.

TOTAL

74
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Naturally, I am a little concerned about the number of returns at this stage which amounts to
approximately 28% of the total board member population. The overall richness of the study will be
enhanced by greater participation. In addition, the diversity of analysis by institution and constituency
membership will also be enhanced and more meaningful through larger numbers.

To that end, I would like to request that you emphasize the importance of participation to the
members of your board, and encourage those who have not already done so to complete and submit a
questionnaire. In the event that a board member needs a questionnaire, the quickest approach would
be to call me at 250-755-8730 (office) or 250-758-3853 (home). We are now facing the possibility of a
postal strike in the coming days; therefore, I would suggest that completed questionnaires and consent
forms should be sent by fax transmission to 250-741-2730. In order to encourage further participation,
the deadline for submissions has been extended to November 30,1997.

Thank you for your assistance.

ED/dvb
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Constituency Group

Potential Count

Actual Count

Percentage Distribution
of Actual Count

Actual Count as Percentage
of Potential Count

Appointees

153

Elected Faculty

17

7

7

42

Elected Staff

17

8

8

48

Elected Students

34

6

6

Presidents

17

Council Chairs

17

All

255

59

13
9

102

58%

39%

18

12

77

9

53

100%

40%

Appendix F
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Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by Constituency Group

College
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
0
P
Q
ALL

Potential Count
16
13
16
16
15
15
15
16
15
13
14
15
16
15
16
14
15
255

Actual Count
5
3
5
8
5
4
5
6
10
5
6
7
11
8
7
3
4
102

Percentage Distribution
of Actual Count
5%
3
5
8
5
4
5
6
9
5
6
7
10
8
7
3
4
100%

Actual Count as Percentage
of Potential Count
31%
23
31
50
33
27
33
38
67
38
43
47
69
53
44
21
27
40%

Appendix G
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Summary of Questionnaire Returns, by College (A to Q)

342

Experience

Count

Percentage-Frequency Distribution

Less than two years*

26

27%

Between two and three years

20

20

Between three and four years

18

18

Between four and five years

12

12

Between five and six years

19

19

Greater than six years

4

4

99'

100%

Total

Mean

2.909 years

Standard Deviation

1.610

Appendix H

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary of Board Experience, by Years and Percentage-Frequency Distribution

Notes:
1. Not all participants responded to this question.
2. Slight ambiguity in the questions precludes differentiation between one and two years.
343

Grand
Statement1
Mean
General M atters of Board Business: Sharing of Power
1
2
3
4
5
6
7a
7b
8a
8b

My board has established a climate of trust
among all members (irrespective of the
constituency they come from).
Board members may bring different values and
expertise but all generally contribute equally to
the functioning of the board.
Board members view themselves as equals.
The six year term for appointed board members
is appropriate.
The three year term for elected (employee)
board members is appropriate.
The one year term for student board members is
appropriate.
The remuneration for appointed board members
is appropriate.
The remuneration for student board members is
appropriate.
Faculty and support staff members and the
chairs of the education council should be
remunerated by way of a stipend.
Faculty and support staff members and chairs of
the education council should be remunerated by
way of release time.

SD2

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

Agree

Strongly
Agree

3.730

1.004

2%

10%

25%

39%

24%

3.406

1.124

4%

21%

24%

33%

18%

3.644
3.574

1.054
1.306

2%

23%

12%

15%
8%

20%

37%
31%

23%
29%

3.784

1.087

6%

6%

19%

43%

26%

3.520

1.210

7%

16%

18%

36%

23%

3.050

1.366

19%

17%

20%

28%

16%

3.263

1.290

14%

14%

23%

31%

18%

2.772

1.513

30%

19%

12%

22%

17%

3.521

1.451

17%

7%

18%

24%

34%

Appendix I
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Summary of Data by Decision-Making Context,
Aspect of Leadership and Percentage-Frequency Distribution

22

All members of my board have equal
independence and disinterest when it comes to
dealing with budget issues.

3.146

1.187

9%

21%

30%

25%

15%

23

Elected and ex-officio board members have an
inevitable vested interest when dealing with
budget issues.

3.604

1.011

2%

15%

22%

43%

18%

33

The composition of the board has made it more
difficult to balance the budget in these tight
financial times.

2.224

1.145

31%

38%

14%

13%

4%

Board Labour Relations Matters: Sharing of Power
34

Shared governance as a broad goal is difficult to
achieve in a unionized environment.

2.627

1.342

24%

29%

17%

18%

12%

35

Labour relations, in particular the negotiation
and administering of collective agreements, has
caused division among the members of my
board.

2.376

1.190

26%

36%

19%

12%

7%

44

Student board members should play a full part in
decision-making on labour relations issues.

3.653

1.204

8%

9%

21%

34%

28%

45

Student members on my board do play a full
part in decision-making on labour relations
issues.

3.626

1.282

9%

10%

22%

26%

33%

19%

34%

32%

Appendix I
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Board Financial Matters: Sharing of Power

General M atters of Board Business: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Ma dug Process
9

The composition of my board makes an
effective contribution to the governance of the
institution.

3.782

1.145

5%

10%

345

The way my board operates makes an effective
contribution to the governance of the institution.

3.735

1.014

2%

9%

29%

33%

27%

11

The conduct of my board represents good
boardsmanship.

3.743

0.997

2%

7%

32%

32%

27%

12

My board has managed to make some difficult
decisions in the last two years.

4.141

0.926

0%

9%

9%

40%

42%

13

My board is accountable for its decisions to the
internal and external communities.

4.049

0.999

1%

10%

12%

38%

39%

14

I feel my board is fulfilling its obligations under
the College and Institute Act.

4.137

0.955

2%

4%

16%

35%

43%

15

I feel the powers of the board are being
diminished as more decisions are being
centralized at the provincial level.

3.696

1.097

4%

9%

29%

29%

29%

Board Financial Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
24 I feel that elected and ex-officio members have

3.594

1.168

7%

11%

22%

36%

24%

generally NOT shown bias towards their own
department, area, or constituency (trade or
student union) when dealing with budget issues.

25

I feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal
responsibilities under the College and Institute
Act.

4.200

0.910

1%

5%

12%

37%

45%

26

My board discharges its fiduciary responsibility
to all students from whom it collects student
union fees when dealing with that organization.

3.938

0.938

2%

3%

25 %

39%

31%

30

The board’s role is to approve the parameters
and underlying assumptions of the budget, but
otherwise to leave the assembly of the numbers
to administration.

4.020

1.157

5%

9%

9%

34%

43%

Appendix I
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10

346

My board ensures that all stakeholder groups
have advisory input into the budget process.

3.762

1.167

32

I feel that all stakeholder groups are adequately
informed about financial matters.

3.755

1.085

1

5%

12%

17%

34%

32%

4%

11%

18%

41%

26%

Board Labour Relations Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
36

Labour relations has become a centralized
provincial issue, hence my board has not
experienced any difficulties in decision-making
due to the presence of elected and ex-officio
members.

2.980

1.101

9%

27%

28%

29%

7%

37

I feel my board effectively discharges its labour
relations responsibilities under the College and
Institute Act.

4.059

0.830

1%

3%

17%

48%

31%

38

I feel my board would have generally adopted a
different direction in labour relations over the
last two years if the board did not include
elected and ex-officio members.

2.307

1.129

28%

34%

21%

13%

4%

39

I feel my board would have generally adopted a
different direction in labour relations over the
last two years if provincial centralization had not
taken place.

3.052

1.084

9%

23%

27%

36%

5%

40

I feel my board would have generally adopted a
different direction in labour relations over the
last two years if the board did not include
elected and ex-officio members and if provincial
centralization had not taken place.

2.724

1.091

15%

29%

26 %

28%

2%

Appendix I
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31

347

16

The president should be a non-voting ex-officio
member of the board.

4.188

1.255

8%

6%

5%

22%

59%

17

The president should be a full voting member of
the board.

1.755

1.278

65%

17%

4%

5%

9%

18

The chair of education council should be a non
voting ex-officio member of the board.

3.578

1.595

19%

11%

6%

20%

44%

19

The chair of education council should be a full
voting member of the board.

2.485

1.610

42%

19%

7%

11%

21%

20

The bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest
adopted at my institution is generally accepted
by all board members as fair and workable.

3.853

1.075

4%

10%

13%

44%

29%

21

Conflict of interest has not been a problem with
my board.

3.424

1.348

10%

20%

14%

29%

27%

Board Financial Matters: How Conflict of Interest has >een Addressed
My board has dealt effectively with the issue of
conflict of interest as it relates to student board
members with respect to financial matters
between the board and the student union, such
as tuition and other fees.

3.887

0.988

2%

5%

27%

34%

32%

28

The College and Institute Act provision that
students may vote on proposed tuition fee
increases is appropriate.

3.188

1.369

17%

15%

21%

27%

20%

29

Elected student board members should be
disqualified from simultaneously holding office
in their respective student unions because of the
perceived conflict of interest on financial
matters.

2.810

1.390

20%

30%

16%

17%

17%

348

27

Appendix I
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General M atters of Board Business: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed

41

The elected and ex-officio board members have
lived upto their oath of office in contributing to
my board’s role in labour relations.

4.102

0.891

42

My board has dealt effectively with the issue of
conflict of interest as it relates to elected and exofficio board members with respect to matters of
administering collective agreements.

3.900

43

My board has employed a personnel or labour
relations committee from which some board
members are excluded on the basis of their
perceived or real conflict of interest.

46

Elected employee members and ex-officio
members should be disqualified from
simultaneously holding office in their respective
trade unions.

|

0%

6%

16%

39%

39%

1.096

4%

10%

11%

42%

33%

2.753

1.554

29%

25%

10%

14%

22%

3.109

1.523

19%

25%

12%

16%

28%
Appendix I
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Board L abour Relations Matters: How Conflict of Interest bas been Addressed

Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (See Appendix B).
2. Standard Deviation from the Mean.

349

Statement1

Grand
Mean

Minimal
Existence

Moderate
Existence

Strong
Existence

8

^ on

3.911

0.918 *

1%

8%

17%

47%

27%

3.455
3.290

1.188
1.076

7%
6%

17%
17%

20%

20%

31%

36%
34%

3.416

1.013

5%

12%

32%

39%

12%

3.400

0.955 |

3%

15%

34%

35%

13%

3.869

1.007

1%

11%

18%

40%

30%

3.960
4.172

0.947
0.833

1%

9%
3%

13%

47%
46%

30%
38%

SD2

| Existence

Neutral

Sharing of Power
47

47
47
47
47

The undemoted themes can be considered to
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in the
sharing of power in a shared governance model:
(a)--A climate of trust among all board
members.
(b)--Equal contribution by all board members.
(c)--Independence of all board members from
their constituency.
(d)—Board members not bringing vested interest
to the board table.
(e)~Management/labour relations not
infiltrating the board culture.

12%

Appendix J
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Summary of the Assessment of Own Boards’ Effectiveness
in Aspects of Leadership and Percentage-Frequency Distribution

Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
48

48
48

The undemoted themes can be considered to
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in the
shared decision-making process in a shared
governance model:
(a)~Clear rules of boardsmanship, consistently
applied.
(b)--Accountability for board decision-making.

1%

12%

350

(c)~Meeting obligations of the College and
Institute Act.

(d)-Coping with the tendency toward
centralized (provincial) decision-making.

3.510

0.846

1%

11%

34%

45%

9%

48

(e)-N o bias shown by employee board members
in dealing with budget issues and distribution of
resources.

3.825

0.990

2%

8%

22%

41%

27%

48

(f)--No bias shown by student board members in
dealing with budget issues and distribution of
resources.

3.546

0.990

2%

13%

29%

39%

17%

48

(g)--Understanding the distinction between
leadership and management and acknowledging
the roles of the board and administration.

3.714

1.112

3%

13%

21%

34%

29%

48

(h)--The college having a history of informal
shared governance, therefore, the introduction of
legislated shared decision-making was not
difficult.

3.344

1.034

3%

18%

35%

29%

15%

3.889

1.203 I

7%

8%

11%

36%

38%

How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
49

The undemoted themes can be considered to
contribute to a board’s effectiveness in dealing
with real or perceived conflict of interest of
employee and student board members in a
shared governance model:

Appendix J
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48

(a)~A clearly understood and accepted bylaw
and/or policy on conflict of interest having been
developed by the board.

49

(b)--Elected board members as members-atlarge and not representing their constituencies.

3.500

1.133

6%

14%

22%

40%

18%

49

(c)--The oath of office, sworn by each member,
preventing management/labour problems among
board members.

3.582

1.121 |

8%

5%

28%

39%

20%
co

oi

(d)--A personnel or labour relations committee,
with restricted membership, preventing
management/labour problems among board
members

2.570

1.355

32%

14%

29%

14%

11%

49

(e)-The president being able to make a full
contribution to board affairs.

4.323

0.967

1%

7%

8%

26%

58%

49

(O-The education council chair being able to
make a full contribution to board affairs.

4.162

0.987

0%

9%

14%

28%

49%

Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (See Appendix B).
2. Standard Deviation from the Mean.
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49

352

an d Aspect o f Leadership

(ie n e r a l M a tte rs o f B o a rd Business; S h a rin g o f P ow er

1

i

3
4
5
6
7a
7b
8a

8b

Elected

Elected

Elected

S ta te m e n t1

V u lu e

A ppointees

F aculty

s ta rr

Students

Presidents

C hairs

My board has established a climate ol'misl
among all members (irrespcctite ol the
constituency they eoine from)
Board members may bring different values
and expertise but all generally contribute
equally to the timclinning ol the boaul
Board members view Ihcmsclvcs as
equals.

M e an '

3.746

3.571

3 875

4.000

3 333

4.000

3.730

SD'

0.975

1.512

0 641

1.095

1.073

0.926

1.004

M ean

3.569

2.857

3.750

3.500

3.406

1.078

1.215

0707

1.378

2692
1.109

3 444

sn

1.236

1.124

M ean

3.759

2.857

4.000

3.500

3.385

3 667

3 644

SD

0.961

1.574

0.926

1.225

0961

1.225

1.054

The six year term lor appointed board
members is appropriate.

M ean

3.741

3.429

3 250

2.833

3.385

3.667

3.574

SD

1 319

1.272

1.389

1.109

1.446

1.118

1 306

Ihe three year term lor elected (employed
board members is appropriate.

Mean

3.610

4 000

4 375

4.107

3.692

4 111

3.784

SD

1.204

1.000

0.744

0.408

0.947

0.947

1.087

The one year term for student board
members is appropriate.

M ean

3.439

3.286

3.500

3.167

3.615

4.333

3.520

SD

1 225

1.380

0 535

1.835

1.044

1 118

1.210

nte remuneration for appointed board
members is appropriate.

Mean

2.845

3.000

4 125

4.000

3000

2.875

3.0 50

SD

1.399

1.155

0.835

1.265

1.291

1.458

1.366

The remuneration lor student board
members is appropriate.

M ean
SD

2 981

3.000

4.000

4.000

3 385

4000

3.263

1.339

1.155

0.926

1.265

1.121

1.155

1.290

Faculty and support stafT members and the
chairs of the education council should be
remunerated by way ol a stipend
Faculty and support staff' members and
chairs of the education council should be
remunerated by wav ol release time

M ean

2.759

3.400

3.000

4.000

2.077

2.429

2.772

SD

1.413

1.817

1 732

1.095

1.441

1.902

1.513

M ean

3.569*

3.800

4 571*

3.500

1.833*

4625*

3.521

SD

1.339

1.789

0.787

1.517

1.1 )5

0.744

1.451

C ouncil
T u ta l

P6720

.1081

.2710
.5911
.3292
.3999
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S um m ary o f D a ta liy C on stituen t C ro u p , D ccision -M u Lin g C o n tex t,

.0927
.0753
1487

.0001

353

22

23

33

All members of my board have equal
independence and disinterest when il
coincs lo dealing with budget issues.

Mean

3.161

3.429

3.571

3.400

2.538

3.250

3.146

SD

1.203

0.787

0.787

1.673

1.330

1.035

1.187

Elected and cx-ufficio board members
have an inevitable vested interest when
dealing with budget issues

Mean

3.672

3 286

3 875

3.500

3.767

3.000

3 604

SD

1.033

1.380

0.835

0837

0.927

0.866

1 011

The composition of the board has made it
more difficult to balance the budget in
these light financial limes.

Mean

2.121

1 857

2.125

1 667

3.231

2.167

2.224

SD

1 109

1.069

0 641

0 516

1.481

0.753

1.145

.4229

.4024

.0218

Board L a b o u r R elation s M a tte rs : S h a rin g o f Pow er

34

35

44

45

Shared governance as a broad goal is
difficult lo achieve in a unionised
environment.

Mean

2 .5 08*

1.714*

2.375

2.833

3.846*

2.444

2.627

SD

1.251

1.254

0.916

1.472

1.214

1.590

1.342

Labour relations, in particular the
negotiation and administering of collective
agreements, has caused division among the
members of my board.

Mean

2.322

2.143

1.750

2.667

3 077

2.250

2.376

SD

1 121

1.345

0463

1 506

1 44!

1.165

1.190

Student board members should play a full
pan in decision-making on labour relations
issues.

Meun

3.610

4.000

2.875

5.000

3.769

3.444

3.653

SD

1.160

1.414

1 642

0

1.013

1.014

1.204

Student members on nty board do play a
full pan in decision-making on labour
relattuns issues.

Mean

3.759

4.200

3 846

3.000

3.626

1.218

3.286
1.890

2.875

SD

1.356

1.304

1.068

I 195

1.282

00 78

.1809
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Board F in a n c ia l M a tte rs : S h a rin g o f P ow er

.0541

.2093

G eneral M a tte rs o f B o a rd Business: Effectiveness o f the S hared O ccisio n-M akin g Process

9

The composition of my board makes an
effective contribution to the governance of
the institution.

Mean

3.898

3 286

3.750

4 .8 33*

2.917*

3.889

3.782

SD

1.109

1.380

1.282

0.408

0.996

0.928

1.145

.0130

354

11
12
13
14
IS

The way iny board operates makes an
effective contribution to the governance ol'
the institution.

Mcutt

3.966

2.857

3.625

4 333

3.077

3.556

3.735

SD

0928

1.069

1.061

0516

0862

1 236

1.014

The conduct o f my board represents good
bourdsmanship.

Mean

3.845

3.571

3.875

4.500

3 154

3.444

3.743

SD

0.933

1.512

0.991

0.548

0.801

1.130

0997

My board has managed to make some
difficult decisions in the last two years.

Mean

4 .3 2 2 ’

4 286

4.250

4.800

3 .3 0 8 ’

3.429

4.141

SD

0.8 40

0.488

0.707

0.447

1.032

1.134

0926

My board is accountable for its decisions
lo the internal and external communities

Mean

4 .2 8 8 *

3 571

3.875

4.667

3 .2 3 1 ’

3.778

4 049

SD

0.720

1.512

1 126

0 816

1.031

1 394

0.990

1 feel my board is fulfillin g its obligations
under the College and Institute Act.

M ean

4 .4 0 7 ’

3.429

4.125

4.833*

3.308*

3.667

4.137

SD

0.673

1.397

1.126

0.408

0.947

1.225

0955

1 feel the powers o f the board are being
diminished as more decisions arc being
cenlraliaed at the provincial level.

Mean

3.729

3.429

3.875

3.500

4077

3.111

3 696

SD

1.096

0.535

0 991

1.225

1.0.18

1.453

1.097

.0043

.0777
.0007
0031
.0001
4223

B oard F in a n c ia l M a tte r s : Effectiveness o f the S h ared D e c is io n -M a k in g Process

24

25

26

30

1 feel that elected and ex-officio members
have generally NOT shown bias towards
tlicir own department, area, or
constituency (trade ur student union) when
dealing with budget issues.

Mean

3.483

4.429

4 250

3.500

2.923

4.111

3 594

SD

1.143

0 535

0463

1.975

1 188

0.782

1.168

1 1'eel my board effectively discharges its
fiscal responsibilities under the College
and Institute Act.

M ean

4.404

4 429

4 375

3.667

3 769

3.556

4.200

SD

0.753

0 535

1.061

1.033

1.092

1.130

0.910

My board discharges its fiduciary
responsibility to all students from whom it
collects sludcnt union fees when dealing
with that organisation

M ean

4.073

4.000

4.000

3.000

3.692

3.889

3.938

SD

0836

1.265

0.756

1.581

1.032

0.782

0.938

The board's role is to approve the
parameters and underlying assumptions o f
the budget, but otherwise to leave the
assembly o f the numbers to administration.

Mean

4.103

3.714

4.250

3.500

4.385

3.333

4.020

SD

1.103

1.113

0.707

1 643

0870

1.658

1.157

0222
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10

.0190

.2122

.2384

co
Ol
Ol

32

My board ensures that all stakeholder
groups have advisory input into the budget
process

M ean
SD

3.966

3.571

3.571

3.500

3.923

2.667

3.762

1.082

0.976

1.272

1.643

0.954

1.323

1.167

1 feel that all stakeholder groups are
adequately informed about financial
matters

M ean

3 814

3.714

3 875

3.167

4.308

2.889

3.755

SD

I.0S8

1.254

0.835

1.329

0.751

1.167

1.085

.0542

.0439

B oard L a b o u r R ela tio n s M a tte rs : Effectiveness o f the S hared D ecisio n -M a kin g Process

Labour relations has become a centralized
provincial issue, hence my board has not
experienced any difficulties in decision
making due 10 the presence ol'elected and
ex-oltlcio members.

Mean

3 052

3 286

2.857

3.000

2.385

3 222

2 980

SD

1.083

1 496

0.900

0.894

1.121

1 093

1.101

1 Icel my board elTeclively discharges its
labour relations responsibilities under the
College and Institute Act.

M ean

4 288

3.857

3 875

4.000

3 538

3 667

4 059

SD

0 671

1.069

0.991

0.894

0.907

0.86b

0.830

38

1 feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two years i f Ihc
board did not include elected and exofficio members.

Mean
SD

2 .0 00*
1.000

2.000
1.414

3.250
0 .8 86

2.400
1.673

2.462
0.967

3.444*
0 726

2.307
1.129

.0007

39

1 feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two yean i f
provincial centralization had not taken
place.

M ean

2.930

1.857*

3.143

3.200

3.615*

3.875*

3.052

.0 0 2 3 '

SD

1.015

1.069

0 .9 00

1.789

0.768

0 641

1.084

1 feel my board would have generally
adopted a different direction in labour
relations over the last two yean i f the
board did not include elected and exofficio memben and i f provincial
centralization had not taken place.

Meun

2.500

1.714*

3.125

2.800

3.4 62*

3.444*

2.724

SD

1.009

0 951

0 99|

1.483

0967

0.726

1.091

36

37

40

4081

.0251
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31

.0 0 0 9 '

356

16

17

18

19
20

21

The president should be a non-voting exofficio member o f the board.

Mean

4.186

4.500

4.375

4 167

3.692

4.55b

4.188

SD

1.196

0.548

1.408

1.602

1.750

0.726

1.255

The president should be a full voting
member o f the board.

Mean

1.864

1.143

1.625

1.667

2.000

1.337

1.755

SD

1.332

0 378

1.408

1 633

1.414

0.707

1.278

The chair o f education council should be a
non-voting cx-oflicio member o f the
Ixiard

Mean

3.814

3 286

3.125

3.167

3615

2.889

3 578

SD

1.444

1.890

1.642

2.041

1.710

1.900

1.595

The chair o f education council should be a
lull volmg member o f the hoard

Mean

2.293

2.857

2.875

2.833

2.077

3.414

2.485

SD

1.449

1.773

1 642

2.041

1 553

1.878

1 610

(he bylaw and/or policy on conflict o f
interest adopted at my institution is
generally accepted by all board members
as fair and workable

M ean

4.085

3.857

3.750

3.333

3.077

3.889

3.853

SD

1.022

0.690

0.463

1.6.33

1.038

1.269

1.075

Conflict o f interest has not been a problem
with my board.

Mean

3.544

3.571

3.750

2.833

2.769

3.625

3 424

SD

1.324

1.134

0.707

1.722

1.636

1.768

1.348

.6554

.6162
.5216

.3113
0469'

3745

B o a rd F in a n c ia l M u tte rs : H o w C o n flic t o f In terest bus been Addressed

27

28

29

My board has dealt effectively with the
issue o f conflict o f interest as it relates lo
student board members w nh respect to
financial mailcis between the board and
the student union, such as tuition and other
fees.

Mean

4088

3.571

3.375

3.800

3.538

3.857

3.887

SD

0872

1.134

1.061

1.789

0.967

0.900

0.988

The College and Institute Act provision
that students may vote on proposed tuition
fee increases is appropriate.

Mean

3.431*

3 429

2.625

3 667

1.923*

3.444

3.188

SD

1.224

1.272

1.302

2.066

1.038

1.333

1.369

Elected student board members should be
disqualified from simultaneously holding
office in their respective student unions
because o f the perceived conflict o f
interest on financial matters

Mean

2.860

2.286

2.810

1.704

1.833
1 169

2.556

1.329

3.250
1.389

3.231

SD

1.301

1.667

1.390
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(ic n e r a l M u lle n o f H o a rd Business: H o w C o n flic t o f Interest hus been Addressed

2303

0060

.2781

357

41

42

43

46

The clcaed and cx-ollicio board members
have lived uplo iheir oam of office In
contributing lo my board's role in labour
relations.

M ean

4 .1 93*

4.714*

4 250

4.000

3.154*

4.375

4 102

S I)

0.833

0.488

0 707

0.707

0.987

0744

0.891

My board has dealt effectively with the
issue of conllicl of inlcresl as tl relates lo
elected and ex-officio board members with
respect lo mailers of administering
collective agreements.

Mean

4 .1 9 0 *

3.714

4000

3.800

2.846*

3.667

3.900

SD

0868

1 380

0.756

1 304

1.144

1.500

1.096

My hoard has employed u personnel or
labour rclaliuns committee Iroin which
some board members are excluded on the
basis ol'ihcir perceived or real conllicl of
interest.

Mean

2.830

3 333

2 667

3.000

2.154

2.714

2.753

SD

1.541

1.966

1 633

2.309

1.345

1.380

1.554

Elected employee members and cx-officio
members should be disqualified from
simultaneously holding ultice in ilieir
respective trade unions.

Mean

3.203

2.857

2.250

3.200

3.538

2.778

3.109

SD

1.529

1.773

1.282

1.789

1 391

1.563

1.523

.0008

.0033'

7072

.4954
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B oard L a b o u r R elation s M u lle rs : H ow C o n flic t o f In terest has been Addressed

Noies:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (sec Appendix U).
2.

Level o f Significance.

3.

Standard D eviation from the Mean.

4.

I » strongly disagree; 2 = disugree; 3= neutral; 4 » agree; 3 = strongly agree

*>

Indicates significant difference ut the O.S confidence level.

*

Indicates where Scheffc post hoc lest has revealed significant difference at the 0.3 confidence level between pair(s) o f constituent groups.
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Elected

!
V a lu e

.2070

359

48

48

48

48

48

(c)--Mecling obligations o f ihe College
and Institute Act.

M euti

4.328

4 143

4 375

3.750

3 692

3 889

4 172

SD

0.735

0.690

0.518

0.500

1.032

1.269

0833

(d)--Coping wills ihe tendency toward
centralized (provincial) decision-making.

M ean

3.596

3.429

3.286

3.500

3.385

3.375

3.510

SD

0.821

0976

0488

1.000

1.044

0 916

0.846

(c)--No bias shown by employee board
members in dealing with budget issues and
distribution o f resources.

M ean

3.842

4 000

4.250

3.250

3.692

3.625

3.825

SD

1.066

0.577

0.577

1.500

0.947

0.916

0.990

(IV-No bias shown by student board
members in dealing with budget issues and
distribution o f resources.

M ean

3.579

3.429

3.500

3.250

3.462

3.750

3.546

SD

1.017

1.134

0.926

1.500

0.776

1.035

0.990

(gHUndcrsianding the distinction between
leadership and management and
acknowledging the rules o f the board and
administration.

Mean

3.931

3.143

3.875

3.750

3.231

3.250

3.714

SD

1.057

1.215

0.641

0.957

1.013

1.669

1.112

(h)~The college having a history o f
informal shared governance, therefore, the
introduction o f legislated shared decision
making was not difficult

M ean

3429

2.857

3.385

3.500

3.538

2.750

3.344

SD

1.126

1 069

0.744

0.577

0877

0886

1 034

M ean

3.983

3.857

4 000

4 200

3 462

3.667

3.889

SD

1.221

1 464

0.577

0.447

1.266

1.500

1.20.3

M ean

3.526

3.429

3.625

3.800

3.231

3.500

3.500

SD

1.182

1.512

1.061

1.095

1.166

0.535

1.133

1104

.9018

.6148

.9672

1496

4076

H ow C o n flic t o f in terest has been Addressed

49

The undemoted themes con be considered
to contribute to a board's clfccuvencss in
dealing with real or perceived conflict o f
interest o f employee and student board
members in a shared governance model:
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48

.7552

(a)--A clearly understood and accepted
bylaw and/or policy on conflict o f interest
having been developed by the board.
49

(b)-Glectcd board members as mcmbersat-large and not representing their
constituencies.

.9445

360

49

49
49

(O -Tlie oath of office, sworn by each
member, preventing managcincnVlabour
problems among board members.

Mean

3 696

3.429

3 625

3.600

3.385

3.222

3 582

SD

1.043

1.272

1.302

0.894

1.261

1.394

1.121

(dV-A personnel or labour relations
committee, with restricted membership,
preventing management/labour problems
among board members

Mean

2.564

2.857

2.000

3.000

2.538

2.714

2.570

SD

1.371

1.574

1.414

0816

1.450

1.254

1.355

(c)--Thc president being able to make a
full cunlribuiiun to board affairs.

Mean

4.552

3.571

4 500

4 200

3.769

4.125

4 232

SD

0.841

1.618

0.535

0.837

0.927

1.126

0.967

(f)--llic education council chair being able
to make a lull contribution lo board affairs.

Mean

4.310

4.143

4.250

4.000

.3.538

4.125

4.162

SD

0.094

1.069

1.035

0.707

1.050

1.126

0.987

Notes:
1. Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).
2.

Level o f Significance.

3.

Standard D eviatio n from the Mean.

4.

I - strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 =* neutral, 4 = agree; 5 = stronglyagree,

v

Indicates significant dilTcrence at the 0.5 confidence level.

*

Indicates where SchefTe post hoc lest has revealed significant difference at the 0.5 confidence level between pair(s) o f constituent groups.

8484

.8507

.0253
.2434
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05
03

an d Aspect o f Leadership

G e n e ra l M a tte rs o f B o a rd Business: S h arin g o f Pow er
S tatem ent'

V a lu e

A

B

C

1)

E

F

G

II

1

J

K

L

M

N

O

P

1

M e an '

4.600

3.667

3.400

4.571

2.600

3.500

4 600

3.800

3.600

4.200

4.333

4 143

3818

3.750

3.141

2.000

Q
2.250

SD *

0.548

0.577

0894

0.535

0.548

0.577

0.548

0837

0 843

0.837

1.033

1 1169

0.874

0886

0.690

1.000

0.957

1.004

2

M ean

4.2 00

3.333

3.400

3.750

3.000

2.750

4.2 00

2.667

3.222

4.000

4.667

4.000

3.182

3.375

2.857

2.000

2.500

3.406

SD

0837

0.577

1.342

1.165

0.707

1.258

0.8 37

0.816

0.972

1 000

0816

1.155

1.079

0.744

1.215

1.000

1.291

1.124

M ean

4.200

4667

3.200

4.000

3.000

2.7 50

3.800

3.667

3.600

2.800

4 333

4 .0 0 0

3.727

4.143

3.429

2.000

3.500

3644

SD

0.447

0.577

0.837

0.756

0.707

0.5 00

0.447

1.033

1.265

0.837

0816

1.155

0.905

0.900

1.272

1.000

1.915

1.054

M ean

4.400

3.333

4.400

3.500

4200

2.7 50

3.200

3.500

3.500

3.800

4.500

4 143

2.636

3.714

3.429

3 000

3.000

3.574

SD

0.548

1.155

0.548

1.414

1.304

1.258

1.643

1.378

1.354

0837

0548

0.9 00

1.286

1.380

1.813

1.732

1.633
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M e an

3.800

2.667

3.200

2.875

3.200

2.000

3.000

3.667

3 200

2.600

1.833

3.429

4.300

3.000

2.571

3.667

2.750

3.109

SD

1 643

0.577

1.643

1.553

1.304

1.414

1.581

1.506

1.687

1.517

0.753

1.988

1.059

1.512

1.512

1.528

2062

1.523

.3747

Notes:
1.

Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).

2.

Level o f Significance.

3.

Standard D eviatio n from the Mean.

4.

I - strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 - neutral; 4 - agree; 5 = strongly ugrce.

<-

Indicates significant difference at the 0.5 confidence level.

*

Indicates where S chelle post hoc test has revealed significant difference atthe 0.3 confidence level between pair(s) o f colleges.
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4.000

2.500
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3.300
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4.800

4.857

3.400

4.0 00

3 000

3.000
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3.714
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0.837

0.5 77

0894

0.787
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1.155

0.447

0894

1 287

1.225

0.548

1.134

1.000

0.744

0.690

0.577

1.826

0967

Mean

5.000

4.333

4.400

5.000

3.200

3.750

4.600

3.833

3.700

3.600

4 600

4.857

4.000

4.250

3.857

4.667

3.000

4.162

SD

0

0 .5 77

0548

0

1.304

0957

0 548

0.753

1.252

1 140

0.548

0.378

0866

1.165

1.069

0.577

1.155

0.987

1.817

.0001
.6203
.0005
.0007

1.355
.2423
.0033
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48g

Notes:
1.

Statements front the survey questionnaire (sec Appendix B).

2.

Level o f significance.

3.

Standard deviation from the M ean.

4.

I » strongly disagree; 2 - disugree; 3 “ neutral; 4 “ agree; 5 - strongly ugree.
Indicates significant difference at the O.S confidence level.

*

Indicates where Scheffe post hoc test has revealed significant difference utthe O.S confidence level between pair(s) o f colleges.
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General M atters of Board Business: Sharing of Power:
Statem ent1

Mean
Square
7.132
5.415
2.711
1.590
1.837
2.021
0.727
1.277
1.072
2.584
0.898
1.692

F-Test2

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
General M atters of Board Business: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process
9.. .The composition of my board makes an effective contribution to the
governance of the institution.

4.. .The six year term for appointed board members is appropriate.

5.. .The three year term for elected (employee) board members is appropriate.

6.. .The one year term for student board members is appropriate.

Source
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction4
Error
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error

P3

4.486
3.406
1.705

.0355*
.0057*
.1352

1.439
1.583
0.570

.2318
.1666
.7233

0.633
1.527
0.531

.4271
.1831
.7529

0.154
7.550
1.327
1.715

0.090
4.403
0.774

.7648
.0008*
.5696

3.167
1.145
3.251
1.054

3.004
1.086
3.083

.0847
.3697
.0107*
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Summary of Matched Statements in the 1995/96 and 1997/98 Studies,
By Constituent Group

Board L abour Relations M atters: Sharing of Power
34.. .Shared governance as a broad goal is difficult to achieve in a unionized
environment.

369

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error

2.821
1.887
2.349
0.969

2.912
1.948
2.425

.0896
.0883
.0370*

25 .. .1 feel my board effectively discharges its fiscal responsibilities under the

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
26.. .M y board discharges its fiduciary responsibility to all students from
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
whom it collects student union fees when dealing with that organization.
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
30.. .The board’s role is to approve the parameters and underlying
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
assumptions of the budget, but otherwise to leave the assembly of the numbers Constituent Groups
to administration.
Interaction
Error
Board Labour Relations Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision-Making Process

0.413
2.913
1.467
0.743
1.571
3.759
1.122
0.964
0.717
1.884
1.521
0.998

0.556
3.920
1.974

.4569
.0021*
.0845

1.630
3.900
1.164

.2033
.0022*
.3287

0.719
1.889
1.524

.3975
.0982
.1842

37.. .1 feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations responsibilities
under the College and Institute Act.

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
General M atters of Board Business: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed

0.498
3.371
2.050
0.702

0.710
4.803
2.921

.4007
.0004*
.0146*

16.. .The president should be a non-voting ex-officio member of the board.

1.378
1.255
1.146
1.328

1.038
1.021
0.110

.3096
.4066
.9901

College and Institute Act.

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error

370

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
governance of the institution.
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
Board Financial Matters: Effectiveness of the Shared Decision- Making Process
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10.. .The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to the

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
18.. .The chair of education council should be a non-voting ex-officio
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
member of the board.
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
19.. .The chair of education council should be a full voting member of the
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
board.
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
2 0 .. .The bylaw and/or policy on conflict of interest adopted at my institution
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
is generally accepted by all board members as fair and workable.
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
Board Financial M atters: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed
27. . .My board has dealt effectively with the issue of conflict of interest as it
relates to student board members with respect to financial matters between the
board and the student union, such as tuition and other fees.
29. . .Elected student board members should be disqualified from
simultaneously holding office in their respective student unions because of the
perceived conflict of interest on financial matters.

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error

1.037
1.691
0.246
1.295
11.586
1.761
1.947
2.271
10.708
1.700
1.850
2.275
0.062
1.713
1.781
1.097
0.487
0.883
0.968
0.986
0.066
2.660
1.885
1.994

0.801
1.306
0.190

.3719
.2630
.9662

5.102
0.776
0.857

.0250*
.5684
.5109

4.706
0.747
0.813

.0313*
.5890
.5415

0.056
1.562
1.623

.8127
.1730
.1558

0.494
0.896
0.982

.4832
.4851
.4301

0.033
1.334
0.945

.8555
.2516
.4529
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17.. .The president should be a full voting member of the board.

co

4 2 .. .M y board has dealt effectively with the issue of conflict of interest as it
relates to elected and ex-officio board members with respect to matters of
administering collective agreements.

46.. .Elected employee members and ex-officio members should be
disqualified from simultaneously holding office in their respective trade
unions.

1.
2.
3.
4.
0

Statements from the survey questionnaire (see Appendix B).
Ratio o f True to Error Variance based on Mean Square.
Level of Significance.
Interaction between the pre/post test and constituent groups.
Indicates Significant Statistical Difference

1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error
1995/96-1997/98 Studies
Constituent Groups
Interaction
Error

0.061
1.415
2.125
1.056
0.039
3.945
0.252
2.170

0.058
1.340
2.013

.8105

0.018
1.818
0.116

.8929

.2489

.0785

.1110
.9888
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Board Labour Relations M atters: How Conflict of Interest has been Addressed

372

Colleges
Most Positive

Least Positive

(Top Three Institutions)

(Bottom Three Institutions)

Board Members3 Views

11!

2nd

3rd

15“*

16,h

General Matters )
Financial Matters ) Sharing o f Power
Labour Matters )
General Matters ) Effectiveness o f
Financial M atters ) Shared DecisionLabour Matters ) Making Process
General Matters )
Financial M atters) Conflict o f Interest
Labour Matters ) Addressed

K
G
K
G
D

B

G

F

K

L
J

H

P

D

K
G
K

L
H

Q
P

P
B

OVERALL

P

G
K
K
K

P
L

G
N
A

G
G

L
L

Q
E
J
P
I
E

F
E
M
M
F
Q
F

17u,
P
B

I
Q
F
F
Q
Q
H
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Summary of the Most Positive and Least Positive Attitudes1in General
Toward Shared Governance, by College3and Constituent G roup7

Q

Board Members3 Views of Own Board3s Effectiveness
G

D

A

0

F

Q

Effectiveness of Shared-Decision Making
Process

L

G

K

B

F

Q

Conflict of Interest Addressed

A

L

G

M

B

Q

OVERALL
TOTAL OVERALL

G

D

A

H

F

Q

K

G

D

E

F

Q

1.
2.
3.

Attitude is measured by the net aggregate of mean scores on all questions in the survey— See Appendix B. Net aggregate is the sum of all the
positive questions less all the negative questions.
Constituent Group Key: A = Appointees; F = Faculty; SS = Support Staff; S = Students; P = Presidents; C = Education Council Chairs.
The seventeen participating colleges were named A through Q.

373

Sharing of Power

Most Positive

Least Positive

(Top Three Constituent Groups)

(Bottom Three Constituent Groups)
4*

Board Members’ Views

1*«

2nd

3rd

General Matters )
Financial Matters) Sharing o f Power
Labour Matters )
General Matters ) Effectiveness o f
Financial Matters) Shared Decision-

SS
F
S
S
SS
F
A
S
SS

C
S
F
A
F
A
F
C
C
A

S
C
A
SS
A
S
SS
F
A
F

A
F
SS

Labour Matters

) Making Process

General Matters )
Financial Matters) Conflict o f Interest
Labour Matters ) Addressed
OVERALL

s

A
SS
C

c
p
SS

c

5,h

6th

F
A
SS
F
C
P
P
SS

P
P
P
P
S

c
s

s
c

p
p
p

Board Members’ Views of Own Board’s Effectiveness
Sharing of Power

c

S

A

SS

F

p

Effectiveness of Shared-Decision Making
Process

SS

A

F

S

C

p

Conflict of Interest Addressed

SS

A

S

C

F

p

OVERALL

SS

A

S

C

F

p

TOTAL OVERALL

A

SS

S

F

C

p

2.

Attitude is measured by the net aggregate of mean scores on all questions in the survey— See Appendix B. Net aggregate is the sum of all the
positive questions less all the negative questions.
Constituent Group Key: A = Appointees; F = Faculty; SS = Support Staff; S = Students; P = Presidents; C = Education Council Chairs

3.

The seventeen participating colleges were named A through Q.
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1.
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Constituent Groups
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Question 10: The way my board operates makes an effective contribution to the governance
of the institution.

S tr o n g ly
A g re e

4.S

A g re e

>

TJ
73
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Question 37: I feel my board effectively discharges its labour relations responsibilities
under the College and Institute Act.
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